On Dec 4, 2007 11:35 AM, Owen Taylor [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Tue, 2007-12-04 at 14:29 +, Stef Walter wrote:
Dan Winship got me thinking about the unable to verify identify of this
certificate dialogs we see in browsers when using self-signed or
otherwise unverifiable certificates.
On Ter, 2007-12-04 at 16:38 +, Bastien Nocera wrote:
On Tue, 2007-12-04 at 16:28 +, Stef Walter wrote:
Bastien Nocera wrote:
On Mon, 2007-12-03 at 19:47 +, Stef Walter wrote:
However I'm not sure of the correct autovoodoo to remove the soname and
libtool la file. The
On Tue, 2007-12-04 at 12:12 -0500, Adam Schreiber wrote:
Unfortunately, one of the main UI elements that indicate a secure
connection is the https:// URL in the URL bar. Are you proposing to
disguise that as well?
Maybe just not shade it yellow. It will still be running over ssl
like
On Dec 4, 2007 11:35 AM, Owen Taylor [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Tue, 2007-12-04 at 14:29 +, Stef Walter wrote:
Dan Winship got me thinking about the unable to verify identify of this
certificate dialogs we see in browsers when using self-signed or
otherwise unverifiable certificates.
Murray Cumming wrote:
On Tue, 2007-12-04 at 12:12 -0500, Adam Schreiber wrote:
Unfortunately, one of the main UI elements that indicate a secure
connection is the https:// URL in the URL bar. Are you proposing to
disguise that as well?
Maybe just not shade it yellow. It will still be running
On Tue, 2007-12-04 at 17:20 +, Gustavo J. A. M. Carneiro wrote:
On Ter, 2007-12-04 at 16:38 +, Bastien Nocera wrote:
On Tue, 2007-12-04 at 16:28 +, Stef Walter wrote:
Bastien Nocera wrote:
On Mon, 2007-12-03 at 19:47 +, Stef Walter wrote:
However I'm not sure of the
On Tue, 2007-12-04 at 12:38 -0500, Pat Suwalski wrote:
Murray Cumming wrote:
On Tue, 2007-12-04 at 12:12 -0500, Adam Schreiber wrote:
Unfortunately, one of the main UI elements that indicate a secure
connection is the https:// URL in the URL bar. Are you proposing to
disguise that as
Owen Taylor wrote:
If you are connecting on an insecure network (say coffee shop wireless)
then a https connection to an untrusted certificate is a distinctly weak
form of security.
It tells you that you have a encrypted connection to *somebody*.
That is correct, of course. It is, however,
Owen Taylor wrote:
On Tue, 2007-12-04 at 14:29 +, Stef Walter wrote:
Dan Winship got me thinking about the unable to verify identify of this
certificate dialogs we see in browsers when using self-signed or
otherwise unverifiable certificates.
I'd like to propose [1] that we do away with
Adam Schreiber wrote:
On Dec 4, 2007 9:29 AM, Stef Walter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I'd like to propose [1] that we do away with these dialogs in GNOME. In
my opinion if we cannot verify the certificate, then we should simply
not show the UI elements that indicate a secure connection. We should
Owen Taylor wrote:
If you are connecting on an insecure network (say coffee shop wireless)
then a https connection to an untrusted certificate is a distinctly weak
form of security.
It tells you that you have a encrypted connection to *somebody*.
- Owen
(And note that Stef's proposal
On Wed, 2007-12-05 at 00:34 +, Stef Walter wrote:
Owen Taylor wrote:
If you are connecting on an insecure network (say coffee shop wireless)
then a https connection to an untrusted certificate is a distinctly weak
form of security.
It tells you that you have a encrypted connection
dobre večer,
vincent already blogged[1] about Google's Highly Open Participation
Contest[2] (GHOP).
it's a contest similar to summer of code, but for high school students
and with much smaller tasks in any fields (like doc, code, translation,
a11y or whatever). the average amount of time to be
13 matches
Mail list logo
