On 31/01/14 18:28, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
On Fri, January 31, 2014 9:18 am, Alan Braggins wrote:
On 31/01/14 10:24, Julien Pierre wrote:
On 1/27/2014 10:28, Kathleen Wilson wrote:
Draft Design Doc posted by Ryan Sleevi regarding Chrome migrating from
NSS to OpenSSL:
On Mon, 2014-02-03 at 12:13 +, Alan Braggins wrote:
Having support for PKCS#11 tokens at all is a pro, even if one
irrelevant to the vast majority of users.
That gets less true as we start to use PKCS#11 a little more. It isn't
*just* about hardware tokens — things like gnome-keyring
Hi folks,
there is consensus that some algorithms/ciphers (e.g. RC4) allowed by default
should not be considered secure, though because of interop issues, they cannot
be removed at this point.
The problem with this is that people may think they are using a secure
connection while in fact,
On Mon, February 3, 2014 4:30 am, David Woodhouse wrote:
On Mon, 2014-02-03 at 12:13 +, Alan Braggins wrote:
Having support for PKCS#11 tokens at all is a pro, even if one
irrelevant to the vast majority of users.
That gets less true as we start to use PKCS#11 a little more. It
As a non-Firefox/non-HTTP consumer of NSS, I'd like to see an NSS API flag
indicating a cipher suite is retained for backwards compatibility but
considered inferior by cryptographic community standards at the time the
NSS library was built.
A. is unacceptable because it breaks copy/paste of
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