this for
me without worrying about which algorithm(s) the browser supports.
-Justin
On Fri, Apr 20, 2012 at 6:10 AM, David Dahl dd...@mozilla.com wrote:
[Forgot to reply all]
- Forwarded Message -
From: David Dahl dd...@mozilla.com
To: Ehsan Akhgari ehsan.akhg...@gmail.com
Sent
supports.
I imagine we might for the WebAPI, however, for this internal API, I think we
should specify it.
Do you mean s/this/the? If so, I totally agree. If not, I'm
confused, because I thought I was looking at the web api. :)
Thanks, David!
-Justin
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...@mozilla.com wrote:
- Original Message -
From: Justin Lebar justin.le...@gmail.com
To: David Dahl dd...@mozilla.com
Cc: dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org
Sent: Friday, April 20, 2012 6:31:02 PM
Subject: Re: Feedback on DOMCryptInternalAPI
(Not cross-posting to dev-platform per
more information
and look under technical information but I do not see anywhere
details of the key negotiation that was performed at the TLS level.
Justin
On Aug 19, 6:38 pm, Nelson B Bolyard nel...@bolyard.me wrote:
On 2009-08-19 11:30 PDT, Justin wells wrote:
Hi all,
When I visit an HTTPS
that Firefox prints just after
giving the content encryption strength.
Justin
On Aug 20, 6:02 am, Ian G i...@iang.org wrote:
On 19/08/2009 20:30, Justin wells wrote:
Plainly the concern is that 256 bit AES does you no good if they AES
keys were exchanged insecurely. The security of the connection
. But I'm now
lost and can't find how the Master PWD is used to encrypt.
See:
http://mxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/manager/ssl/src/nsSDR.cpp
and
http://mxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11sdr.c
Justin
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dev-tech
(or mozilla.policy.trustanchors),
instead of in the .dev hierarchy.
Justin
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On 1/1/09 6:44 PM, Kyle Hamilton wrote:
If he's a security and user interface expert, why is the security UI
so appallingly *bad*?
*plonk*
Justin
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On 12/23/08 11:27 AM, Kyle Hamilton wrote:
I'd rather deal with disruption caused thereby (and, yes, the user
complaints generated thereby -- at least then the end-user would KNOW
that there's a problem that's being dealt with rather than having a
FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY)
Hmm, would they?
On 12/23/08 12:12 PM, Justin Dolske wrote:
On 12/23/08 11:27 AM, Kyle Hamilton wrote:
I'd rather deal with disruption caused thereby (and, yes, the user
complaints generated thereby -- at least then the end-user would KNOW
that there's a problem that's being dealt with rather than having
On 12/23/08 12:20 PM, Justin Dolske wrote:
That said, the Comodo/Certstar is hugely sucky and I would hope there's
something we can do about it that helps users.
I am just full of fail today: ... the Comodo/Comstar *incident* is
hugely sucky ...
Justin
in Mozilla products without going
through the Mozilla approval process. It seems like a different degree
or trust.
Justin
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Graham Leggett wrote:
...
Quick note: you might look at some of the Weave code, which is using PKCS#5.
http://hg.mozilla.org/labs/weave/file/53e25c0c7e2e/src/WeaveCrypto.cpp#l462
Justin
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-purpose crypto API, as it's tailored for Weave's usecase.
Justin
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is the important issue.
It's unfortunate that it can take so long to process new requests, but
neither should we hastily rush to rubberstamp anyone who knocks on the door.
Justin
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https
Kai Engert wrote:
Ubuntu has apparently chosen to use non-standard library names,
therefore you can't use your binary produced on Ubuntu on a system that
uses standard library names.
Similar problems have bitten Labs' Weave extension. See bugs 442679,
442788, 442257.
Justin
not improve security *immediately*, I don't see why a
gradual transition to stricter requirements is a problem. Are you
suggesting we're stuck with small keys forever, or that all CAs must
switch simultaneously?
Justin
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the issue sooner than desired.
Justin
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/bin/sh: ../../../../dist/SunOS5.9_DBG.OBJ: cannot create
permissions problem?
Go into that directory and try to touch SunOS5.9_DBG.OBJ
Wan-Teh Chang [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
On Thu, Feb 21, 2008 at 4:42 PM, Gatfield, Geoffrey
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
entropy.
Perhaps the entropy gathering in NSS could be simplified now, since
modern Unix (and Windows, I assume) platforms include this as part of
the OS...
Justin
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much more favor providing both the target file and a separate file
containing the hash, as is done on the Mozilla FTP site.
And how do you verify the contents of the hash file? Another hash file? :)
Justin
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is something the user really ought to do themselves.
Justin
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that adding it natively to Mozilla would thus
be a lot of work.
Justin
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