Re: Server Gated Cryptography

2009-01-20 Thread srdavidson
Yes, those browsers allowed SGC/Step-up only for a restricted list of pre-installed root CA certificates. Anyone have a list of the specific roots that are SGC enabled? Many of them must be due for expiry soon. Is the intent to renew/replace them with SGC super-powers, or to let SGC fade

Re: Reassessment of sub-ordinated CA certificates

2008-02-13 Thread srdavidson
Maintenance of the WebTrust seal requires an annual audit. The audit is of compliance with the CPS - so if there are issuing CAs - whether internal or external - covered by the CPS, then they part of those procedures. The same is not true of ETSI - which is a standard not really an audit regime.

Re: Reassessment of sub-ordinated CA certificates

2008-02-11 Thread srdavidson
1. Audit standards (WebTrust and ETSI for example) check that the CA complies with its CPS - and that includes subordinates and external RAs From Webtrust: In the hierarchical model, the root CA maintains the established community of trust by ensuring that each entity in the hierarchy conforms

Re: Reassessment of sub-ordinated CA certificates

2008-02-11 Thread srdavidson
The end result is that anyone who chooses to spend a hundred thousand bucks or so on a single audit can then go around selling the benefit of their inclusion in the trust list to the highest bidder without fear of repercussion. Which is what they've been doing. And nobody has the balls

Re: StartCom Root Certificate Inclusion Request

2007-05-23 Thread srdavidson
This is a broader comment on the Mozilla CA policy. If the desire is to include security reviews that are equivalent to a WebTrust audit, then for reviews against technical standards like ETSI the policy should require annual reviews as well as provide more detail on what comprises a Competent