Re: The Rational Rejection of Security Advice by Users by Cormac Herley

2010-05-21 Thread Matt McCutchen
On May 21, 1:46 am, Kurt Seifried k...@seifried.org wrote: m...@mattmccutchen.net wrote: I'm not claiming that the user knows.  I only said that if there is in fact no impersonation, then the error is a false positive. [...] For you to claim that the browser should be able to determine the

Re: The Rational Rejection of Security Advice by Users by Cormac Herley

2010-05-21 Thread Eddy Nigg
On 05/21/2010 06:12 AM, From Kyle Hamilton: The way that commercial certifying authorities have gone about things thus far is completely antithetical to how business is transacted on the commercial internet. (hint: banks require *two* forms of ID in order to open a bank account, and CAs provide

Re: The Rational Rejection of Security Advice by Users by Cormac Herley

2010-05-21 Thread Eddy Nigg
On 05/21/2010 07:36 AM, From Matt McCutchen: That's not right. We are discussing SSL as a /means/ to prevent impersonation of the site the user wanted to visit. In this context, a false positive is defined as an SSL error when no impersonation is taking place. Oh really? And how do

Re: The Rational Rejection of Security Advice by Users by Cormac Herley

2010-05-21 Thread Eddy Nigg
On 05/21/2010 08:46 AM, From Kurt Seifried: For you to claim that the browser should be able to determine the intent of a self signed and unknown certificate (i.e. is it legitimate, or a man in the middle) without any external help represents a failing is to show a pretty fundamental lack of

Re: The Rational Rejection of Security Advice by Users by Cormac Herley

2010-05-21 Thread Gervase Markham
On 21/05/10 12:11, Eddy Nigg wrote: And your whole arguing starts to become ridiculous. Not at all. He is saying that the browser cannot tell whether a certificate problem is the result of an attack or the result of a misconfiguration. And that's absolutely correct. Isn't it? Otherwise

Re: The Rational Rejection of Security Advice by Users by Cormac Herley

2010-05-21 Thread Gervase Markham
On 21/05/10 05:36, Matt McCutchen wrote: I'm not claiming that the user knows. I only said that if there is in fact no impersonation, then the error is a false positive. This seems a fine definition to me. If the browser says OMG - someone might be trying to MITM you, and no-one is, that's

Re: The Rational Rejection of Security Advice by Users by Cormac Herley

2010-05-21 Thread Marsh Ray
On 5/21/2010 9:51 AM, Gervase Markham wrote: Otherwise we'd just not put up errors for the misconfigurations, only for the attacks :-) Is there an open bug for support of RFC 3514? http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3514 - Marsh -- dev-tech-crypto mailing list dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org

Re: The Rational Rejection of Security Advice by Users by Cormac Herley

2010-05-21 Thread Robert Relyea
intent of a self signed and unknown certificate (i.e. is it legitimate, or a man in the middle) without any external help represents a failing is to show a pretty fundamental lack of understanding as to how this all works. Once again, I make no such claim. I said that if there is in

Re: The Rational Rejection of Security Advice by Users by Cormac Herley

2010-05-21 Thread Robert Relyea
On 05/21/2010 07:52 AM, Gervase Markham wrote: On 21/05/10 05:36, Matt McCutchen wrote: I'm not claiming that the user knows. I only said that if there is in fact no impersonation, then the error is a false positive. This seems a fine definition to me. If the browser says OMG - someone

Re: The Rational Rejection of Security Advice by Users by Cormac Herley

2010-05-21 Thread Kyle Hamilton
2010/5/21 Robert Relyea rrel...@redhat.com: On 05/21/2010 07:52 AM, Gervase Markham wrote: On 21/05/10 05:36, Matt McCutchen wrote: I'm not claiming that the user knows.  I only said that if there is in fact no impersonation, then the error is a false positive. This seems a fine definition