On Thu, Aug 15, 2013 at 10:15 AM, Chris Richardson ch...@randomnonce.orgwrote:
I believe this plan would have poor side effects. For example, if Apple
ships clients with a broken ECDSA implementation [0], a server cannot
detect detect if a connecting client is an Apple product and avoid the
On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 11:13 AM, Camilo Viecco cvie...@mozilla.com wrote:
Hello Brian
I think this proposal has 3 sections.
1. Unifing SSL behavior on browsers.
2. Altering the criteria for cipher suite selection in Firefox (actually
NSS)
3. removing certain cipher suites from the default
On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 5:58 PM, Wan-Teh Chang w...@google.com wrote:
On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 3:36 PM, Rob Stradling rob.stradl...@comodo.com
wrote:
Wan-Teh, why do you think Firefox should specify a preference for ECDSA
over
RSA?
Because ECDSA is more secure than RSA, and ECC
On Mon, Aug 12, 2013 at 6:52 AM, Gervase Markham g...@mozilla.org wrote:
On 09/08/13 18:12, Brian Smith wrote:
No, each combination is hard-coded into its own distinct code point that
is
registered with IANA:
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