Re: Proposal to Change the Default TLS Ciphersuites Offered by Browsers

2013-09-12 Thread Stefan Arentz
How about mobile?

What about the initial key exchange that SSL/TLS does? I thought that was the 
biggest CPU killer?

 S.

- Original Message -
From: Julien Vehent jul...@linuxwall.info
To: Julien Pierre julien.pie...@oracle.com
Cc: mozilla's crypto code discussion list dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org
Sent: Thursday, September 12, 2013 10:35:06 PM
Subject: Re: Proposal to Change the Default TLS Ciphersuites Offered by Browsers

On 2013-09-12 22:01, Julien Pierre wrote:
 Julien,

 On 9/12/2013 07:06, Julien Vehent wrote:
 If performance was the only reason to prefer AES-128, I would disagree 
 with the proposal. But your other arguments regarding AES-256 not provided 
 additional security, are convincing.

 The performance is still an issue for servers. More servers are needed if
 more CPU-intensive crypto algorithms are used.

aes-256-cbc with AES-NI does 543763.11kB/s. That's 4.35Gbps of AES bandwidth 
on a single core.
On a decent 8 core load balancer, dedicate 4 to TLS, and you get 17.40Gbps 
of AES bandwidth.
I don't this AES is close to being the limiting factor here. Processing HTTP 
is probably 20 times more expensive than that.

Just reinforcing the point that performance is not, in my opinion, an issue. 
The quality of AES-256 is much more relevant here.


---
Julien Vehent
http://jve.linuxwall.info


-- 
dev-tech-crypto mailing list
dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org
https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-tech-crypto
-- 
dev-tech-crypto mailing list
dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org
https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-tech-crypto


Re: Proposal to Change the Default TLS Ciphersuites Offered by Browsers

2013-09-09 Thread Stefan Arentz

On Sep 9, 2013, at 11:16 AM, Gervase Markham g...@mozilla.org wrote:

 On 09/08/13 03:30, Brian Smith wrote:
 Please see https://briansmith.org/browser-ciphersuites-01.html
 
 This proposal promotes ECC.
 
 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-how-to-remain-secure-surveillance
 
 Schneier: Prefer conventional discrete-log-based systems over
 elliptic-curve systems; the latter have constants that the NSA
 influences when they can.
 
 He elaborates in the comments:
 
 I no longer trust the constants. I believe the NSA has manipulated them
 through their relationships with industry.
 
 Does that affect your proposal?

Wasn’t he talking about http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dual_EC_DRBG#Controversy ?

 S.

-- 
dev-tech-crypto mailing list
dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org
https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-tech-crypto