The NSS Development Team is pleased to announce the release of NSS 3.14.3.

The official release notes are available at
https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/NSS/NSS_3.14.3_release_notes ,
and are reproduced at the end of this message.

This release includes mitigations for recently discussed "Lucky Thirteen"
attack (CVE-2013-1620). However, please note the limitations of the
mitigations discussed in the release notes below.



Introduction:

Network Security Services (NSS) 3.14.3 is a patch release for NSS 3.14.
The bug fixes in NSS 3.14.3 are described in the "Bugs Fixed" section
below.

Distribution Information

* The CVS tag is NSS_3_14_3_RTM. NSS 3.14.3 requires NSPR 4.9.5 or newer.
* NSS 3.14.3 source distributions are also available on ftp.mozilla.org
for secure HTTPS download:
  - Source tarballs:
https://ftp.mozilla.org/pub/mozilla.org/security/nss/releases/NSS_3_14_3_RTM/src/

New in NSS 3.14.3

* No new major functionality is introduced in this release. This release
is a patch release to address CVE-2013-1620.

New Functions

* in pk11pub.h
 - PK11_SignWithSymKey - Similar to PK11_Sign, performs a signing
operation in a single operation. However, unlike PK11_Sign, which uses a
SECKEYPrivateKey, PK11_SignWithSymKey performs the signature using a
symmetric key, such as commonly used for generating MACs.

New Types

* CK_NSS_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME_PARAMS - Parameters for use with
CKM_NSS_HMAC_CONSTANT_TIME and CKM_NSS_SSL3_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME.
New PKCS #11 Mechanisms
* CKM_NSS_HMAC_CONSTANT_TIME - Constant-time HMAC operation for use when
verifying a padded, MAC-then-encrypted block of data.
CKM_NSS_SSL3_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME - Constant-time MAC operation for use when
verifying a padded, MAC-then-encrypted block of data using the SSLv3 MAC.

Notable Changes in NSS 3.14.3

* CVE-2013-1620
Recent research by Nadhem AlFardan and Kenny Patterson has highlighted a
weakness in the handling of CBC padding as used in SSL, TLS, and DTLS that
allows an attacker to exploit timing differences in MAC processing. The
details of their research and the attack can be found at
http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/, and has been referred to as "Lucky
Thirteen".

NSS 3.14.3 includes changes to the softoken and ssl libraries to address
and mitigate these attacks, contributed by Adam Langley of Google. This
attack is mitigated when using NSS 3.14.3 with an NSS Cryptographic Module
("softoken") version 3.14.3 or later. However, this attack is only
partially mitigated if NSS 3.14.3 is used with the current FIPS validated
NSS Cryptographic Module, version 3.12.9.1.

* Bug 840714 - "certutil -a" was not correctly producing ASCII output as
requested.
* Bug 837799 - NSS 3.14.2 broke compilation with older versions of sqlite
that lacked the SQLITE_FCNTL_TEMPFILENAME file control. NSS 3.14.3 now
properly compiles when used with older versions of sqlite.

Acknowledgements

* The NSS development team would like to thank Nadhem AlFardan and Kenny
Patterson (Royal Holloway, University of London) for responsibly
disclosing the issue by providing advance copies of their research. In
addition, thanks to Adam Langley (Google) for the development of a
mitigation for the issues raised in the paper, along with Emilia Kasper
and Bodo Möller (Google) for assisting in the review and improvements to
the initial patches.

Bugs fixed in NSS 3.14.3

*
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/buglist.cgi?list_id=5689256;resolution=FIXED;classification=Components;query_format=advanced;target_milestone=3.14.3;product=NSS

Compatibility

* NSS 3.14.3 shared libraries are backward compatible with all older NSS
3.x shared libraries. A program linked with older NSS 3.x shared libraries
will work with NSS 3.14.3 shared libraries without recompiling or
relinking. Furthermore, applications that restrict their use of NSS APIs
to the functions listed in NSS Public Functions will remain compatible
with future versions of the NSS shared libraries.

Feedback

* Bugs discovered should be reported by filing a bug report with
bugzilla.mozilla.org (product NSS).

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