Re: Cipher suits, signature algorithms, curves in Firefox

2016-05-11 Thread Hubert Kario
On Friday 06 May 2016 10:34:37 Zoogtfyz wrote: > > the larger key size helps w.r.t. quantum computers. > > If quantum computers are currently on the level of breaking AES-128, > then they are on the level of breaking any asymmetric cryptography > (RSA, DHE or ECDHE key exchange) we are using -

Re: Cipher suits, signature algorithms, curves in Firefox

2016-05-06 Thread Julien Pierre
Zoogtfyz, On 5/6/2016 07:34, Zoogtfyz wrote: Websites that prefer AES-256, such as internal websites, can always instruct their users/customers to toggle a switch in Firefox to enable AES-256. I am proposing having AES-256 ciphersuits toggled off by default. IMO, that is impractical. I

Re: Cipher suits, signature algorithms, curves in Firefox

2016-05-06 Thread Zoogtfyz
Brian Smith wrote: > A lot of people have interpreted what I wrote as saying AES-256 is bad. I was not really referring to what you wrote about AES-256. I was referring to for example https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/374 . Even though those are related key attacks (which should not be relevant to

Re: Cipher suits, signature algorithms, curves in Firefox

2016-05-05 Thread Martin Thomson
On Fri, May 6, 2016 at 10:12 AM, Peter Bowen wrote: > Is a reasonable path to implement > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-negotiated-ff-dhe-10 and > treat ECDHE suites as being DHE using a Supported Group? This would > avoid new cipher suite IDs and accomplish the

Re: Cipher suits, signature algorithms, curves in Firefox

2016-05-05 Thread Martin Thomson
On Fri, May 6, 2016 at 9:33 AM, Brian Smith wrote: > So, I don't think that dropping AES-256 is the right thing to do. Instead, > the ECDHE-AES-256-GCM cipher suites should be added to Firefox. Note that > they were just recently added to Google Chrome. These are also

Re: Cipher suits, signature algorithms, curves in Firefox

2016-05-05 Thread Peter Bowen
On Thu, May 5, 2016 at 4:33 PM, Brian Smith wrote: > Zoogtfyz wrote: >> >> 3) DHE (not ECDHE) cipher suits are far too often implemented incorrectly, >> most often with default common DH primes, DH parameter reuse, or generally >> weak bitstrenght

Re: Cipher suits, signature algorithms, curves in Firefox

2016-05-05 Thread Brian Smith
Zoogtfyz wrote: > This is my recommendation for changes to the supported ciphersuits in > Mozilla Firefox. I performed rigorous compatibility testing and everything > works as advertized. I used Firefox telemetry data, SSL Pulse data, and my > own tests to verify that

Re: Cipher suits, signature algorithms, curves in Firefox

2016-05-05 Thread Gervase Markham
On 05/05/16 15:22, Zoogtfyz wrote: > This is my recommendation for changes to the supported ciphersuits in > Mozilla Firefox. I performed rigorous compatibility testing and > everything works as advertized. I used Firefox telemetry data, SSL > Pulse data, and my own tests to verify that *not a

Cipher suits, signature algorithms, curves in Firefox

2016-05-05 Thread Zoogtfyz
This is my recommendation for changes to the supported ciphersuits in Mozilla Firefox. I performed rigorous compatibility testing and everything works as advertized. I used Firefox telemetry data, SSL Pulse data, and my own tests to verify that *not a single* publicly accessible website would