Ian Clarke wrote:
> The scenario I outlined above may be too contrived, but I do think we
> should simulate short walks to find nodes for random swapping, rather
> than just assuming that a short walk will select a random node with
> even probability.
The version of the simulator I sent to the
On Feb 5, 2008, at 5:39 PM, Robert Hailey wrote:
>
> On Feb 5, 2008, at 1:05 PM, Matthew Toseland wrote:
>> Is this sufficiently well-defined for simulations yet? It seems to
>> me there
>> will be threshold parameters and so on?
>
> Is it well-defined enough to be implemented for simulations?
On Feb 6 2008, Matthew Toseland wrote:
>> The swap limit does prevent the subnets from completely segragating
>> (even without randomly resetting the locations), but there still are
>> many columns with 10-20% or 80-90% red nodes.
>
>"Red" nodes?
Oh sorry, I labelled the two subnets red and
On Wednesday 06 February 2008 09:32, Michael Rogers wrote:
> On Feb 5 2008, Matthew Toseland wrote:
> >> I was under the impression that the random walks for swapping were long
> >> enough to reach any node with roughly equal probability - I believe that
> >> was Oskar's intention. If the random
On Feb 6, 2008, at 3:57 AM, Michael Rogers wrote:
> On Feb 5 2008, Robert Hailey wrote:
>> My question is, *if* such an idea is considered valid and in such a
>> case how could we be assured that us labeling and isolating a subnet
>> is not what *keeps* it labeled as a subnet because it's
On 06 Feb 2008 09:44:30 +, Michael Rogers wrote:
> On Feb 5 2008, Ian Clarke wrote:
> >For a random walk of 10 hops to get from cluster A to cluster B, it
> >needs to find one of the 10 connections between them - yet there are
> >about 1,250 connections - a 1/125 probability per hop, or a
On Feb 5 2008, Robert Hailey wrote:
>My question is, *if* such an idea is considered valid and in such a
>case how could we be assured that us labeling and isolating a subnet
>is not what *keeps* it labeled as a subnet because it's routing is
>messed up for lack of swapping?
We seem to be
On Feb 5 2008, Ian Clarke wrote:
>For a random walk of 10 hops to get from cluster A to cluster B, it
>needs to find one of the 10 connections between them - yet there are
>about 1,250 connections - a 1/125 probability per hop, or a 1/12.5
>probability that a random walk will find one of them.
>
On Feb 5 2008, Matthew Toseland wrote:
>> I was under the impression that the random walks for swapping were long
>> enough to reach any node with roughly equal probability - I believe that
>> was Oskar's intention. If the random walks aren't escaping from local
>> clusters then we'll never be
On Feb 5 2008, Robert Hailey wrote:
My question is, *if* such an idea is considered valid and in such a
case how could we be assured that us labeling and isolating a subnet
is not what *keeps* it labeled as a subnet because it's routing is
messed up for lack of swapping?
We seem to be
On Wednesday 06 February 2008 09:32, Michael Rogers wrote:
On Feb 5 2008, Matthew Toseland wrote:
I was under the impression that the random walks for swapping were long
enough to reach any node with roughly equal probability - I believe that
was Oskar's intention. If the random walks
On Feb 6 2008, Matthew Toseland wrote:
The swap limit does prevent the subnets from completely segragating
(even without randomly resetting the locations), but there still are
many columns with 10-20% or 80-90% red nodes.
Red nodes?
Oh sorry, I labelled the two subnets red and black. :-)
On 06 Feb 2008 09:44:30 +, Michael Rogers [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Feb 5 2008, Ian Clarke wrote:
For a random walk of 10 hops to get from cluster A to cluster B, it
needs to find one of the 10 connections between them - yet there are
about 1,250 connections - a 1/125 probability per
Ian Clarke wrote:
The scenario I outlined above may be too contrived, but I do think we
should simulate short walks to find nodes for random swapping, rather
than just assuming that a short walk will select a random node with
even probability.
The version of the simulator I sent to the list
On Feb 5, 2008, at 5:39 PM, Robert Hailey wrote:
On Feb 5, 2008, at 1:05 PM, Matthew Toseland wrote:
Is this sufficiently well-defined for simulations yet? It seems to
me there
will be threshold parameters and so on?
Is it well-defined enough to be implemented for simulations? The
biggest
On Tuesday 05 February 2008 21:10, Robert Hailey wrote:
>
> On Feb 4, 2008, at 7:24 PM, Michael Rogers wrote:
>
> > Matthew Toseland wrote:
> >> Swapping creates this problem. Or does it? Could you perhaps do
> >> some simulations of two networks of different sizes weakly linked
> >> and
On Tuesday 05 February 2008 20:21, Michael Rogers wrote:
> Robert Hailey wrote:
> > First, there is an equal chance of nodes from either network swapping.
> > In the freenet network (since swapping is done through the network) it
> > is not equal (if for no other cause than the scarce links
Robert Hailey wrote:
> First, there is an equal chance of nodes from either network swapping.
> In the freenet network (since swapping is done through the network) it
> is not equal (if for no other cause than the scarce links between the
> two networks).
I was under the impression that the
On Tuesday 05 February 2008 19:05, Robert Hailey wrote:
>
> On Feb 4, 2008, at 7:24 PM, Michael Rogers wrote:
>
> > Matthew Toseland wrote:
> >> Swapping creates this problem. Or does it? Could you perhaps do
> >> some simulations of two networks of different sizes weakly linked
> >> and
Is this sufficiently well-defined for simulations yet? It seems to me there
will be threshold parameters and so on?
On Monday 04 February 2008 20:31, Robert Hailey wrote:
>
> On Feb 2, 2008, at 10:24 AM, Michael Rogers wrote:
> >>> what am I missing?
> >>
> >> That following the algorithm will
On Feb 5, 2008 2:21 PM, Michael Rogers wrote:
> Robert Hailey wrote:
> > First, there is an equal chance of nodes from either network swapping.
> > In the freenet network (since swapping is done through the network) it
> > is not equal (if for no other cause than the scarce links between the
> >
On Feb 5, 2008, at 1:05 PM, Matthew Toseland wrote:
> Is this sufficiently well-defined for simulations yet? It seems to
> me there
> will be threshold parameters and so on?
Is it well-defined enough to be implemented for simulations? The
biggest threshold business will be in attempting to
On Feb 5, 2008, at 1:25 PM, Matthew Toseland wrote:
> On Tuesday 05 February 2008 19:05, Robert Hailey wrote:
>> For a "quick simulation", I think this is an excellent demonstration!
>> However, I think that there are two major errors.
>>
>> First, there is an equal chance of nodes from either
On Feb 4, 2008, at 7:24 PM, Michael Rogers wrote:
> Matthew Toseland wrote:
>> Swapping creates this problem. Or does it? Could you perhaps do
>> some simulations of two networks of different sizes weakly linked
>> and show whether they get independant location spaces, or whether
>>
On Feb 4, 2008, at 7:24 PM, Michael Rogers wrote:
> Matthew Toseland wrote:
>> Swapping creates this problem. Or does it? Could you perhaps do
>> some simulations of two networks of different sizes weakly linked
>> and show whether they get independant location spaces, or whether
>>
Ian Clarke wrote:
> I would have expected regions close to each other to tend to have the
> same subnet, with one subnet occupying one side of the location space,
> and the other region occupying the other, yet I'm seeing something
> like this:
>
> 86 95 86 60 2 1 72 89 87 91 8 5 3 39 108 91 64 6
Matthew Toseland wrote:
> Swapping creates this problem. Or does it? Could you perhaps do some
> simulations of two networks of different sizes weakly linked and show whether
> they get independant location spaces, or whether swapping tries to put one of
> them within the global keyspace for
On Tuesday 05 February 2008 19:05, Robert Hailey wrote:
On Feb 4, 2008, at 7:24 PM, Michael Rogers wrote:
Matthew Toseland wrote:
Swapping creates this problem. Or does it? Could you perhaps do
some simulations of two networks of different sizes weakly linked
and show whether they
On Feb 4, 2008, at 7:24 PM, Michael Rogers wrote:
Matthew Toseland wrote:
Swapping creates this problem. Or does it? Could you perhaps do
some simulations of two networks of different sizes weakly linked
and show whether they get independant location spaces, or whether
swapping tries to
Is this sufficiently well-defined for simulations yet? It seems to me there
will be threshold parameters and so on?
On Monday 04 February 2008 20:31, Robert Hailey wrote:
On Feb 2, 2008, at 10:24 AM, Michael Rogers wrote:
what am I missing?
That following the algorithm will eventually
Robert Hailey wrote:
First, there is an equal chance of nodes from either network swapping.
In the freenet network (since swapping is done through the network) it
is not equal (if for no other cause than the scarce links between the
two networks).
I was under the impression that the random
On Feb 4, 2008, at 7:24 PM, Michael Rogers wrote:
Matthew Toseland wrote:
Swapping creates this problem. Or does it? Could you perhaps do
some simulations of two networks of different sizes weakly linked
and show whether they get independant location spaces, or whether
swapping tries
On Tuesday 05 February 2008 20:21, Michael Rogers wrote:
Robert Hailey wrote:
First, there is an equal chance of nodes from either network swapping.
In the freenet network (since swapping is done through the network) it
is not equal (if for no other cause than the scarce links between the
On Feb 5, 2008, at 1:25 PM, Matthew Toseland wrote:
On Tuesday 05 February 2008 19:05, Robert Hailey wrote:
For a quick simulation, I think this is an excellent demonstration!
However, I think that there are two major errors.
First, there is an equal chance of nodes from either network
On Tuesday 05 February 2008 21:10, Robert Hailey wrote:
On Feb 4, 2008, at 7:24 PM, Michael Rogers wrote:
Matthew Toseland wrote:
Swapping creates this problem. Or does it? Could you perhaps do
some simulations of two networks of different sizes weakly linked
and show whether they
On Feb 5, 2008, at 1:05 PM, Matthew Toseland wrote:
Is this sufficiently well-defined for simulations yet? It seems to
me there
will be threshold parameters and so on?
Is it well-defined enough to be implemented for simulations? The
biggest threshold business will be in attempting to
On Feb 5, 2008 2:21 PM, Michael Rogers [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Robert Hailey wrote:
First, there is an equal chance of nodes from either network swapping.
In the freenet network (since swapping is done through the network) it
is not equal (if for no other cause than the scarce links
On Feb 4, 2008 7:24 PM, Michael Rogers wrote:
> on each line the key space is divided into 20 regions,
> and each column shows the number of nodes from the first subnet in that
> region. Initially there are roughly 50 nodes in each region, but
> swapping causes the subnets to segregate so that
On Saturday 02 February 2008 16:24, Michael Rogers wrote:
> Robert Hailey wrote:
> > Unless [in a later implementation] DNFs (maybe weighed against HTL)
> > become an indication of a separate network. Then it would do precisely
that.
>
> DNFs would detect a "black hole" attacker - what about an
On Feb 2, 2008, at 10:24 AM, Michael Rogers wrote:
>>> what am I missing?
>>
>> That following the algorithm will eventually color the entire
>> network/subnetwork/dungeon with the same network id, which is
>> presumed necessary for any sort of distant routing.
>
> OK, I think I see what you mean
Evan Daniel wrote:
> Do we have any understanding of how well network clusters will
> correlate with content clusters? That is, if there are effectively
> two networks, especially if they result from cultural and language
> barriers, to what extent will the two sides be uninterested in
>
On Feb 2, 2008, at 10:24 AM, Michael Rogers wrote:
what am I missing?
That following the algorithm will eventually color the entire
network/subnetwork/dungeon with the same network id, which is
presumed necessary for any sort of distant routing.
OK, I think I see what you mean now - the
On Saturday 02 February 2008 16:24, Michael Rogers wrote:
Robert Hailey wrote:
Unless [in a later implementation] DNFs (maybe weighed against HTL)
become an indication of a separate network. Then it would do precisely
that.
DNFs would detect a black hole attacker - what about an attacker
Matthew Toseland wrote:
Swapping creates this problem. Or does it? Could you perhaps do some
simulations of two networks of different sizes weakly linked and show whether
they get independant location spaces, or whether swapping tries to put one of
them within the global keyspace for the
On Feb 4, 2008 7:24 PM, Michael Rogers [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
on each line the key space is divided into 20 regions,
and each column shows the number of nodes from the first subnet in that
region. Initially there are roughly 50 nodes in each region, but
swapping causes the subnets to
Ian Clarke wrote:
I would have expected regions close to each other to tend to have the
same subnet, with one subnet occupying one side of the location space,
and the other region occupying the other, yet I'm seeing something
like this:
86 95 86 60 2 1 72 89 87 91 8 5 3 39 108 91 64 6 0 7
Evan Daniel wrote:
Do we have any understanding of how well network clusters will
correlate with content clusters? That is, if there are effectively
two networks, especially if they result from cultural and language
barriers, to what extent will the two sides be uninterested in
communicating
Evan Daniel wrote:
> The nodes using rejectoverload is insufficient, I think -- they'll
> reject the attacker's requests and real requests with similar
> probability, and so performance for real requests will degrade
> substantially. Now the attacker only needs resources comparable to
> the
Robert Hailey wrote:
> Unless [in a later implementation] DNFs (maybe weighed against HTL)
> become an indication of a separate network. Then it would do precisely that.
DNFs would detect a "black hole" attacker - what about an attacker who
just wants to monitor a region of the key space or
Robert Hailey wrote:
Unless [in a later implementation] DNFs (maybe weighed against HTL)
become an indication of a separate network. Then it would do precisely that.
DNFs would detect a black hole attacker - what about an attacker who
just wants to monitor a region of the key space or censor
Evan Daniel wrote:
The nodes using rejectoverload is insufficient, I think -- they'll
reject the attacker's requests and real requests with similar
probability, and so performance for real requests will degrade
substantially. Now the attacker only needs resources comparable to
the
On Friday 01 February 2008 17:00, Robert Hailey wrote:
>
> On Jan 31, 2008, at 11:03 AM, Robert Hailey wrote:
>
> >> How do you authenticate the routed pings, to prevent an attacker from
> >> replying on behalf of another node?
> >
> > Excellent question. Surely the "true/false" response of
On Friday 01 February 2008 17:20, Evan Daniel wrote:
> On Feb 1, 2008 12:00 PM, Robert Hailey wrote:
> >
> >
> > On Jan 31, 2008, at 6:48 PM, Evan Daniel wrote:
> >
> > > On Jan 30, 2008 5:49 PM, Matthew Toseland
> > > wrote:
> > >
> > >> You also need an escape-route mechanism - a way to find
On Feb 1, 2008 12:57 PM, Matthew Toseland wrote:
> > Even if the requestor can't specify a target network, I think it
> > works. If the model is that the request is first routed within the
> > network, and if that fails it tries to find an escape route -- then
> > that "escape route" is a
On Feb 1, 2008, at 11:57 AM, Matthew Toseland wrote:
>> I'm not familiar enough with the details of the proposed ULPRs and
>> how
>> USKs and Frost and the like check for new updates / messages, but it
>> seems possible that simple legitimate checks for new content would
>> have a similar
On Feb 1, 2008 12:00 PM, Robert Hailey wrote:
>
>
> On Jan 31, 2008, at 6:48 PM, Evan Daniel wrote:
>
> > On Jan 30, 2008 5:49 PM, Matthew Toseland
> > wrote:
> >
> >> You also need an escape-route mechanism - a way to find an entrance
> >> into
> >> another network once regular routing has
On Jan 31, 2008, at 6:48 PM, Evan Daniel wrote:
> On Jan 30, 2008 5:49 PM, Matthew Toseland
> wrote:
>
>> You also need an escape-route mechanism - a way to find an entrance
>> into
>> another network once regular routing has exhausted the local network.
>
> Doesn't this allow an attacker
On Jan 31, 2008, at 11:03 AM, Robert Hailey wrote:
>> How do you authenticate the routed pings, to prevent an attacker from
>> replying on behalf of another node?
>
> Excellent question. Surely the "true/false" response of present is
> woefully inadequate. Since we have a direct connection to
On Jan 31, 2008, at 11:03 AM, Robert Hailey wrote:
How do you authenticate the routed pings, to prevent an attacker from
replying on behalf of another node?
Excellent question. Surely the true/false response of present is
woefully inadequate. Since we have a direct connection to the peer
On Jan 31, 2008, at 6:48 PM, Evan Daniel wrote:
On Jan 30, 2008 5:49 PM, Matthew Toseland
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
You also need an escape-route mechanism - a way to find an entrance
into
another network once regular routing has exhausted the local network.
Doesn't this allow an
On Feb 1, 2008 12:00 PM, Robert Hailey [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Jan 31, 2008, at 6:48 PM, Evan Daniel wrote:
On Jan 30, 2008 5:49 PM, Matthew Toseland
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
You also need an escape-route mechanism - a way to find an entrance
into
another network once regular
On Friday 01 February 2008 17:20, Evan Daniel wrote:
On Feb 1, 2008 12:00 PM, Robert Hailey [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Jan 31, 2008, at 6:48 PM, Evan Daniel wrote:
On Jan 30, 2008 5:49 PM, Matthew Toseland
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
You also need an escape-route mechanism - a
On Friday 01 February 2008 17:00, Robert Hailey wrote:
On Jan 31, 2008, at 11:03 AM, Robert Hailey wrote:
How do you authenticate the routed pings, to prevent an attacker from
replying on behalf of another node?
Excellent question. Surely the true/false response of present is
On Feb 1, 2008 12:57 PM, Matthew Toseland [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Even if the requestor can't specify a target network, I think it
works. If the model is that the request is first routed within the
network, and if that fails it tries to find an escape route -- then
that escape route is a
On Feb 1, 2008, at 11:57 AM, Matthew Toseland wrote:
I'm not familiar enough with the details of the proposed ULPRs and
how
USKs and Frost and the like check for new updates / messages, but it
seems possible that simple legitimate checks for new content would
have a similar effect. Of
On Jan 30, 2008 5:49 PM, Matthew Toseland wrote:
> You also need an escape-route mechanism - a way to find an entrance into
> another network once regular routing has exhausted the local network.
Doesn't this allow an attacker to selectively DOS the bottleneck
points by sending out requests for
On Jan 31 2008, Robert Hailey wrote:
>For all decisions particularly with regards to routing, we *only* use
>the network id that we finally assign to them.
OK... so we're essentially creating a map of the network, identifying
subnets and numbering them? For local subnets we check which of our
On Thursday 31 January 2008 17:03, Robert Hailey wrote:
>
> > The attacker isn't necessarily interested in creating a dungeon
> > (certainly
> > not a detectable one) - he might just want to control a large region
> > of the
> > key space, either to monitor it or to censor selected keys,
On Jan 31, 2008, at 11:57 AM, Michael Rogers wrote:
> (This is a different attacker from the one that wants to occupy a
> region of
> the key space, BTW - this one's goal is to make you search a large
> number
> of nonexistent subnets before giving up, and possibly to stop you
> discovering
On Jan 31, 2008, at 11:57 AM, Michael Rogers wrote:
> OK... so we're essentially creating a map of the network, identifying
> subnets and numbering them? For local subnets we check which of our
> immediate peers can reach which others, and possibly override the
> network
> IDs they advertise -
On Jan 30 2008, Robert Hailey wrote:
>No, in the way I am thinking this is even expected; a node can
>advertise whatever network-id it wants (just an integer), it is up to
>the peers to make sense of it.
I don't see how that can be made robust against malicious nodes.
>Some time in the future,
On Jan 31, 2008, at 5:33 AM, Michael Rogers wrote:
> On Jan 30 2008, Robert Hailey wrote:
>> No, in the way I am thinking this is even expected; a node can
>> advertise whatever network-id it wants (just an integer), it is up to
>> the peers to make sense of it.
>
> I don't see how that can be
On Jan 30 2008, Robert Hailey wrote:
No, in the way I am thinking this is even expected; a node can
advertise whatever network-id it wants (just an integer), it is up to
the peers to make sense of it.
I don't see how that can be made robust against malicious nodes.
Some time in the future, using
On Jan 31, 2008, at 5:33 AM, Michael Rogers wrote:
On Jan 30 2008, Robert Hailey wrote:
No, in the way I am thinking this is even expected; a node can
advertise whatever network-id it wants (just an integer), it is up to
the peers to make sense of it.
I don't see how that can be made
On Thursday 31 January 2008 17:03, Robert Hailey wrote:
The attacker isn't necessarily interested in creating a dungeon
(certainly
not a detectable one) - he might just want to control a large region
of the
key space, either to monitor it or to censor selected keys, while
On Jan 31 2008, Robert Hailey wrote:
For all decisions particularly with regards to routing, we *only* use
the network id that we finally assign to them.
OK... so we're essentially creating a map of the network, identifying
subnets and numbering them? For local subnets we check which of our
On Jan 31, 2008, at 11:57 AM, Michael Rogers wrote:
OK... so we're essentially creating a map of the network, identifying
subnets and numbering them? For local subnets we check which of our
immediate peers can reach which others, and possibly override the
network
IDs they advertise - for
On Wednesday 30 January 2008 19:02, Robert Hailey wrote:
> -- #2 -- Avoiding dungeons
>
> The only way I am aware of defining a dungeon is as a separate network
> whose likelyhood of success is effectively-zero, and even then only if
> it is not a substantial portion of our peers (which
On Jan 30 2008, Robert Hailey wrote:
>The two peers on the ends recognize that
>subnetwork inconsistency and route less/none into it (unless, as
>Matthew was saying, it fails in the current network).
But how do they decide to route around it? Any scheme based on
collectively-agreed network
On Wednesday 30 January 2008 15:24, Michael Rogers wrote:
> On Jan 28 2008, Robert Hailey wrote:
> >Inside China (in this case)
> >there would be a viable freenet, and outside there would be a viable
> >freenet but due to the few connections between them, keys could not be
> >effectively
On Jan 28 2008, Robert Hailey wrote:
>Inside China (in this case)
>there would be a viable freenet, and outside there would be a viable
>freenet but due to the few connections between them, keys could not be
>effectively fetched or put one to the other.
Unfortunately even if we can solve
On Jan 28, 2008 11:49 AM, Matthew Toseland wrote:
> > Concerning the general routing theory; the more I ponder about it, the
> > more I think that dungeons and subnets will always be a problem with a
> > computer-meta-level small world network. Consider the large case! If a
> > big country has a
On Jan 30, 2008, at 11:34 AM, Michael Rogers wrote:
> On Jan 30 2008, Robert Hailey wrote:
>> The two peers on the ends recognize that
>> subnetwork inconsistency and route less/none into it (unless, as
>> Matthew was saying, it fails in the current network).
>
> But how do they decide to route
On Jan 30, 2008, at 9:24 AM, Michael Rogers wrote:
> On Jan 28 2008, Robert Hailey wrote:
>> Inside China (in this case)
>> there would be a viable freenet, and outside there would be a viable
>> freenet but due to the few connections between them, keys could not
>> be
>> effectively fetched
On Jan 28 2008, Robert Hailey wrote:
Inside China (in this case)
there would be a viable freenet, and outside there would be a viable
freenet but due to the few connections between them, keys could not be
effectively fetched or put one to the other.
Unfortunately even if we can solve this
On Wednesday 30 January 2008 15:24, Michael Rogers wrote:
On Jan 28 2008, Robert Hailey wrote:
Inside China (in this case)
there would be a viable freenet, and outside there would be a viable
freenet but due to the few connections between them, keys could not be
effectively fetched or
On Jan 30, 2008, at 9:24 AM, Michael Rogers wrote:
On Jan 28 2008, Robert Hailey wrote:
Inside China (in this case)
there would be a viable freenet, and outside there would be a viable
freenet but due to the few connections between them, keys could not
be
effectively fetched or put one
On Jan 30 2008, Robert Hailey wrote:
The two peers on the ends recognize that
subnetwork inconsistency and route less/none into it (unless, as
Matthew was saying, it fails in the current network).
But how do they decide to route around it? Any scheme based on
collectively-agreed network IDs
On Jan 30, 2008, at 11:34 AM, Michael Rogers wrote:
On Jan 30 2008, Robert Hailey wrote:
The two peers on the ends recognize that
subnetwork inconsistency and route less/none into it (unless, as
Matthew was saying, it fails in the current network).
But how do they decide to route around
On Jan 28, 2008 11:49 AM, Matthew Toseland [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Concerning the general routing theory; the more I ponder about it, the
more I think that dungeons and subnets will always be a problem with a
computer-meta-level small world network. Consider the large case! If a
big
On Wednesday 30 January 2008 19:02, Robert Hailey wrote:
-- #2 -- Avoiding dungeons
The only way I am aware of defining a dungeon is as a separate network
whose likelyhood of success is effectively-zero, and even then only if
it is not a substantial portion of our peers (which probably
On Monday 28 January 2008 17:16, Robert Hailey wrote:
I think that this coming alpha is at a good time. Performance has
always been a hinderance to the usability of freenet, and it appears
to be much faster just recently. One benchmark that I noticed is from
AnotherIndex, the time it
On Monday 28 January 2008 17:16, Robert Hailey wrote:
>
> I think that this coming alpha is at a good time. Performance has
> always been a hinderance to the usability of freenet, and it appears
> to be much faster just recently. One benchmark that I noticed is from
> AnotherIndex, the
I think that this coming alpha is at a good time. Performance has
always been a hinderance to the usability of freenet, and it appears
to be much faster just recently. One benchmark that I noticed is from
AnotherIndex, the "time it takes to try every key in the database" has
gone down
I think that this coming alpha is at a good time. Performance has
always been a hinderance to the usability of freenet, and it appears
to be much faster just recently. One benchmark that I noticed is from
AnotherIndex, the time it takes to try every key in the database has
gone down from
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