[freenet-dev] Implemented random first hop

2002-07-28 Thread Matthew Toseland
CVS now is at version 489, and this includes code to always route to a random key on the first hop, at oskar's suggestion. This hopefully will have the following benefits: a) prevents the network from splitting, sows it back together when/if it does b) if you can't find a piece of data, then

Re: [freenet-dev] Implemented random first hop

2002-07-28 Thread Ian Clarke
On Mon, Jul 29, 2002 at 02:11:19AM +0100, Matthew Toseland wrote: CVS now is at version 489, and this includes code to always route to a random key on the first hop, at oskar's suggestion. This hopefully will have the following benefits: a) prevents the network from splitting, sows it back

Re: [freenet-dev] how to sign/verify using the freenet.crypt classes?

2002-07-28 Thread Dan Merillat
Oskar Sandberg writes: Note also that signatures have absolutely no value unless the root of the authenication, in this case the fingerprint, is received from some other source then the message itself. In SSK URIs, the signatures verify that the data you receive is that which your source