From: Tom Metro [mailto:tmetro-...@vl.com]
I think the attack vector would be along the lines of an attacker
identifying one or more blocks of a privileged executable, creating
replacement blocks that have both malicious code and cause a hash
collision. They write the blocks to disk, and
On Apr 27, 2011, at 5:00 PM, Edward Ned Harvey wrote:
It's even more difficult than that ... Yes, many files span multiple
blocks, and therefore begin at the beginning of one block and end in the
middle of another block, but the hashes are calculated on a per-block basis
up to 128k. So any
On 04/24/2011 10:52 PM, Edward Ned Harvey wrote:
From: Mark Woodward [mailto:ma...@mohawksoft.com]
You know, I've read the same math and I've worked it out myself. I agree
it
sounds so astronomical as to be unrealistic to even imagine it, but no
matter
how astronomical the odds, someone
On 04/25/2011 09:32 AM, Daniel Feenberg wrote:
On Mon, 25 Apr 2011, Mark Woodward wrote:
This is one of those things that make my brain hurt. If I am
representing more data with a fixed size number, i.e. a 4K block vs a
16K block, that does, in fact, increase the probability of collision
Edward Ned Harvey wrote:
(2) We're assuming the data in question is not being maliciously formed for
the purposes of causing a hash collision. I think this is a safe
assumption, because in the event of a collision, you would have two
different pieces of data that are assumed to be identical
From: Tom Metro [mailto:tmetro-...@vl.com]
(Doesn't ZFS also employ overall file hashing to insure the integrity of
a file? (Or is that the verification option you referred to?) If so,
then that would likely thwart this attack vector.)
The data integrity hash is something much faster and
From: Mark Woodward [mailto:ma...@mohawksoft.com]
You know, I've read the same math and I've worked it out myself. I agree
it
sounds so astronomical as to be unrealistic to even imagine it, but no
matter
how astronomical the odds, someone usually wins the lottery.
I'm just trying to assure
From: discuss-boun...@blu.org [mailto:discuss-boun...@blu.org] On Behalf
Of Mark Woodward
I have been trying to convince myself that the SHA2/256 hash is
sufficient to identify blocks on a file system. Is anyone familiar with
this?
I am intimately familiar with this. And on planet Earth,
On 04/23/2011 08:31 AM, Edward Ned Harvey wrote:
From: discuss-boun...@blu.org [mailto:discuss-boun...@blu.org] On Behalf
Of Mark Woodward
I have been trying to convince myself that the SHA2/256 hash is
sufficient to identify blocks on a file system. Is anyone familiar with
this?
I am
I have been trying to convince myself that the SHA2/256 hash is
sufficient to identify blocks on a file system. Is anyone familiar with
this?
The theory is that you take a hash value of a block on a disk, and the
hash, which is smaller than the actual block, is unique enough that the
On 04/22/2011 12:00 PM, discuss-requ...@blu.org wrote:
Message: 15 Date: Fri, 22 Apr 2011 11:53:23 -0400 From: David
Rosenstrauch dar...@darose.net Subject: Re: ZFS and block
deduplication To: discuss@blu.org Message-ID:
4db1a473.1090...@darose.net Content-Type: text/plain;
charset=ISO
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