Serious question: is there any evidence that legislators care about
these petitions?
This is a bit out of left field, but I used to be the head of a
largish community organization (the combined neighborhood associations
of Cambridge). The Mayor and City Council were all liberal and
On 08/05/2013 11:30 AM, Richard Pieri wrote:
S/MIME is that it depends on a certificate authority to issue X.509
certificates.
And we know that they can't be trusted. But, a big realization I had
recently is that even flawed crypto is valuable.
Okay, maybe ROT-13 isn't worth much. But
Kent Borg wrote:
Okay, maybe ROT-13 isn't worth much. But ROT-12, being a bit more
obscure, starts to be useful. And something that requires a
man-in-the-middle attack, is very valuable.
Substitution ciphers fall in near real time to automated frequency
analysis. The obscurity of the
On 08/05/2013 02:07 PM, Richard Pieri wrote:
Flawed cryptography is useless. Good cryptography may be useless when
one of your foes is responsible for approving and endorsing the
encryption systems you use.
Flawed crypto is of little use if they are specifically after *you*
(particularly
On Mon, Aug 5, 2013 at 12:39 PM, Kent Borg kentb...@borg.org wrote:
On 08/05/2013 11:30 AM, Richard Pieri wrote:
S/MIME is that it depends on a certificate authority to issue X.509
certificates.
...
Good cryptography is great. Flawed cryptography--even just using obscure
non-standard
Kent Borg wrote:
Requiring them to take active measures in advance of the communication
(MitM attacks) or even afterwards (human intervention) harms their
economics *enormously*. Orders of magnitude.
What harm? The NSA has an effectively unlimited budget. The only real
cost is time and
Kent Borg wrote:
For what values of effectively? Even the NSA needs to get money
appropriated. Make them put extra zeros on the end and it matters.
Where effectively means that they get everything they ask for in terms
of money and equipment.
What does it take to grab all the e-mail
Edward Ned Harvey (blu) wrote:
Their budget is not large enough to crack really good crypto (256 bit
with truly random key, and no other way to expose the key). Which
means even a targeted individual can keep them out, if you are very
paranoid and smart about it.
You're assuming that the NSA
On Mon, Aug 05, 2013 at 07:25:52AM -0400, d...@geer.org wrote:
In a face-to-face exchange over proposed changes to our zoning law
(to curb over-building), these were the exact words from the Mayor
of our fair city:
You're right, but irrelevant; you don't deliver any votes.
That was
On Mon, Aug 05, 2013 at 02:49:32PM -0400, Richard Pieri wrote:
Kent Borg wrote:
Requiring them to take active measures in advance of the communication
(MitM attacks) or even afterwards (human intervention) harms their
economics *enormously*. Orders of magnitude.
What harm? The NSA has an
On Sun, Aug 4, 2013 at 2:52 PM, Derek Martin inva...@pizzashack.org wrote:
On Fri, Aug 02, 2013 at 12:46:59PM -0500, Derek Martin wrote:
On Fri, Aug 02, 2013 at 10:25:46AM -0700, Joseph Guarino wrote:
Also, I know I started a petition but another person had one with more
online. If you
Derek Martin wrote:
Dan Geer wrote:
...words from the Mayor of our fair city:
You're right, but irrelevant; you don't deliver any votes.
That was educational and factual. Petitions, to be effective,
need to be like tracer bullets for artillery to follow.
My impression is that these
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