From: Simmons, Forest [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Any time that IRV does not elect the sincere CW (when there is one)
there
is going to be a strong incentive for order reversal under IRV,
except under
the (non-existent) zero information case. [The only real life cases
that
exist in hot elections are
At 9:28 AM -0400 6/30/06, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
What about a method with determines the IRV winner and the Condorcet
winner and then selects one of them using a random ballot. I assume
that someone has already suggested it.
It seems to me that if you included a reasonable number of election
Quoting Eric Gorr [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Allen Pulsifer wrote:
Going back to the example I gave, the Condorcet majority that elected D was
made up of everyone who did not rank A the highest, i.e., the Not A's, and
they all coalesced around D. In reality a coalition like that would never
happen
Here's another proposal for a voting system.
Since all voting systems are to some extent strategic, the goal of this
system is to enable each voter of groups of voters to achieve their best
strategic outcome, consistent with their political power.
Here's how it would work:
The ballot allows a
From: Jan Kok [EMAIL PROTECTED]
A couple weeks ago Forest Simmons suggested the candidate withdrawal
option as a way of improving most election methods. I just realized
that the candidate withdrawal option would greatly mitigate the center
squeeze problem with IRV. (Sometimes it takes a
In the runoff election, the plurality wins.
I don't think it is appropriate to call it a plurality really. You
would need 50% + 1 votes to get elected (unless the other side
doesn't unify against you, and then that is tacit support).
The plurality was on purpose. If no alliance is able
