[EM] IFNOP method (continued)

Well, it's a little late, but I did a test of the IFNOP (Ignore Fewest Number of Preferences) method using 4 examples from the Wikipedia article on the Schulze method. I picked Schulze because it is fairly well-behaved with fewer voting paradoxes than many other methods. Example 1 (45 voters; 5

Re: [EM] Range voting, zero-info strategy simulation

From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Kevin, I did not understand how many voters there were in your simulations. Other than that, they look interesting and confirm my own (and others') widely held suspicions. I think the way it works is that he picks a number between 0 and S for each candidate. The

Re: [EM] Range voting, zero-info strategy simulation

At 04:42 PM 10/30/2006, Kevin Venzke wrote: I wrote a simulation to measure the utility of zero-info Approval strategy in zero-info Range elections. Range Voting is designed to maximize overall utility to society, not *expected utility* for the individual voter. This study seems to replicate

Re: [EM] Ranked Preferences, Range

At 12:19 AM 10/31/2006, Dave Ketchum wrote: This certainly DOES NOT earn a need for special assistance to such a voter. Whatever information may be available, if the voter does not know enough from it to HAVE a personal preference, the obvious response is to not vote - leaving to others

[EM] RE : Re: Range voting, zero-info strategy simulation

Hi, --- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : At 04:42 PM 10/30/2006, Kevin Venzke wrote: I wrote a simulation to measure the utility of zero-info Approval strategy in zero-info Range elections. Range Voting is designed to maximize overall utility to society, not *expected

Re: [EM] Addendum to condorcet method theory

--- Antonio Oneala [EMAIL PROTECTED], on 10/24/2006 wrote: David Cary [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Besides its severely limited range of application, the other major drawback of the proposed method is that it is not proportional. I have no idea how the application of the method is limited.