Re: [EM] Majority Criterion, hidden contradictions

2006-11-07 Thread Michael Poole
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax writes: At 11:29 AM 11/6/2006, Michael Poole wrote: By the majority criterion, a candidate X should win if a majority of voters answers affirmatively to the question 'Do you prefer X to every other candidate?'. A voter who cannot honestly or easily answer yes to

[EM] Electoral college competition rule

2006-11-07 Thread raphfrk
I may have posted this a while ago, but not sure. On the EC, what about this rule: The most popular party shall be assigned a "win margin" which shall be equal to its total vote cast for the party less the total vote of the next largest rival. Before the count, the party that was assigned a

[EM] Thompson insurance like voting for a legislature

2006-11-07 Thread raphfrk
The legislature would be made up of - Sitting Legislators elected by some PR system - legislators who still have votes in their pool, but failed to get re-elected Both sets are allowed into the legislature and may vote (speaking rights may be different). At the start of each month and before

[EM] Range voting fails IIA

2006-11-07 Thread David Cary
Both CRV and Wikipedia claim that range voting meets the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) criterion, but neither gives much justification for such claims. Electorama succinctly but informally describes IIA as: if one option (X) wins the election, and a new alternative (Y) is

Re: [EM] RE : Re: RE : Majority Criterion, hidden contradictions

2006-11-07 Thread Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
At 01:30 AM 11/7/2006, Chris Benham wrote: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: 90: A9B1(sincere is A9B1) 10: B99A0 (sincere is B5A3) All the voters have a sincere low opinion of both candidates, but 90% think that A is 900% better than B and yet B wins (with only 10% of the voters not being

Re: [EM] Majority Criterion, hidden contradictions

2006-11-07 Thread Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
At 08:35 AM 11/7/2006, Michael Poole wrote: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax writes: No voting method can use preferences that are not expressed. Linguistically, the Criterion contains a lost performative -- or something like that. *How* do the voters answer affirmatively. It could only mean that

[EM] Range voting fails IIA?

2006-11-07 Thread Warren Smith
Cary: Both CRV and Wikipedia claim that range voting meets the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) criterion, but neither gives much justification for such claims. Benham: Range votign supporters like to move the goalposts around. Actually: http://www.rangevoting.org/ArrowThm.html

[EM] IRV theorem

2006-11-07 Thread Warren Smith
Theorem saying IRV ignores asymptotically 100% of the votes always: puzzle 34 at http://rangevoting.org/PuzzlePage.html election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info