[sorry if this comes twice, but it didn't seem to get thru the first time]
Dear folks,
some clarification because in recent posts democracy and majority rule
were confused quite often...
In a dictatorial system, almost all people have no power.
In a majoritarian system, up to half of the
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[sorry if this comes twice, but it didn't seem to get thru the first time]
Dear folks,
some clarification because in recent posts democracy and majority rule
were confused quite often...
In a dictatorial system, almost all people have no power.
In a
At 01:59 PM 3/1/2007, Michael Poole wrote:
You did not specify a method for the runoff election. There are two
candidates in the result set I specified; it might itself be the
runoff. If the method for the runoff cannot be Range Voting, it is
inappropriate to claim that Range satisfies the
At 05:40 AM 3/2/2007, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
some clarification because in recent posts democracy and majority rule
were confused quite often...
Well, I don't think I personally confuse them, but I might use
language loosely sometimes.
In a dictatorial system, almost all people have no power.
I
Forest W Simmons wrote:
Here are the main advantages of UncAAO over other Condorcet methods:
1. It is resistant to manipulation ... more so than Beatpath or Ranked
Pairs, if I am not mistaken.
2. It always chooses from the uncovered set.
3. It is at least as easy as Ranked Pairs to
Forest had correctly said:
Under winning votes the C faction can take defensive action and
truncate to 20 C. The resulting position is a Nash Equilibrium.
Chris writes:
Taking such defensive action causes B to win, so why would they want to do
that when they
prefer A to B? And I don't see
I said:
The B voters, by truncating, make the would-be reversers accept the Nash
equilibrium or suffer the consequences.
I meant The C voters instead of The B voters
The C voters, by truncating, make the would be reversers accept the Nash
equilibrium or suffer the consequences.
Mike
