Hello folks,
I would be very glad if all of you would take one minute's time to answer this
very simple email poll!
Consider a situation with three options A,B,C and only two voters, whose
ratings* are as follows:
voter 1: A 100, C 50, B 0
voter 2: B 100, C 50, A 0
Now please answer these
Are we supposed to understand what Warren wants to say with this?
re puzzle 33 at http://rangevoting.org/PuzzlePage.html
the answer is
W_K = const * (2 P_K - 1) / (4 P_K [1-P_K])
wds
_
In 5 Schritten zur eigenen
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Consider a situation with three options A,B,C
and only two voters, whose
ratings* are as follows:
voter 1: A 100, C 50, B 0
voter 2: B 100, C 50, A 0
Now please answer these three questions with yes or no:
1. Is C socially preferable to A? ___
On Mar 2, 2007, at 12:40 , Jobst Heitzig wrote:
[sorry if this comes twice, but it didn't seem to get thru the
first time]
Dear folks,
some clarification because in recent posts democracy and majority rule
were confused quite often...
In a dictatorial system, almost all people have no
At 07:26 AM 3/4/2007, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Hello folks,
I would be very glad if all of you would take one minute's time to
answer this very simple email poll!
Well, the problem with ad-hoc polls is that the answers depend on the
questions, and ask the wrong questions, you'll get misleading
Juho--
In a posting to a different mailing list, Markus pointed out that margins
fails the Plurality Criterion, and that wv Condorcet passes the Plurality
Criterion.
For me, Plurality isn't essential. For instance, I consider MDDA a good
proposal.
But if we're going to have the added
Juho said:
I very much support evaluating also the performance with sincere votes /
the utility function that a methods tries to implement (in addition to
evaluating its strategy resistance).
I reply:
Often, when people speak of methods in terms of strategy, they speak of
At 08:51 AM 3/4/2007, Juho wrote:
On Mar 3, 2007, at 9:06 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
If we cannot agree on the best method with sincere votes, we are
highly unlikely to agree on the best method in the presence of
strategic voting, though I suppose it is possible
Range is good with sincere
At 03:29 PM 3/4/2007, Juho wrote:
Single winner at its
purest is just electing one of a number of candidates, giving no
consideration to if it was the same voters that last time got their
way through. Basic single winner methods maybe have worse utility
than ones that take distribute the power
On Sun, 2007-03-04 at 23:41 -0500, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Let's consider the method of deriving social utility from individual
utilities to be a detail. There seems to be some general agreement
that simple summing is not without value, but it is also clear that
summation is a
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