Too many more stories like this and I'll have to write up my own software
and go into business selling election counting systems.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
On Thu, 10 May 2007, Gervase Lam wrote:
Oops:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/6622963.stm
Review under way on voting chaos
I'm trying to understand the details of this procedure.
On Apr 16, 2007, at 12:03 PM, Chris Benham wrote:
My current favourite plain ranked-ballot method is Approval-
Sorted Margins(Ranking) Elimination:
1. Voters rank candidates, truncation and equal-ranking allowed.
2. Interpreting
of
redistributed to their other choices.
Alternate name Continuous Transferrable Vote?
* In practice, to make up for a modern computer's floating point
arithmetic roundoff error, this will be (sum quota + epsilon) where
epsilon will be about (total vote/100).
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
election
someone didn't see the hyphen and asked how they vote on a 10 to 10
scale. is 10 good or is 10 bad?
Doh!
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
+
units, and it's manageable.
Oh wait, except that I don't believe in voting machines because they're
all a waste of money and I think we should have hand counted paper
ballots. But, if society insists on voting machines then I'm going to
insist we have good ones.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org
But the problem is you didn't count the million lines of python
interpreter or the millions of lines of X11 or Linux you might run it on.
If you're going to claim verification, you need verified building blocks
or build the whole thing yourself.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
On Thu, 1 Feb
into the computer and let it sort out the
counting. IRV especially needs a computer count, otherwise w need to
physically move potentially huge piles of ballots.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
On Thu, 1 Feb 2007, Ka-Ping Yee wrote:
On Thu, 1 Feb 2007, Brian Olson wrote:
But the problem is you
the tradeoffs and costs of that
good cause as its being implemented are winding up being really bad.
Perhaps the evil lead the good down the road to hell by paving it with
good intentions.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
On Thu, 1 Feb 2007, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
I've made the following
wars are stupid, as are all participants therein
(though they may yet be lucid and interesting at other times).
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
On Thu, 18 Jan 2007, Nathan Herring wrote:
On 1/17/07 8:30 PM, Kevin Venzke [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
--- Brandon J. Van Every [EMAIL PROTECTED
(zero info), Vote For and Against, Maximized
Ratings all show different patterns of squeezing out centrists or
other choices. Borda bulges in its odd way. IRV gets horribly
fractured. IRNR flakes out at corners.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
election-methods mailing list - see http
It then becomes Instant Runoff by Schwartz Set. Nothing wrong with
that except as with all instant runoff methods it is no longer
summable and requires multiple passes through the whole set of votes.
In this case two passes. First pass, find the Schwartz set, second
pass find the highest
If I understand this, it's a Condorcet cycle resolution system based
purely on who was 1st pick on each ballot. So, count up the virtual
round robin matrix, and count 1st place votes separately for later if
needed.
It's incomplete. A Condorcet method can elect someone no one put in
for
Here's a sample of what the rest of the world is hearing about
proportional representation and other election methods.
http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-voting25dec25,1,404720.story
This little bit got me really annoyed:
Bob Mulholland, political director for the California Democratic
://bolson.org:9080/voting/voting/sim_one_seat/
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On Fri, 22 Dec 2006, Warren Smith wrote:
Approval with mean-as-threshold seemed to look bad in the sense that
it could prevent some candidates from ever winning, and make their winning
regions
lie far away from them if they existed. (This is assuming I believe the
pictures
I saw, which
In the outlying areas of two or more color fuzz the mixed colors are
effectively getting tied all the time and a random winner among the
tied winners chosen, thus random fuzz.
These areas usually occur when the center of the population is more
than one standard deviation away from all of
Zoomed out a factor of ten, some odd results show up far from the
grouping of candidates:
http://bolson.org/voting/sim_one_seat/zoomout/
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
? If the strategy is to vote yes for the top half and no for the
bottom half, then it makes sense to try and split the middle choice in
half that way.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
On Wed, 20 Dec 2006, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I slightly modified the ApprovalNoInfo code and re-ran
http://bolson.org/voting/sim_one_seat/dist/
I also have 3 computers running these things and I'll post the results as
available, as Kevin noted, some of the newest addditons are already up.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
A BIG thank you to Raphfrk and Kevin Venzke! I've integrated the code
they posted and I'm running the simulations currently, results to be
posted in 1-3 days of compute time...
Here's a first one to whet your appetite, ApprovalNoInfo with three
candidates showing a perhaps odd consequence
On Dec 12, 2006, at 9:55 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Mostly I've independently verified the results, but I've added my
favorite pet method, Instant Runoff Normalized Ratings (IRNR) into
the mix.
When you say you average results, does that mean you mix the colour ?
in _some_
language, C, C++, java, javascript, perl, python, heck I'll even
accept PHP, LISP or FORTRAN, I'll translate it and fit it into the
test harness.
Anyway, mostly I wanted to share the pretty graphs I made of
simulated elections. An ounce of data is worth a pound of theorizing?
Brian
attempts t give reasons to prefer 0-99,
http://rangevoting.org/Why99.html
Yeah, selectable range is I think top on the to-do list of new features
coming. (Right after making no-vote different from the neutral-vote, which
is implemented but not published yet.)
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org
Sounds interesting, can you post a link to Rivest's original paper on
this? Or at least a Bibliographical entry on what journal it was published
in?
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Nevermind, google shall provide, this must be it:
http://theory.csail.mit.edu/~rivest/Rivest-TheThreeBallotVotingSystem.pdf
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
summation of the
ratings, per-ballot-rating methods such as IRNR and raking-derivation to
Borda or Condorcet/VRR are not possible.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
On Fri, 29 Sep 2006, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Very interesting method. Just a quick question. The article mentions that
rank-order
/andru/civs.html ) or my site, but maybe that's
just groundless paranoia.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
or ratings
ballots and all that.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
pushing for minimize the average distance of each person
to the center of their district. I have a solver and some results here:
http://bolson.org/dist/
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
On Fri, 1 Sep 2006, Steve Barney wrote:
It seems to me that a requirement that districts have to be convex
may
First they ignore you. Then they laugh at you. Then they attack you.
Then you win.
If this is somewhere between laughing at us and attacking us, we
should be on schedule to get better election methods around here in
the next couple years. :-)
Also, I really hope this is reporter error and
:40 PM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
At 3:28 PM -0700 7/21/06, Brian Olson wrote:
Also, I really hope this is reporter error and they're not actually
implementing the broken bizarro-IRV described in the article.
Worse, actually. Check out their multi-seat variation.
http://www.ncleg.net/sessions
What's a district for? Districts achieve geographic representation on the theory that some region of people will share some concerns, or simply on the practical matter that it's administratively convenient and efficient to divvy up representatives that way.Districts have sometimes been contorted
On Jul 8, 2006, at 9:26 AM, James Gilmour wrote:Brian Olson Sent: Saturday, July 08, 2006 8:53 AM I still think I want a bicameral legislature with one districted body and one PR/proxy/asset body. If you want a bicameral legislature, why would you want one chamber elected so that it is
Condorcet. with CSSD)
Single Transferrable Vote (with droop quota and meek reweighting. for
multi-seat elections)
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On Mar 12, 2006, at 8:28 AM, radio deli wrote: Dear Jan, I saw your post on the Elections Methods List. As a Vermont legislator, we may have to decide the issue of IRV on a statewide basis. To be honest, I'm not very enthusiastic about IRV. I would prefer to support the candidate (not plural)
Brian Olson posted and ended up
with a
slightly different pairwise table:
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(0)- 5545 6747 3991 6790 7336
(1) 3556- 5165 3397 5136 5875
(2) 1161 1289- 804 2028 3290
(3) 4763 5730 6961- 7027 7351
(4) 987 1318 1869 603- 3094
(5) 323
Count this too:
http://bolson.org/voting/vote_util/
Java, C++ and perl implementation of a bunch of methods.
On Nov 23, 2005, at 6:55 AM, Anguo wrote:
Hello,
I'm trying to compile a small list of election methods
software.
I'm particularly interested in php software for the web, but
How about this, I'm going for writing the law such that the elections
official in charge can choose from a few approved, good enough,
election methods. So, you pass this law once, and various places try
Condorcet, IRNR, even IRV, and it's a simple thing for state or
county elections
On Jul 15, 2005, at 9:52 AM, Stephen Turner wrote:Mostly, but not only about Diebold. I wonder how these companies stay in business.HAVA, the Help Americans Vote Act, ensures that there will be nice shiny new voting machines in every precinct in the US by November 2006. That's a few billion
%0AC%3EA3%3EA1%3EA2%3EBsystems=all
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
for the proposal.
Assuming the Committee found something like this acceptable, there
might be little more for them to do, beyond existing.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
non-deterministic method
and I'll back it up with rhetoric like people should vote, not random
number generators.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
)
ballots.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
probable winner. If
you've gone and added non-determinism to some method, we've now wasted
a million minus one election calculations.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
free, strategy free election method. I'm going
to implement Gradual Approval and add it to my Election Calculator
soon. Then we'll see what kind of puzzles we can dream up for it.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
:
Date: Wed, 15 Dec 2004 20:30:19 -0800
From: Brian Olson [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Is range voting the panacea we need?
Straight rating summation is vulnerable to strategic voting. Perhaps
in
this study people voted honestly because it obviously didn't matter
and
so there was no incentive
list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
info
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Since its my pet method, I made a slideshow explaining Instant Runoff
Normalized Ratings.
PDF (219KB)
http://bolson.org/voting/IRNR_explaination.pdf
QuickTime (2.3MB)
http://bolson.org/voting/IRNR_explaination.mov
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http
counts, or whatever, here are the results:
http://bolson.org/voting/sf2004/
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
=/chronicle/archive/2004/
11/06/BAG9G9MO0L34.DTL
the biggest race had 32144 votes.
Between this story and all of the snafu going on with the DRE voting
machines, my appraisal of the quality of software engineering in this
country is going down. Even Microsoft could do better.
Brian Olson
http
On Oct 18, 2004, at 7:09 AM, Bill Clark wrote:
On Fri, 15 Oct 2004 11:03:28 -0700, Brian Olson [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
I think I'm allergic to the use of randomness in election methods, so
I
don't plan on implementing such an option.
The unique appealing feature of random methods
need some convincing of other variations.
I think I'm allergic to the use of randomness in election methods, so I
don't plan on implementing such an option.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
need some convincing of other variations.
I think I'm allergic to the use of randomness in election methods, so I
don't plan on implementing such an option.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
that this reform will involve a lot of discussions with
citizens about what fairness means in a single-winner election.
I naturally gravitate towards a Utilitarian measure of fairness which
is make the most people the happiest or maximize social utility. I
based
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election
and would like your election method added, there's a
pretty simple abstract class with just a couple methods to implement.
See the javadoc:
http://bolson.org/voting/vote_util/doc/org/bolson/vote/VotingSystem.html
Happy Hacking!
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see
would guess that IRV is a good fit to Kislanko's desires from a
voting system.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
behind-the-scene deals. As far as I can tell,
the best fix is a responsive participatory democracy where people at
whatever level (voter, representative) are paying some attention to
what goes on in the parts they have a vote over and they vote the bums
out as needed.
Brian Olson
http
only be workable for PR, districts have to be worked out in
advance.) What if PR was such that any 200,000 votes elected a
candidate? That number would have to be tuned based on expected turn
out, and desired size of legislative body.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing
/vote_form.html ).
Although, I'll also have a similar Instant Runoff Normalized Ratings
for PR there.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
for the same party.
Or at least, So it is defined in California elections code (a pedantic
document full of gaps and yet taking up over two megabytes of plain
text).
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
!).
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
again. I included it for some sort of completeness, and because my
front end makes no enforcement against casting tied-ranking ballots.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
around zero
to use the fixed approval cutoff.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
important to get one of those I approve
(and not get one of those I don't approve) than to distinguish within
them.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
think I've seen more usage
of 1p1v as equal voting power.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
. Now you can have
(ta dah!) Instant Runoff!
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
about the candidate by placing a lower and higher rating.
So, on a scale of 0 to 10, I'm pretty unsure about Ralph Nader though
he seems pretty good, so I'll give him a [4,8].
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Rankings (no
shifting, no scaling, simple summing) is equivalent
(psychological/anthropological effects aside) no matter what the scale.
Some rated systems behave differently if signed numbers are used or if
positive-only numbers are used.
OK so far?
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election
On May 22, 2004, at 9:54 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
--- Brian Olson [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Well said. This argument goes back at least as far as the canonical
work by Kenneth Arrow. In laying the axioms on which his conclusions
lay, he argued that you can't compare utility _between_ people.
I
sized chunks and each uses a different strategy to modify their votes.
I count an Election Method as good when the group that votes honestly
has the highest average happiness (over several thousand simulated
elections).
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http
.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
people. We
declare them all to be equal. That's why the ideal has been One Man,
One Vote. (Unless you're a shareholder where the system is 'one share,
one vote')
Given that we _can_ compare utilities between people, Rating systems
become the natural basis, rather than Ranking systems.
Brian
of
fairness. This particular variation can still be taken advantage of.
The proper vote is 1.0 for all choices with positive utility and -1.0
for all others. That maximizes my expected utility. But, the experiment
as I understand it was applying various voting systems to honest
preferences.
Brian
better)Reliability Std.(lower better)Consensus Std.(lower better)
I suppose it's similar overall, but I think I see more variation in the
primary statistic Average Happiness, which makes me wonder if there's
some artifact in your simulator.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
should
any of you like it?
Breakfast for thought, good day. :-)
(results calculated with http://bolson.org/voting/vote_form.html )
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
,
they can speak all they want, and they'll have their vote in their own
house. That's enough influence.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
-at-the-time.
(Never mind that IRV might miss the compromise choice and jump straight
to what some opposing faction prefers.)
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
77 matches
Mail list logo
