Allen Pulsifer wrote:
Going back to the example I gave, the Condorcet majority that elected D was
made up of everyone who did not rank A the highest, i.e., the Not A's, and
they all coalesced around D. In reality a coalition like that would never
happen and if it did, it could not be held
Jonathan Lundell wrote:
What we want, it seems to me, is to be able to persuade the voter to
vote sincerely, and to do so honestly. The problem with burying is
that it's a both simple and relatively obvious, and in particular
elections might become widespread.
Which is why voter education
radio deli wrote:
What are the problems you see with IRV? Could you explain them in a
way
that people without a statistics degree (like me) could comprehend? I
hope you have a chance to respond---you seem quite knowledgeable on the
topic!
Here's a great commentary posted by Ralph Suter
James Gilmour wrote:
Jan Kok Sent: Monday, March 13, 2006 4:07 AM
Yes, I agree that the election rules affect how people vote.
But, unsophisticated IRV supporters are not aware that there
can be incentives to vote insincerely in IRV elections, or
may believe that IRV and Condorcet will
Quoting James Gilmour [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Eric Gorr Sent: Monday, March 13, 2006 1:31 PM
James Gilmour wrote:
Jan Kok Sent: Monday, March 13, 2006 4:07 AM
Yes, I agree that the election rules affect how people vote.
But, unsophisticated IRV supporters are not aware that there
can
Quoting rob brown [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Ok, I've made it pretty clear I am not a fan of Range Voting as it has been
presented. However, I could see it being done in a way that is fair and
does not encourage people to inadvertedly do something that is counter to
their interests.
Just a guess,
Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Thu, 01 Sep 2005 14:08:08 -0400 Eric Gorr wrote:
Most of the places for which RVH claims value cannot benefit without
voters accepting it as suitable - give them a black box without content
they can understand with reasonable effort and they properly choke.
Again, what
Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Fri, 02 Sep 2005 08:26:32 -0400 Eric Gorr wrote:
Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Thu, 01 Sep 2005 14:08:08 -0400 Eric Gorr wrote:
Most of the places for which RVH claims value cannot benefit without
voters accepting it as suitable - give them a black box without
content
Eric Gorr wrote:
The primary reason why the RVH is better then simply selecting a tied
candidate at random is because it provides a statistical edge to those
candidates who are preferred by a majority of voters.
For a concrete example, let's say that you have a genuine three way tie
Dave Ketchum wrote:
Let's say that we have the following set of ballots:
60:abc
20:bca
20:cab
Since I see a winning via majority vote, I see no tie to need breaking.
Indeed.
There is a 60% chance the tie breaking order would be: abc
There is a 20% chance the tie breaking order would
Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Fri, 02 Sep 2005 14:44:40 -0400 Eric Gorr wrote:
Eric Gorr wrote:
The primary reason why the RVH is better then simply selecting a tied
candidate at random is because it provides a statistical edge to
those candidates who are preferred by a majority of voters
Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Wed, 31 Aug 2005 12:29:17 -0400 Eric Gorr wrote:
Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Wed, 31 Aug 2005 11:22:21 -0400 Eric Gorr wrote:
Dave Ketchum wrote:
OnTue, 30 Aug 2005 14:45:58 -0400 Eric Gorr wrote:
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Definite_Majority_Choice
Dave Ketchum wrote:
OnTue, 30 Aug 2005 14:45:58 -0400 Eric Gorr wrote:
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Definite_Majority_Choice
When it comes to the handling of ties, what objections would there be
to using Eppley's Random Voter Hierarchy (RVH -
http://alumnus.caltech.edu/~seppley/MAM
Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Wed, 31 Aug 2005 11:22:21 -0400 Eric Gorr wrote:
Dave Ketchum wrote:
OnTue, 30 Aug 2005 14:45:58 -0400 Eric Gorr wrote:
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Definite_Majority_Choice
When it comes to the handling of ties, what objections would there
be to using Eppley's
B wins under Condorcet Voting [Ranked Pairs variant, winning votes,
equality-ranking permitted] according to Eric Gorr's calculator at
http://www.ericgorr.net/condorcet/. (Incidentally, I think this is also
the same as what has been called Steve Eppley's MAM method.)
It is not.
A MAM
Simmons, Forest wrote:
Here's when I first saw the light that DMC was the best Condorcet
proposal:
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2005-March/015418.html
Where can one find a detailed definition of DMC?
--
== Eric Gorr
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Definite_Majority_Choice
When it comes to the handling of ties, what objections would there be to
using Eppley's Random Voter Hierarchy (RVH -
http://alumnus.caltech.edu/~seppley/MAM%20procedure%20definition.htm)?
It seems likely that injecting some possible
, is unaffected.
--
== Eric Gorr === http://www.ericgorr.net ===
Government is not reason, it is not eloquence, it is force; like fire,
a troublesome servant and a fearful master. - George Washington
== Insults, like violence, are the last refuge of the incompetent
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
In a message dated 8/13/05, Warren Smith writes:
Given that this is the case, we now can take it to be 100% certain that
Condorcet voting methods will lead to 2-party domination, just like the
flawed plurality system those methods were supposed to fix, and just
like
Warren Smith wrote:
WDS: Specifically, it is NOT possible to determine your strategically-optimal
range vote
working without any information about what the other voters are doing.
Eric Gorr:
Yes, it is.
Simply decide who you wouldn't mind seeing as the winner and give them
the highest
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Warren Smith wrote:
--Actually, as a math PhD, what I understand is that the
Condorcet criterion is NOT already well-defined
This mystifies me. I've long understood the Condorcet criterion
to mean that if one candidate would defeat all others in one to one
contests,
to see win and the lowest possible ranking to
those they don't. Those not voting this way are at a disadvantage.
This, of course, effectively reduces the method to Approval Voting.
--
== Eric Gorr = http://www.ericgorr.net = ICQ:9293199 ==
Those who would sacrifice a little freedom
of voters who preferred a b might be different then those
who preferred a c.
--
== Eric Gorr === http://www.ericgorr.net ===
Therefore the considerations of the intelligent always include both
benefit and harm. - Sun Tzu
== Insults, like violence, are the last refuge
and few between.
--
== Eric Gorr = http://www.ericgorr.net = ICQ:9293199 ==
Those who would sacrifice a little freedom for temporal safety
deserve neither to be safe or free. -- Benjamin Franklin
== Insults, like violence, are the last refuge of the incompetent... ===
Election
Kevin Venzke wrote:
With ranked ballots one can't be sure that
the method won't pick and choose what information to use, or even (in the
first example) use the information to elect the ballot's last choice.
I do wish that the various Condorcet Methods passed the Participation
Criterion, much
Dave Ketchum wrote:
Remember that the topic is ties, rather than splitting up a district
with a fixed quantity of real voters. The district could have had 3000
real voters in 2 groups of 1500 or 3 groups of 1000 - or whatever made
the desired example.
I fail to see the significance of
Ken Kuhlman wrote:
The method proposed below, which I call Correlated Instant
Borda Runoff, is basically a tweak of Baldwin to solve the clone problem.
There seems to be a problem with a case where a high-correlation would
exist, but there are not actual clones...i.e. your method may
Chris Benham wrote:
Critics of IRV haven't said that IRV is evil. We've only said that IRV
isn't a significant reform or a significant improvement over Plurality.
The part after We've only said that.. logically implies that either:
(1) IRV is evil , or
(2) Plurality isn't evil, or is only
Alex Small wrote:
Am I the only person who sees the irony in awarding another poster an
award for posts with personal attacks, and naming the award after a
third poster?
I don't know.
However, I never read that particular post.
I assume this award was granted and named by Mike or Russ?
Rob Lanphier wrote:
I don't know who started this flamewar, and quite frankly, I don't care.
Please stop the personal attacks and profanity. Attacking ideas is
fine. Attacking people is not.
I would recommend doing what I have done and just simply deleting
everything they choose to post.
Araucaria Araucana wrote:
But that doesn't explain why he can't find his sent email -- even free
web email has a 'sent-mail' folder.
Some e-mail applications require that one enable this feature or allows
one to disable it.
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for
Juho Laatu wrote:
Ex. 1: Sincere preferences:
46: ABC
44: BAC
5: CAB
5: CBA
Ex. 1: Pairwise comparisons:
AB 51-49
AC 90-10
BC 90-10
And the B voters then voted strategically 44: BCA and as a result B
won the election.
But, since the C voters who also ranked A above B, know they don't
Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hello,
Is this Ranked Pairs tie-breaking method usable?:
Suppose AB and CD are of equal strength as strength is being defined.
If B is not D and one of B and D defeats the other pairwise, then rank
AB ahead of CD if D defeats B, or vice versa if B defeats D.
Else (when B is D,
Kevin Venzke wrote:
Eric,
--- Eric Gorr [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Else (when B is D, or B and D tie pairwise) rank AB ahead of CD if A
defeats C pairwise, and CD ahead of AB if C defeats A pairwise.
Looks interesting.
What would you do if neither A nor C defeat the other pairwise?
Maybe throw
I was just poking around some of the election method pages at wikipedia
and noticed that on this one:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voting_system
it states that IRV does not pass the Participation criterion. Now, I was
under the impression that it did.
--
== Eric Gorr = http
Russ Paielli wrote:
Eric Gorr eric-at-ericgorr.net |EMlist| wrote:
Russ Paielli wrote:
What is too complicated? Nobody knows the exact answer to that
question, of course, but let me tell you what I think.
I think you can forget about any method that cannot be explained in
two or three sentences
Juho Laatu wrote:
Hello All,
In an earlier mail I brought up the question what would be the best
Condorcet completion method in the case that we would have the luxury of
sincere votes.
Why do you believe sincere votes are a luxury with respect to a good
condorcet completion method?
--
== Eric
Russ Paielli wrote:
What is too complicated? Nobody knows the exact answer to that question,
of course, but let me tell you what I think.
I think you can forget about any method that cannot be explained in two
or three sentences understandable by persons of average intelligence.
Maybe that can
I finally got around to a much needed upgrade to my voting calculator.
I got rid of the need to enter the number of options and the names of
the candidates - both are now taken directly from the entered ballots.
I also cleaned up some of the output and added some useful output for
the IRV
-index.php?page=SanFrancisco2004
--
== Eric Gorr = http://www.ericgorr.net = ICQ:9293199 ==
Therefore the considerations of the intelligent always include both
benefit and harm. - Sun Tzu
== Insults, like violence, are the last refuge of the incompetent... ===
Election-methods
and I
fail to see how this could be a rational choice.
--
== Eric Gorr = http://www.ericgorr.net = ICQ:9293199 ==
Those who would sacrifice a little freedom for temporal safety
deserve neither to be safe or free. -- Benjamin Franklin
== Insults, like violence, are the last refuge
Bart Ingles wrote:
Eric Gorr wrote:
I believe the numbers you are looking for are contained within the
published results at:
http://www.sfgov.org/site/uploadedfiles/election/results.htm
I've seen the round-by-round result on the SF web site, but I believe
you'd have to crunch through
the USA and I don't believe a
convincing case could be made that this claim is accurate.
--
== Eric Gorr === http://www.ericgorr.net ===
I believe each individual is naturally entitled to do as he pleases
with himself and the fruits of his labor, so far as it in no way
determined by random.
However, I would agree with the following statement:
I think voters will reject any method that isn't deterministic except in
the case where a true tie requires a resolution.
--
== Eric Gorr = http://www.ericgorr.net = ICQ:9293199 ==
Therefore
I am doing my own count of the votes and I seem to be having trouble
getting the same tally for district 9 that match the official results.
The data I am using comes from:
http://web.sfgov.org/site/election_index.asp?id=28171
The results can be found at:
I found the reason why my counts were different from the official tally
for District 9, but this leads to more confusion on how the ballots were
counted...is anyone more familiar with the IRV counting rules used in SF
then myself?
First, there were only 7 candidates in the race...6 named and 1
Greg Dennis wrote:
just FYI on the San Francisco data . . .
a vote for candidate (number-of-candidates + 1) indicates an overvote,
which is a vote for more than one candidate at the same rank. in
District 9 there were only 7 candidates, so a vote for candidate 08
indicates an overvote. SF
I'm actually not sure how to best respond to a message such as:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/instantrunoff-freewheeling/message/905
which argues that Approval Voting preserves the spoiler effect. Anyone
want to jump in?
--
== Eric Gorr = http://www.ericgorr.net = ICQ:9293199
provide further details...I am merely repeating
my understanding of his method based on past conversations with him.
--
== Eric Gorr === http://www.ericgorr.net ===
The more you study, the more you know. The more you know, the more you
forget. The more you forget
find elections both with and without a CW, at:
http://www.ericgorr.net/library/tiki-index.php?page=BallotArchives
--
== Eric Gorr = http://www.ericgorr.net = ICQ:9293199 ==
Those who would sacrifice a little freedom for temporal safety
deserve neither to be safe or free. -- Benjamin
, which is why I got these two groups confused) and the message
was sent to that list as well, but apparently never approved for posting.
Here is a reference to the message, posted a few days ago.
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/instantrunoff/message/1927
--
== Eric Gorr = http://www.ericgorr.net
, Condorcet, and Plurality produce the same
winner.
Were there Condorcet Winners in all seven districts as well?
--
== Eric Gorr === http://www.ericgorr.net ===
The more you study, the more you know. The more you know, the more you
forget. The more you forget, the less
...this is the first I've ever seen that claim
made...any idea on what it might be based on?
--
== Eric Gorr === http://www.ericgorr.net ===
The more you study, the more you know. The more you know, the more you
forget. The more you forget, the less you know. So, why study
In a recent conversation with an IRV supporter I asked the question:
What cases would you accept as failure of IRV?
They answered:
Where the general public (or a significant fraction of it) failed to
accept the results as legitimate, or at least beyond question. The
2000 and 2004 Presidential
James Green-Armytage wrote:
Eric Gorr wrote:
In a recent conversation with an IRV supporter I asked the question:
What cases would you accept as failure of IRV?
They answered:
Where the general public (or a significant fraction of it) failed to
accept the results as legitimate, or at least beyond
Dave Ketchum wrote:
Agreed this is a simulation rather than a real election, but it is
simple enough that it could easily happen.
Unfortunately, I am only seeking cases of real elections, not simulations.
--
== Eric Gorr === http://www.ericgorr.net ===
Those who would
, but it would still be interesting to see them actually reject
the evidence some will declare does not exist and will never exist.
--
== Eric Gorr === http://www.ericgorr.net ===
Therefore the considerations of the intelligent always include both
benefit and harm. - Sun Tzu
Daniel Bishop wrote:
Eric Gorr wrote:
In a recent conversation with an IRV supporter I asked the question:
What cases would you accept as failure of IRV?
They answered:
Where the general public (or a significant fraction of it) failed to
accept the results as legitimate, or at least beyond
Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Tue, 08 Mar 2005 14:14:41 -0500 Eric Gorr wrote:
Daniel Bishop wrote:
Eric Gorr wrote:
In a recent conversation with an IRV supporter I asked the question:
What cases would you accept as failure of IRV?
They answered:
Where the general public (or a significant fraction
Forest Simmons wrote:
... if I can ever recover from my horrible malady :'(
Well, I, for one, wish you a speedy recovery!
So, I wonder, is Craig really gone this time?
--
== Eric Gorr === http://www.ericgorr.net ===
Those who would sacrifice a little freedom
interesting to say about the other.
Yes, I agree completely.
I certainly just don't care and truly hope it is now over.
If you want to flame me because of my extraordinarily low opinion of
both of you, feel free. You will not get a reply - your opinion of me is
simply unimportant.
--
== Eric
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Here is the corrected
version.
Dang...that was excellent.
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Craig Carey wrote:
| Subject: [EM] Chris, Range-Voting
| From Markus Schulze markus.schulze at alumni.tu-berlin.de
| Sat Jan 1 16:08:58 PST 2005
|
| * Previous message: [EM] Chris, Range-Voting
| * Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
|
| Hallo,
That is an
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/instantrunoff-freewheeling/message/829
Some of the more interesting comments by James Salsman
Because Condorcet voting can more easily be manipulated by strategic
voting (i.e., marking whichever of the top-two candidates you do not
want to win dead last after people
Thought this was cool.
OPINION LINE EXTRA
http://www.kansas.com/mld/eagle/news/editorial/10206460.htm
The two-party system is broken. Both the Democrats and the
Republicans are corrupt, and our throw away your vote system put
them there. Look up Condorcet voting, then write your legislators
in
At 8:03 PM -0800 11/15/04, Bart Ingles wrote:
What would be an example of a spoiler (ICC or other violation) which
is NOT an irrelevant alternative?
With IIA, the spoiler is a candidate that is either added or removed
from the ballots.
With ICC, the spoiler is among the ballots already.
At 3:14 PM -0600 11/16/04, Paul Kislanko wrote:
No one can be added or removed
from a ballot after the votes have been counted,
Sure one can...just do it and recalculate.
so by this distinction
there is no such thing as an IIA spoiler.
I believe there is.
Compute the winner.
Start removing
At 8:16 PM -0800 11/14/04, Bart Ingles wrote:
Eric Gorr wrote:
At 7:44 AM -0800 11/12/04, Justin Sampson wrote:
On Fri, 12 Nov 2004, Eric Gorr wrote:
Well, it will cause IRV to fail the Independence of Clones Criterion and
thereby be subject to a spoiler effect again.
Doesn't IRV suffer from
On Fri, 12 Nov 2004 23:25:55 -0500, Eric Gorr [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Well, use the one that Dr. Tideman proposes.
I would assume that it would fall into the resolute model.
Isn't the resolute model just, well, wrong?
The topic under discussion is not the relative merits of the variants
of ICC
the strong version of IIA (and by strong version, I
assume we are speaking about the one Dr. Arrow used) imply passing
ICC?
--
== Eric Gorr = http://www.ericgorr.net = ICQ:9293199 ===
Therefore the considerations of the intelligent always include both
benefit and harm. - Sun Tzu
At 10:11 AM -0500 11/12/04, Warren Schudy wrote:
1) Did the ballot only allow each voter to give the top three choices? I
suspect that restriction would significantly decrease the effectiveness of
IRV.
Well, it will cause IRV to fail the Independence of Clones Criterion
and thereby be subject to
At 7:44 AM -0800 11/12/04, Justin Sampson wrote:
On Fri, 12 Nov 2004, Eric Gorr wrote:
Well, it will cause IRV to fail the Independence of Clones Criterion and
thereby be subject to a spoiler effect again.
Doesn't IRV suffer from spoiler effects anyway?
Depends.
The method itself passes the ICC
At 1:47 PM -0500 11/12/04, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Fri, 12 Nov 2004 13:06:23 -0500 Eric Gorr wrote:
At 7:44 AM -0800 11/12/04, Justin Sampson wrote:
On Fri, 12 Nov 2004, Eric Gorr wrote:
Well, it will cause IRV to fail the Independence of Clones Criterion and
thereby be subject to a spoiler
At 12:25 AM +0100 11/13/04, Markus Schulze wrote:
Dear Eric Gorr,
you wrote (13 Nov 2004):
I am not talking about the IIA variant that you prefer, but Dr.
Arrow's variant (which does not involve probabilities - unless
I am mistaken), so my question to you stands.
So when you want to use
into the resolute model.
--
== Eric Gorr = http://www.ericgorr.net = ICQ:9293199 ===
Therefore the considerations of the intelligent always include both
benefit and harm. - Sun Tzu
== Insults, like violence, are the last refuge of the incompetent... ===
Election-methods mailing
, this statement would imply that
satisfaction of IIR implies satisfaction of ICC.
Now, I don't recall seeing this claim before, but wanted to check
here before I edited the page in case the statement is true.
--
== Eric Gorr = http://www.ericgorr.net = ICQ:9293199 ===
Therefore
At 6:04 PM + 11/11/04, Paul Crowley wrote:
On Thu, 11 Nov 2004 12:08:31 -0500, Eric Gorr [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
hummmthere appears to be two opposing points of view here.
Chris B. claims that IIA satisfaction does imply ICC satisfaction.
Markus S. claims that it does not.
I'm
At 10:42 AM -0800 11/11/04, Steve Eppley wrote:
Hi,
Eric G wrote:
On the current wikipedia page for the Spoiler Effect, it says:
A voting system which satisfies the independence of irrelevant
alternatives criterion is immune to the spoiler effect,
Now, considering people use the term
would be
happy to place them on my website and I'm sure others would like to
have that stuff as well.
--
== Eric Gorr = http://www.ericgorr.net = ICQ:9293199 ===
Therefore the considerations of the intelligent always include both
benefit and harm. - Sun Tzu
== Insults, like
the 'Tell Me Everything' option.
http://condorcet.ericgorr.net/
You should be able to find some interesting ballot sets to paste at:
http://www.ericgorr.net/library/tiki-index.php?page=BallotArchives
--
== Eric Gorr = http://www.ericgorr.net = ICQ:9293199 ===
Therefore
.
--
== Eric Gorr = http://www.ericgorr.net = ICQ:9293199 ===
Therefore the considerations of the intelligent always include both
benefit and harm. - Sun Tzu
== Insults, like violence, are the last refuge of the incompetent... ===
Election-methods mailing list - see http
At 8:34 PM -0700 10/12/04, James Cooper wrote:
I am convinced of the technical superiority of Condorcet over other
methods. However, the lack of any real world implementations to point
to, and the difficulty of explaining the tie-breaker make it very
difficult to explain to voters.
If you would
At 12:36 PM -0700 10/11/04, Dr. Ernie Prabhakar wrote:
Hi Paul,
Perot is the clear Condorcet winner, but that cannot be the right result. If
you replace those names with A, B, C the result looks ok.
I suspect the issue with your example is that:
45% Bush Perot
10% Perot
45% Clinton Perot
is
.
--
== Eric Gorr = http://www.ericgorr.net = ICQ:9293199 ===
Therefore the considerations of the intelligent always include both
benefit and harm. - Sun Tzu
== Insults, like violence, are the last refuge of the incompetent... ===
Election-methods mailing list - see http
At 3:40 PM -0500 10/6/04, Paul Kislanko wrote:
I am beginning to like this idea myself. One could extend the
grades allowed a bit, without leaving what would be well
understood by the voters with including the +, - grades as well.
This gives 14 possible bins (A+ A A-, ... , D+ D D-, F, E) in
At 2:43 PM -0700 10/6/04, Dr. Ernie Prabhakar wrote:
Paul, I don't think anyone is saying you 'must' support MAM, or that
everyone will like it. If so, I agree that's silly.
I think the statement being made is that -- even given an unusual
series of cyclic ties like this -- MAM gives an
At 3:12 PM -0700 10/6/04, Dr. Ernie Prabhakar wrote:
On Oct 6, 2004, at 2:58 PM, Paul Kislanko wrote:
But, to use the terminology and techniques y'all do, let's examine the
BALLOTS that result if B is not a candidate:
4: AC
5: CA
Adding B to the mix causes A to be elected, even though all voters
Just found this
How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Electoral College
by randym77
Sat Sep 25th, 2004 at 03:58:43 GMT
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2004/9/24/235843/656
--
== Eric Gorr = http://www.ericgorr.net = ICQ:9293199 ===
Therefore the considerations
At 6:27 AM -0400 9/16/04, James Green-Armytage wrote:
Not sure why Colorado is doing this,
Because the electoral college is widely recognized to be an
anti-democratic antique, left over from the time that ordinary people were
not trusted with the decision of electing the president.
topic
At 12:04 PM -0500 9/6/04, Paul Kislanko wrote:
Suppose I were a staunch pro-life believer, so anti-abortion is
my most important criterion. There are 5 candidates in the race, and
A E are both anti-abortion, but have opposite views on gun control
(A for, E against) and capital punishment (A
Let's keep these kinds of discussions off the list. I am not
interested. No, it does not matter how important you think your final
thought is...I am not interested.
If you would like a suggestion on an appropriate location for such
discussions, I would be happy to provide them off-list.
Paul
At 9:50 AM -0400 9/1/04, Stephane Rouillon wrote:
Dear bunch of electoral reformists,
I am now (it seems so) officially Doctor Rouillon.
Congratulations!
And I got a job interview for tomorrow.
Nice. Good luck!
--
== Eric Gorr = http://www.ericgorr.net = ICQ:9293199 ===
Therefore
At 10:58 PM + 8/31/04, Rob Brown wrote:
Eric Gorr eric at ericgorr.net writes:
You are welcome to show that such a strategic advantage would exist
for MAM, using an example of a good Condorcet method.
Not sure I understand you. If there is not an advantage to ranking them
explicitly, why
, various political groups could provide theirs,
etc.
The voter could select one of these rankings or would always have the
option of doing it themselves...some voters will take the time to
educate themselves.
--
== Eric Gorr = http://www.ericgorr.net = ICQ:9293199 ===
Therefore
At 10:09 PM + 8/31/04, Rob Brown wrote:
Eric Gorr eric at ericgorr.net writes:
If you choose to not pick one from this list, you can do the rankings
yourself. I can't imagine this would not be important for general
acceptance. People will want the option even if most do not use it.
Well
At 3:41 AM -0400 8/26/04, James Green-Armytage wrote:
P.S. Yes, I am totally joking... hopefully Craig is too...
That was just to funny.
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
I was looking at the IRV page on wikipedia
(http://en.wikipedia.org/w/wiki.phtml?title=Instant-runoff_voting)
and noticed in the tie-breaking rules that when one eliminates all of
the candidates at once who are tied for least votes that IRV would
then violate independence of clones.
Can
Never mind...the answer is obvious. If enough clones are running in
the same race, it is possible that they will all tie for least votes
and all be eliminated even though one of them would have won should
they have been eliminated one at a time.
At 11:16 AM -0400 8/18/04, Eric Gorr wrote:
I
Anyone want to take a stab an giving an explanation of Condorcet
Voting in 12 words or less...?
Had a conversation recently with an IRV supporter who is supporting
IRV over Condorcet and Approval Voting because IRV can be explained
in 12 words or less (but has yet to provide that explanation)
pairwise winner.
Six words. :)
Mike Rouse
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Eric Gorr wrote:
Anyone want to take a stab an giving an explanation of Condorcet
Voting in 12 words or less...?
Had a conversation recently with an IRV supporter who is supporting
IRV over Condorcet and Approval Voting because IRV can
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