Date: Sat, 19 May 2007 16:38:03 -0700 (PDT)
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [EM] Presidential debate ordering
A few days ago, we had the Republican debates on TV, and I came to the
conclusion that having ten people on the stage at once was an unmanageable
mess.
What I'd like to see is
Oops:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/6622963.stm
Review under way on voting chaos:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/6623287.stm
Election group criticises ballots:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/6628657.stm
All this even after a how to vote publicity campaign on TV!
Thanks,
Date: Thu, 21 Dec 2006 18:36:06 +0100 (CET)
From: Kevin Venzke
Subject: Re: [EM] Election methods in student government...
--- Tim Hull a ?crit?:
Regarding the single winner methods, it seems that IRV or MMPO may be the
way to go there if one wants to maintain later-no-harm.
Here's an
Date: Fri, 20 Apr 2007 18:52:05 -0400
From: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] election-methods Digest, Vol 34, Issue 22
At 05:12 PM 4/20/2007, Howard Swerdfeger wrote:
I disagree:
Imagine a classical 2D political spectrum:
Date: Thu, 26 Apr 2007 20:37:21 +0200 (CEST)
From: Kevin Venzke
Subject: [EM] RE : Re: Election methods in student government...
IRV satisfies LNH but strictly speaking does not allow equal rankings.
MMPO satisfies LNH but allows equal rankings. Would there be any
benefits in
Date: Tue, 24 Apr 2007 20:32:01 -0400
From: Tim Hull
Subject: Re: [EM] Student government - what voting system to
recommend?
I know the Condorcet winner is preferred to every other candidate - however,
I'm in particular assuming ballots like this:
48% - 10 D 2 PW 0 R
47% - 10 R 2
Date: Tue, 17 Apr 2007 15:37:04 -0400
From: Tim Hull
Subject: [EM] Cumulative Voting with Elimination - idea for simple PR
system...
1. Voters vote for up to n candidates - n being either # of open seats or #
of candidates
2. Each voter has one vote equally and evenly divided among the
Date: Tue, 17 Apr 2007 14:28:56 -0400
From: Howard Swerdfeger
Subject: Re: [EM] PR in student government
Voting Instructions:
1. You only have ONE vote.
2. Place an X in the box NEXT to your candidate of choice.
3. Your vote counts both for your candidate and your party.
Party A
I don't know whether something similar to the below was posted to this
list previously:
http://electionupdates.caltech.edu/2006/12/threeballot-tested-by-mit-
students.html
Given that I was finding out about (DVD) cryptography, I was not
expecting to find a link about 3-Ballot voting...
Thanks,
Date: Sat, 18 Mar 2006 10:52:34 -0500
From: raphfrk
Subject: [EM] Electing a proportional executive/cabinet
The only example I know of is the N. Ireland one. Under that system,
the d'hondt system is used. The largest party gets first choice and so
on based on the d'hondt system. This
As many some people may know, the World Cup will take place in Germany
during June/July this year. Many of the top national soccer teams have
qualified for the World Cup, including Brazil, Italy and England.
Before the competition starts, the coaches of each of the national teams
must select a
Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2005 00:30:35 + (UTC)
From: Rob Brown
Subject: Re: [EM] scored condorcet, etc
Candidate's Score = Total No. of Ballots - Max wv against Candidate
That's close to what I was thinking. I probably would, rather than
using total
number of ballots, use something that
Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2005 22:22:00 + (UTC)
From: Rob Brown
Subject: Re: [EM] scored condorcet, etc
I would probably want to do some normalization with the scores so that
higher scores are better, and so that the score of the lowest
candidate
is not zero unless he really got zero
On Mon, 2005-11-21 at 16:00 -0600, Paul Kislanko wrote:
I have a personal distrust of methods that score by looking at only the
contents of the pairwise matrix, but there should surely be a mapping from
the CW back to the ballots that contributed to the CW being the CW. Take
those ballots and
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2005 07:55:40 + (UTC)
From: Rob Brown [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] what is this method called?
Wow no one?
I'll try to reword since my first explanation was rather rambly and
not all that
clear.
The candidate with the smallest sum of all losing margins is
Date: Sun, 20 Nov 2005 23:29:16 -0800
From: rob brown
Subject: [EM] scored condorcet, etc
Therefore, my goal is to come up with a way of producing numerical scores
from a condorcet election that can be shown, for instance, as a bar graph.
If I remember rightly, Forest and then I came up
Date: Mon, 26 Sep 2005 18:45:11 -0500
From: Paul Kislanko
Subject: [EM] RE: Bucklin
I still don't see why A+=Bothers is any different from ABothers.
OK. Another way to describe A+=Bothers is ABothers, which is not
quite the same as ABothers.
For a moment, having the '+' the way you
Rather than starting from scratch, I thought I would instead quote my own
e-mail so that I don't have to re-explain myself. The quotes have also
been (sort of) moved about slightly.
From: Gervase Lam
Subject: Possible Multi-Winner Pairwise techniques/algorithms (Part 1)
Date: Sunday 29 May
In the Parts 1 and 2, the 'seeds' are ballots. The winners come/develop
from these seeds.
The problem with this is that the methods I discussed do not guarantee n
winners. So, I decided to take it from another direction. What if the
seeds were the candidates themselves.
If each candidate x
While finding a way to group candidates together in order to find a
multi-winner pairwise method, I came up with a technique/algorithm for MAM
that partially works. It should also work for Ranked Pairs, considering
that RP is almost the same as RP.
Imagine that so far MAM has created a two
Date: Sun, 29 May 2005 03:02:21 +0100
From: Gervase Lam
Subject: [EM] Possible Multi-Winner Pairwise techniques/algorithms
(Part 1)
For each (non-deleted) ballot (which shall be called x) in l:
(i) Get the head-to-heads involving x at or above R.
(ii) List out the ballots
Date: Sat, 12 Mar 2005 17:06:44 -0800 (PST)
From: Forest Simmons
Subject: [EM] Approval/Condorcet Compromise
Kevin's Approval Runoff in which low approval candidates are eliminated
until there is a Condorcet Winner, can also be described as follows:
Pick the lowest approval score candidate
Rather than trying to be a posts about a particular method, these will be
stream of consciousness posts about a few techniques/algorithms that
could possibly be used in for Multi-Winner Pairwise methods. There were
quite a few things that inspired me, including the way MinMax works under
the
Date: Thu, 24 Mar 2005 01:00:12 +
From: Gervase Lam
Subject: Re: [EM] Sincere methods
If you want something a bit more strategic resistant, Reynaud(Margins)
might be a good step up.
Schulze(Margins) (also known as Cloneproof Schwartz Sequential Dropping
and Beatpath etc...) is possibly
Date: Sun, 27 Mar 2005 19:24:00 +0200 (CEST)
From: Kevin Venzke
Subject: [EM] LNHarm performance: CDTT and Schulze
I wrote a simulation to measure the rate of LNHarm failures under
certain circumstances. I've used it to compare a CDTT method,
Schulze(wv), Schulze(margins), and
Date: Sat, 26 Mar 2005 00:01:02 +0200
From: Juho Laatu
Subject: Re: [EM] Sincere methods
On Mar 24, 2005, at 03:00, Gervase Lam wrote:
If you want something a bit more strategic resistant, Reynaud(Margins)
might be a good step up.
Should I thus read your comment so that you see MinMax
Date: Sun, 27 Mar 2005 19:24:00 +0200 (CEST)
From: Kevin Venzke
Subject: [EM] LNHarm performance: CDTT and Schulze
Results:
CDTT,MMPO,FPP: 13.7 LNHarm, 1177.5 LNHelp.
Schulze(wv): 193 LNHarm, 750 LNHelp.
Schulze(marg): 306 LNHarm, 675.5 LNHelp.
Schulze(opp): 291.5 LNHarm, 838.5 LNHelp.
Date: Wed, 23 Mar 2005 09:15:52 +0200
From: Juho Laatu
Subject: [EM] Sincere methods
I already gave some support to seeing MinMax (margins) (least
additional votes) as one potential sincere method (criticism
received too).
If you want something a bit more strategic resistant,
Date: Sun, 13 Mar 2005 19:17:22 -0800 (PST)
From: Alex Small
Subject: RE: [EM] Round Robins
Say we have a round robin tournament
between soccer teams from USC, UCLA, and UCSB. Say that USC beats UCLA
2-1, UCLA beats UCSB 4-1, and UCSB beats USC 2-0.
Who would be declared the winner of
Date: Mon, 7 Mar 2005 10:17:43 -0800 (PST)
From: Alex Small
Subject: [EM] Equal Rankings in Real World Voting Systems
As to whether equal rankings complicate the Approval cutoff, I prefer to
just have separate yes/no boxes by each candidate's name (or even a
separate Approval section of the
Date: Sat, 26 Feb 2005 17:33:39 -0800
From: Russ Paielli
Subject: [EM] optimal Condorcet truncation
After thinking more about this proposition, I think the Approval formula
(see http://ElectionMethods.org/Approval-formula.htm) applies to
Condorcet voting also.
If this has been suggested
Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2005 14:23:08 -0800 (PST)
From: Forest Simmons [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Clock Methods
Thanks for taking time to explore. And nice text graphics for the
clock!
I think I spent a bit too long calculating how to draw the text graphics...
It turns out that as long
The article talks about solutions to allow ethnic groups not to be
surpressed. This has been briefly discussed before on this list. It
doesn't go into great depth on the subject, but for those who are
interested...
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4196101.stm
Thanks,
Gervase.
Date: Sat, 22 Jan 2005 16:37:12 -0800 (PST)
From: Forest Simmons
Subject: [EM] Clock Methods (for Three Candidates)
Take a clock face and put labels A, B, and C at 12:00, 4:00, and 8:00,
respectively. At 2:00, 6:00, and 10:00 put the labels not(C), not(A),
and not(B), respectively.
Then
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2004 04:49:45 +0100 (CET)
From: Kevin Venzke [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Defection, nomination disincentive, MMPO
Also, every example I've seen of MMPO's Majority failure involves
the use of four slots. It's always this scenario:
20 ABCD
20 BCAD
20 CABD
13 DABC
Date: Sun, 19 Dec 2004 18:56:17 +0100 (CET)
From: Kevin Venzke
Subject: [EM] MMPO, Majority, Condorcet failures
29 B
19 AB
9 AC
43 C
CW is C, but the MMPO winner is A.
This scenario is particularly interesting because A is either
a weak centrist candidate, or else someone taking
From: Matthew Dempsky
Subject: Re: [EM] Re: Election-methods Digest, Vol 4, Issue 13
Date: Thursday 14 October 2004 02:09 am
On Mon, 2004-10-11 at 20:45, Gervase Lam wrote:
Kemeny can be basically described as follows:
[...example elided...]
It seems similar in concept to finding
From: Gervase Lam
Subject: Re: [EM] Re: Election-methods Digest, Vol 4, Issue 13
Date: Thursday 14 October 2004 22:41 pm
From: Matthew Dempsky
Subject: Re: [EM] Re: Election-methods Digest, Vol 4, Issue 13
Date: Thursday 14 October 2004 02:09 am
On Mon, 2004-10-11 at 20:45, Gervase
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 2004 20:34:41 -0700
From: James Cooper
Subject: [EM] Approval vs. IRV
The requirement to rank all the
candidates also results in some odd side effects (like 'how to vote'
cards, and the horrific 'donkey vote').
May be it is not strictly a 'how to vote' card, but for
This weekend, I thought I would use Kemeny's Method on the following
example that Steve Eppley used in order to demonstrate MAM to me:
4: ABC
3: BCA
2: CAB
Result Matrix:
A B C
A [- 6 4]
B [3 - 7]
C [5 2 -]
Date: Sun, 10 Oct 2004 20:51:43 EDT
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [EM] Reply
Date: Wed, 06 Oct 2004 10:05:24 -0700
From: Steve Eppley [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Does MAM use the Copeland method?
Gervase L asked:
Just a quick question that should clear up my understanding
of MAM. Is it the same as Copeland (i.e. count each
candidate's number of wins)
Just a quick question that should clear up my understanding of MAM. Is it
the same as Copeland (i.e. count each candidate's number of wins) except
that any pairwise wins that are inconsistent with the Rank Pairs ranking
are dropped before the Copeland score is tallied up?
Thanks,
Gervase.
From: Philippe Errembault
Subject: Re: [EM] Using weights to compensate multiple votes (It's
mostlyaboutPR)
Thanks for the hint... Do you know where/how I can access those archives
?
Philippe
- Original Message -
From: Bart Ingles [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: EM List [EMAIL
Date: Thu, 1 Jul 2004 15:52:28 -0700 (PDT)
From: Forest Simmons [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [EM] A Deterministic Version of Rob LeGrand's Ballot by Ballot
DSV
In my humble opinion one of the best methods ever invented is Rob
LeGrand's Ballot by Ballot DSV based on Approval Strategy A.
On
Date: Sat, 22 May 2004 23:26:40 -0500 (EST)
From: Adam H Tarr [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Efforts to improve on CR's strategy
1) Identify the two frontrunners, and pick your favorite among them.
2) Give your favorite frontrunner a 10, your less favored frontrunner a
0, and everyone
Date: Thu, 20 May 2004 16:46:02 -0700
From: Ken Johnson
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [EM] Efforts to improve on CR's strategy
SincereCR: A(0.7), B(0.5), C(0.3), D(0.1), E(-0.1), F(-0.3)
(This assumes signed CR's, with an approval cutoff of zero.) What I call
ExaggerateCR simply
Date: Fri, 21 May 2004 00:12:40 -0700
From: Ken Johnson [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [EM] Efforts to improve on CR's strategy
A particular candidate, say candidate 1, has a set of candidate
position indices CP1[1] for issue 1, CP1[2] for issue 2, etc. Each
position index is in the range -1 to
Just in case people are interested...
First a little bit of background on the current election in India:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/3645127.stm
The news report itself about the device being used:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/3493474.stm
Main page for the
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2004 17:21:21 +0100 (CET)
From: =?iso-8859-1?q?Kevin=20Venzke?=
Subject: [EM] another idea (proportionality and intra-party competition)
Open list. Each voter votes for one list, and *any number* of
candidates within that list. So it's Approval within the party, and the
Date: Tue, 09 Mar 2004 13:16:38 -0500
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
From: Adam Tarr [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: RE: [EM] Request for help: complex election
Only that there's no proportionality in this system. So, if 75% of the
voters want one set of four candidates, and 25% of the voters want
From: Gervase Lam
Date: Sun, 7 Mar 2004 13:59:27 +
Subject: [EM] Condorcet, Weber and Info
All that
needs to be known is whether you think one candidate is better than
another. However, I get the feeling that Utilities will matter more the
more complicated the scenario.
The last
About a month ago, I made a brief mention of the fact that the Weber
formula can be used to investigate Condorcet methods. I'll use it to look
into five cases.
(1) 0-info with a voter's utilities being A=1 B=0.75 C=0.5 D=0.25 E=0
As this case is 0-info, the formula to calculate the Weber
From: Steve Eppley
Date: Wed, 03 Mar 2004 06:58:22 -0800
Subject: Arrow's axioms (was Re: [EM] Re: [Fwd: Election-methods digest,
Vol 1 #525 - 9 msgs])
By Arrow's
time, they'd learned that, lacking mind-reading
technologies, they couldn't elicit cardinal utilities that
could be compared
Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2004 00:50:55 +0100 (CET)
From: =?iso-8859-1?q?Kevin=20Venzke?=
Subject: [EM] Minimally improving Approval
I've been half thinking about this and also one of things that Forest
sort of mentioned that really it would be nice for MCA to have a moveable
top slot quota instead
Date: Wed, 11 Feb 2004 06:12:09 -0800
From: James Green-Armytage
Subject: [EM] poll fever
I'd suggest that we give the candidates cardinal ratings from one to a
hundred too, but I guess that may as well be optional, since I don't
want to make this any more complicated than it is already.
From: James Gilmour
Subject: RE: [EM] Extremely simple voting for committee
Date: Sun, 1 Feb 2004 08:30:24 -
It seems
to me to be a simple Yes / No ballot. I accept the Committee as it
stands or I do not accept the Committee as it stands. (What happens
if the majority of those who
For 0-info, I am almost convinced that Vote for the above-mean
candidates is the strategy to use. I'll start from the beginning. (Note
that what I'll be doing won't be exactly how Weber presents his
calculations inpublications.)
In order to work out what a voter should put on an Approval
Date: Sat, 31 Jan 2004 15:22:09 +0100
From: Markus Schulze [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Condorcet for public proposals - IMV
For Ernest's proposal, I suggest terms like Smith-MinMax
or Smith-Simpson-Kramer.
I agree with Markus here. In fact, there are quite a few names involving
Date: Wed, 28 Jan 2004 10:20:09 -0500
From: Adam Tarr
Subject: RE: PR vs. Geographic Representation [WAS: RE: [EM] Bill
Lewis, never re-district]
I also suggest you check out proportional approval voting (PAV). Here's
the initial thread about it:
From: Joe Weinstein [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Thu, 20 Nov 2003 00:10:11 -0800
Subject: [EM] CONFIRMATION SAMPLE SIZE
CONFIRMATION SAMPLE SIZE (WAS Re: Re: Touch Screen Voting Machines)
THE QUESTION. In EM message 12737, Wed. 19 Nov 03, Ken Johnson asked:
Suppose you have a
Date: Fri, 21 Nov 2003 01:21:16 +0100 (CET)
From: =?iso-8859-1?q?Kevin=20Venzke?= [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Approval Strategy A- Question for Rob LeGrand
My thoughts:
Plurality will be the most proportional because it can occasionally
elect a fluke candidate to represent weird
From: Joe Weinstein [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Thu, 20 Nov 2003 14:51:13 -0800
Subject: [EM] Batch of old mail
Reject any non-list-member message, but insofar possible in your
rejection response tell the sender:
(1) 'You must join the list in order to post to it.'
(2) How to start
Date: Fri, 21 Nov 2003 01:42:05 +0100
From: David GLAUDE [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [EM] [OT] Kenneth Arrow theory... anyone?
[[Do you know that a multi-cultural society cannot be democratic?
The Nobel Prize Kenneth Arrow mathematically showed, in 1952, that there
was no possible democracy
Date: Wed, 19 Nov 2003 21:41:07 -0800
From: Rob Lanphier [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [EM] Batch of old messages
a. allow legit posts through, regardless of how old
I don't think this is a good idea. As you mentioned earlier, somebody
could have figured out they needed to subscribe and
Date: Tue, 04 Nov 2003 01:11:06 +0100
From: David GLAUDE [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [EM] does Election-methode require e-voting?
How hard is it to manually count the vote for those method to be
applyed? How hard is it to hand compute the result (once the vote are
properly hand counted)?
Do
From: Gervase Lam [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Re: Hand counting election methods
Date: Wed, 19 Nov 2003 01:19:20 +
I was mostly using intuition in this particular post, which was about hand
counting a Condorcet vote. I was mostly focussing on whether the
counting would obtain
Date: Sun, 16 Nov 2003 20:59:39 +0100
From: David GLAUDE [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Electronic Voting Bill of Rights?
I would like to know wich one are possible to handle with manual
counting on large scale.
I am sure there are lots that can be hand counted. It depends on how much
Date: Sun, 16 Nov 2003 17:59:28 -0500
From: Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Electronic Voting Bill of Rights?
It depends on whether you do Disk-At-Once or Track-At-Once recording.
If you do Disk-At-Once (i.e. write all the ballots in one go), then
what I said above
The 2x2x2 grid can of course be extended yet again to a 2x2x2x2 grid by
using two sheets of paper. The first sheet is for those who voted Yes
for candidate A while the other is for those who voted No for candidate
A. The top grid on each page is for those who voted Yes for candidate B
while
Date: Sun, 16 Nov 2003 00:24:57 -0500
From: Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: David GLAUDE [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Electronic Voting Bill of Rights?
Recording ONLY at the end was my assumption.
Each record of votes is required to contain votes in random order -
From: Gervase Lam [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Displaying intermediate results in Condorcet-based
elections Date: Fri, 31 Oct 2003 02:34:09 +
I've thought of another way of doing this without using Kemeny-Young. I
should have thought of this earlier: 'Plain' Condorcet.
I should
Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2003 19:10:06 -0800
From: Rob Brown [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Displaying intermediate results in Condorcet-based
elections (re: Rob Brown's original question)
My original request was to suggest a way to produce a single scalar
score per candidate which
Date: Thu, 30 Oct 2003 10:07:12 -0800
From: Rob Brown [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Displaying intermediate results in Condorcet-based
elections
You just don't want a lot of after-the-fact
questions like How could Sally have lost? She was 'ahead' by 30 points
yesterday
Date: Thu, 30 Oct 2003 13:55:07 -0500
From: Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Displaying intermediate results in Condorcet-based
elections (re: Rob Brown's original question)
Someone mentioned Approval - I object for, while the math is easier to
implement, the voter must
Date: Fri, 17 Oct 2003 05:37:48 -0400
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Donald Davison)
Subject: [EM] Gervase, may I correct you?
Back in August, I ranked Irving number one, not number ten (number one
being the best).
But, you got something right when you said that I ranked Approval number
eight.
Date: Thu, 9 Oct 2003 00:50:47 +0200 (CEST)
From: =?iso-8859-1?q?Kevin=20Venzke?= [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] three-slot methods
The voter places each candidate in one of three slots.
The ballots are counted such that each voter gives a vote to every
candidate placed in either the
Date: Sat, 4 Oct 2003 18:23:28 +0200 (CEST)
From: =?iso-8859-1?q?Kevin=20Venzke?= [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] lower preferences
Donald wants high-utility candidates (at least, high-utility for SOME
group). I would recommend Approval, but Donald seems worried that voters
will not be
Date: Thu, 2 Oct 2003 08:41:52 -0700 (PDT)
From: Alex Small [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [EM] real-world Condorcet election
Other interesting feature: Apparently the pairwise results yielded a
transitive ranking of all 10 states. There weren't even cycles among
some of the less popular
Date: Fri, 19 Sep 2003 18:55:08 -0700 (PDT)
From: Forest Simmons [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Call for Ideas on Automatic Approval Cutoff Finding
Here's the simplest idea along these lines that seems promising to me.
Well. The idea is easier to explain than Max Power Cardinal
79 matches
Mail list logo
