It is also important to understand that simple Plurality on a Yes/No
question, where the question is formed through deliberative process,
will settle on the Condorcet winner, when there is one.
But, of course, deliberative process is far more complex than the polling
part.
I am sorry if
Every amendment like this is a pairwise election, and, as part of the
process, there is debate and open communication among the members;
Fair enough, I believe you are correct. Thanks for the explanation.
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
A few days ago, we had the Republican debates on TV, and I came to the
conclusion that having ten people on the stage at once was an unmanageable
mess. At thirty seconds per answer, candidates were limited to faux anger
and soundbites, while the cheers and applause
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
It is often possible effect who actually votes elections by selecting when
the voting occurs. For example, the general election in Ireland is being held
on Thursday.
However, university exams are being held at the moment. This means that
students are much
Interesting idea. 10 people on stage is to many. but 45 pair wise
debates it a lot for the public to watch.
Perhaps there is a good middle ground say, 4-5 people on stage at
once.
and try to make sure that each candidate faces each candidate on
stage once.
There could be different
On MMP - I wonder if anyone has looked into the semi-proportional
nonpartisan MMP I mentioned earlier... It would do a best-loser top-up
by %
The closest thing I can think of is DM-MMP
It was proposed by some committee commissioned by the Government of Quebec.
It had 2 members per riding.
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 10:10 AM 4/25/2007, Howard Swerdfeger wrote:
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 06:41 PM 4/24/2007, Juho wrote:
If you vote Approval style, you fail to express your true
appreciation of the candidates, and this can backfire.
Yes, but typically/statistically
Juho wrote:
On Apr 24, 2007, at 1:51 , Howard Swerdfeger wrote:
a) I guess I was thinking of Non-competitive as one where the
winner is obvious long before the contest is held (boxing: Me vs
Mike Tyson). and competitive as one where the winner is not known
until the last possible
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 06:41 PM 4/24/2007, Juho wrote:
If you vote Approval style, you fail to express your true
appreciation of the candidates, and this can backfire.
Yes, but typically/statistically Approval strategy improves the outcome.
No. Check out Warren's simulations.
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 03:56 PM 4/24/2007, Juho wrote:
On Apr 24, 2007, at 1:51 , Howard Swerdfeger wrote:
4) The ultimate form of democracy is one that
* maximizes voter knowledge of issues
* seeks to Involve the voters at every stage of decision making
process (direction
. all
of the multi-seat districts).
Tim
On 4/25/07, Howard Swerdfeger [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 06:41 PM 4/24/2007, Juho wrote:
If you vote Approval style, you fail to express your true
appreciation of the candidates, and this can backfire.
Yes
would be important.
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
--
---
Howard Swerdfeger
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
613-792-3508
522-195 Clearview Ave.
Ottawa, Ontario
K1Z 6S1
Chris Benham wrote:
Howard Swerdfeger wrote:
Tim Hull wrote:
Condorcet, on the other hand, does not suffer
from the center squeeze. However, it suffers from the opposite
problem -
the so-called Pro Wrestler or Loony syndrome in an election with a
couple polarized candidates
Range is expressive and it is able to treat these two different types
of Pro Wrestlers differently. Its problem is that it in practice
easily becomes Approval (only min and max values used) in competitive
elections.
does it?
I have seen arguments stating that a knowledgeable voter
Juho wrote:
On Apr 23, 2007, at 17:40 , Howard Swerdfeger wrote:
Range is expressive and it is able to treat these two different
types of Pro Wrestlers differently. Its problem is that it in
practice easily becomes Approval (only min and max values used)
in competitive elections
See the below links:
Cute interesting stuff about
* democracy in bees
* Massively multilayer online pong
* other forms of quick turn around (democratic) decision making systems.
http://www.kk.org/outofcontrol/ch2-a.html
http://www.kk.org/outofcontrol/ch2-b.html
They are exerts from Out of
In many voting systems also small parties may get representatives.
The #1 reason behind emergence of a two-party system is maybe the use
of single seat districts.
Agreed.
smaller number of voters
I think the same logic is mostly there. Let's arrange some two voter
elections.
wrote:
From: Howard Swerdfeger Sent: 17 April 2007 17:37
Tactical voting is easy in STV.
Step 1 : Determine what your preferred ranking is.
Step 2 : Determine who is sure to lose the election
Step 3 : Rank all candidates you are sure will loose above
the rest of your real list
Tim Hull wrote:
Hi,
I e-mailed this list a while back about election methods in student
government. I'm at the University of Michigan, and we use a variant of the
Borda count for our elections where you get as many votes as open seats.
Slates of candidates typically contest elections as
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 10:58 AM 3/30/2007, Howard Swerdfeger wrote:
It is not voters or citizens who are to blame.
It is the people who are in power, that fear a loss of power that would
come with a new system. These are the people to blame. They are the ones
that conduct
Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Between two evils, I always pick the one I never tried before. - Mae West
If only voters were willing to try something different from what they've
been unsuccessfully trying for decades.
It is not voters or citizens who are to blame.
It is the people who are in
Howard Swerdfeger's xls sheet btw doesn't behave exactly the same way
as the written description of the method says. It doesn't let the Mars
results drop below 45%. Thanks to Howard Swerdfeger for providing the
sheet. Tthat is a good method to give clear (operational) definitions
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 09:32 AM 3/14/2007, Howard Swerdfeger wrote:
[it was written]
In general, I dislike indefinitely repeated elections because they
increase voting costs for both the society and the voters in propotion
to the number of rounds they require.
agreed
What is the justification for Bayesian Regret, as used in IEVS and
described at http://rangevoting.org/BayRegDum.html, being the
uniquely right metric, the gold standard, for comparing different
election methods or varying election scenarios?
I think this is a good question and I don't
There is a conflict that exists between some people when counting a
simple yes|No ballot. Some would say that a simple majority is all that
is needed, while others would suggest an absolute majority or super
majority should be required for some decisions, still others would argue
for some
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