I don't know if anyone else is interested -- since it is only single page
out of three -- but
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/WhosCounting/story?id=3327876page=1 has
a story entitled
Who's Counting: Alternative Voting Methods and Mitt Romney's
Mathematical/Political Gaffes
Assigning First,
A few days ago, we had the Republican debates on TV, and I came to the
conclusion that having ten people on the stage at once was an unmanageable
mess. At thirty seconds per answer, candidates were limited to faux anger
and soundbites, while the cheers and applause gave it a gameshow feel.
(Well,
I was looking at the Yee diagrams again, and I was wondering if anyone had
created tiebreaker diagrams. By that I mean remove the part of the image
where no tiebreaker is necessary, leaving just the part where there is
some type of tie, since this is typically the area you get voting
paradoxes.
I honestly didn't know that (though I should have realized such a simple
idea would already be in use somewhere). I'll have to check out Above the
line voting. Thanks!
Michael Rouse
James Gilmour wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: 06 January 2007 16:39
One partial solution is to require all
Chris Benham wrote:
I'm happy with its performance in this old example:
101: A
001: BA
101: CB
It easily elects A. Schulze (like the other Winning Votes defeat
dropper methods) elects B.
It meets my No Zero-Information Strategy criterion, which means that
the voter with no idea how
Well, it's a little late, but I did a test of the IFNOP (Ignore Fewest
Number of Preferences) method using 4 examples from the Wikipedia
article on the Schulze method. I picked Schulze because it is fairly
well-behaved with fewer voting paradoxes than many other methods.
Example 1 (45 voters; 5
I#8217;ve been doing some checking of the IFNOP method (I should probably
rename it, since it involves ignoring the lowest preferences, not simply
the fewest in number). Here is the method again, for reference:
1. Each voter ranks as many candidates as desired.
2. If there is a Condorcet order
Okay, I'll try this again. Sorry about the weird characters in my previous
email -- I copy/pasted from Word, and apparently it likes to put it's own
formatting into things. I'll try to redo this correctly, though it isn't
my fault if it fails (grin).
*
I've been doing some
Dave Ketchum wrote:
DO NOT DO any switching such as you describe below.
Even if it is far down in a voter's ranking, it is what this
voter said about this pair. If this pair is far down in the
list, there are many candidates this voter has ranked as
better.
You're right, flipping the votes
The problem with an attack like this is that it requires a lot of
co-conspirators. An attack by a few people may work in the absence of a
paper trail (at least until someone gets a profitable book deal), but
for this attack to succeed, everyone would have to
A) Copy his against Bush votes to
That's true, this method would definitely require computers to generate
the ballots, which is a fairly significant flaw. I was mainly throwing out
ideas to see if someone would think of something clever and say, AHA! If
you just do it this way, people can easily cast a secure Condorcet vote
they
Warren Smith [EMAIL PROTECTED]
A revolutionary new protocol called 3ballot was introduced in September
2006 by MIT's Turing-award-winning cryptographer Ron Rivest.
You know, you said this, and I didn't even realize that Rivest was the R
in the RSA public key encryption algorithm. A very bright
(This is a continuation of the thread, 3ballot - revolutionary new
protocol for secure secret ballot elections.)
I originally thought that simply having two ballots reflecting my choice
(say, ABC) and one the anti-choice (CBA) would be sufficient to allow
a ThreeBallot version for Condorcet.
I was playing with the ThreeBallot method some more today, and I realized
you could make my previous Condorcet suggestion far more secure by
converting the rank list to pairwise comparisons. Let's assume you have a
computerized voting booth -- since the method is much more difficult with
just pen
(I sent this yesterday morning, but unfortunately I cut and pasted
[EMAIL PROTECTED] instead of
[EMAIL PROTECTED] Anyway, it still seems on-topic.)
I read through Rivest-TheThreeBallotVotingSystem.pdf, and I was
wondering one thing. It says:
To vote FOR a candidate, you must fill in exactly two
(I apologize for this long post -- I thought it would be a brief couple
of questions but it grew from there.)
I've been looking into proxy voting, and I've been impressed with many of
the features of it, especially how it reduces wasted votes and eliminates
gerrymandering in legislative
I did some checking, and I found out that plotting candidates on the
triangle ABC *did* violate IIA. Worse yet, it violates the majority
criterion. For example, if you had 50.1% in the triangle ACB and 49.9% in
the triangle CBA, the center of mass would be somewhere in CAB (the center
of mass
While googling around this morning, I found a web page on voting geometry,
complete with Flash examples you could play with, on the following
website:
http://mathdl.maa.org/mathDL/4/?pa=contentsa=viewDocumentnodeId=1195pf=1
I did have a question on it, though. In the representation triangle, if
Kevin Venzke wrote:
Do you mean that after you found the center of mass for the complete
triangle, you would elect the candidate corresponding to the corner
that the center of mass is nearest to?
That, and it gives the entire rank order depending on which area it lands
in -- for example, in
From Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Agreed that the bare land should be taxed, mostly for consuming roadside
frontage.
But, the five-star hotel owes more because it requires access to a major
highway.
Land with access to a major highway would be worth more, and thus would
pay higher land rent.
I recently became interested in the problem of taxation myself, though at
this point I kind of lean toward the geolibertarian side -- tax people for
the land rent of their property (equivalent to what renting bare land
would be, rather than the total cost of land+improvements like a property
tax),
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