One strategic vulnerability of PR-STV is vote management. This is where a
party tries to ensure that most of their first choice votes are split equally
between all their candidates in the hope that the quota will drop.
For example, assume a 4 seater
37A1A2
27 B
18 C1C2
18 C2C1
Thanks. I have created 2 methods.
The first one is approval zero info. In this case, the voter averages his
utility for all the candidates and places his approval threshold at the average.
The second one is the same as above. However, it runs 2 elections. The first
election uses the same
About Scott Ritchie's feel alike vote same FAVS criterion
that all members of a feel-alike group should want to vote the same.
FAVS is falsified by IRV if incomplete information:
either A or B need 5 more votes to surpass the hated C and/or the 50% mark
(but you do not know which) and your
Hi,
I believe this code is good for VFA. I am assuming there is a getMin
similar to getMax.
I might also like to implement two-slot MMPO (average rating as the
approval cutoff).
It would be interesting to try implementing a strategic Borda. Perhaps
start with a zero-info approval round, and
A BIG thank you to Raphfrk and Kevin Venzke! I've integrated the code
they posted and I'm running the simulations currently, results to be
posted in 1-3 days of compute time...
Here's a first one to whet your appetite, ApprovalNoInfo with three
candidates showing a perhaps odd consequence
Brian,
--- Brian Olson [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Here's a first one to whet your appetite, ApprovalNoInfo with three
candidates showing a perhaps odd consequence of how the threshold
gets set.
Thanks. Looking at that result, compared with other methods' results
on your site, and noting
