Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise

Dear Steve, Although Jobst may not have intended this assumption, I will continue to make the assumption that the B minority's preference intensity for the compromise C over A is much greater than the A majority's preference intensity for A over C. Sorry, I had just not read carefully

Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the comprom ise when there're only 2 factions

Dear Abd ul-Rahman, Okay, here is my solution. The B voters gain some very substantial advantage for the election of C over the favorite of the A voters, who have only a substantially smaller preference for A over C. So the B voters offer something of value to the A voters to compensate

Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise

Dear Forest, The main thing I overlooked was vote trading. So there are two main devices for solving the challenge: vote trading and randomness. There is a third one! One of the oldest voting methods that have been studied can also solve it at least in part. I wonder who will first see

Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise

Dear Kevin, Hi, It seems to me there might be a use for something like the method that was proposed awhile ago that had to do with offering voters incentives to give sincere ratings. For example, the majority would give the sincere score to their compromise in exchange for their vote

Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions

At 09:16 AM 8/25/2007, Jobst Heitzig wrote: I don't think nearly half of the electorate should pay the other half for getting what is the more just solution in my eyes. Perhaps that is a difference in culture? No. It's an understanding of what utilities mean. If A does not win, the supporters

Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise

At 09:09 AM 8/25/2007, Jobst Heitzig wrote: Dear Abd ul-Rahman! Range *is* a majoritarian method since a majority can elect whomever it wants by bullet voting. That does not contradict what I wrote. Being a majoritarian method does not make the method Majority Criterion compliant. I did

Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise

At 09:01 AM 8/25/2007, Jobst Heitzig wrote: Dear Steve, Although Jobst may not have intended this assumption, I will continue to make the assumption that the B minority's preference intensity for the compromise C over A is much greater than the A majority's preference intensity for A over

Re: [Election-Methods] [EM] A more efficient strategy-free ratings-based method than Hay voting

Jobst, It was Hay Voting that I was referring to. Maybe this post contains the desired answer to your puzzle? Kevin Venzke --- Jobst Heitzig [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : Dear Forest, you wrote: I have one question, though. If best strategy is to report true utilities, then what do you