I'm writing a ranked pairs counter as practice for learning python, and
I realized I don't know the answer to this question.
Suppose I want to know who comes in second in a ranked pairs election.
Is it:
1) Run ranked pairs algorithm on the ballots, find that candidate A
wins, then purge A from
Dear Kevin,
your wrote:
The problem is that if you do not guarantee the majority that they will
get their favorite if they vote sincerely, then they will stop telling
you who their compromise choices are.
No. In D2MAC there is no such guarantee (since it is not majoritarian) and this
fact is
On 10/14/08, Greg Nisbet [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I would like to know what is currently wrong with the strategic voting
simulations.
One objection I would have is that in real life all candidates are not
treated equally by the voters.
This is especially true in something like plurality. One
Scott Ritchie wrote:
I'm writing a ranked pairs counter as practice for learning python, and
I realized I don't know the answer to this question.
Suppose I want to know who comes in second in a ranked pairs election.
Is it:
1) Run ranked pairs algorithm on the ballots, find that candidate A
Hi, you wrote:
encourages people to vote honestly
What makes you believe this?
Yours, Jobst
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Hi folks,
you're right, the option ending up second in the ranking constructed in
RP is also the one that wins when you exclude the first winner. Even
more so, the whole new ranking is just the old one with the top removed.
There is, by the way, a related major difference between RP and the
On Tue, Oct 14, 2008 at 2:04 PM, Brian Olson [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Once upon a time, I designed an election method to fix the strategy problem
with Range Voting.
The method I call Instant Runoff Normalized Ratings (IRNR):
1. Collect ratings ballots
2. Normalize each ballot so that each has
Btw, if we are bringing up old posts :p, any views on this page?
http://ivnryan.com/ping_yee/results.html
since you technically mentioned Yee diagrams.
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
With all the talk about Range Voting and its plusses and minuses, I
wanted to inject this back into the mix.
Once upon a time, I designed an election method to fix the strategy
problem with Range Voting.
The strategy problem:
You shouldn't cast a ballot with your honest ratings, you should
Instant Range-off Voting is an interesting idea. I thought about it once a
while ago too. I didn't renormalize the ballots though, I just set the
co-highest to 100 and the co-lowest to 0 for each ballot as a sanitation
measure. I eventually abadoned it due to nonmonotonicity, but I think the
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_STV
definition:
minimal pair-- borrowing the term from linguistics, in this context it
means two sets of candidates that differ only by one member. E.g. [X,Y,Z] vs
[X,Y,A]
test candidate-- the candidate that is different in each element of the
minimal pair.
On Oct 14, 2008, at 12:11 PM, Raph Frank wrote:
On Tue, Oct 14, 2008 at 2:04 PM, Brian Olson [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Once upon a time, I designed an election method to fix the strategy
problem
with Range Voting.
The method I call Instant Runoff Normalized Ratings (IRNR):
1. Collect ratings
12 matches
Mail list logo
