assuming throughout optimal strategical voting under near perfect
information.
It seems to me that vote trading and/or randomness are needed to solve
this challenge.
Forest W Simmons wrote:
I was thinking of vote against one, which could be called Reverse
Plurality, the base method for each
Under strategic voting with good information, any decent deterministic
method (including Approval) would elect the Condorcet Winner A .
Uncertainty as to the faction sizes could get C elected, but not
necessarily.
So some randomness is essential for the solution of this problem.
The
I understand why Mike thinks the public is not ready for DYN, yet.
I think if Approval were adopted, then the logic of DYN would soon
become obvious.
Also, keep DYN in mind the next time you have an election of some kind
in a small group.
The three main advantages of DYN over plain Approval
