On 6 May 2013, at 2:08 PM, Jonathan Denn i...@agreater.us wrote:
Plurality voting without the Electoral College
In a three way race for POTUS. Let's say we have the traditional D and R. A
fringe third party candidate runs and is widely hated (H) by everyone except
his/her supporters. But
On 5 Feb 2013, at 9:50 AM, Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com wrote:
Dear all,
We recently managed, after some effort to elect some people in our
party using STV (five of seven board members of the Czech Green Party
and more recently some people to lead the Prague organisation etc.).
We used
On 5 Feb 2013, at 10:23 AM, Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com wrote:
Say the default proportional ranking method elects women to all five
seats, and thus that we need to modify it in a good way in order to
satisfy the constraints.
Now the question is: How should the quoted seats be
On Nov 3, 2011, at 9:17 AM, Fred Gohlke wrote:
re: Why the lack of public participation?
Our elections lack public participation because the election methods extant
do not allow, much less encourage, public participation in the selection of
candidates for public office or public
On Oct 9, 2011, at 5:04 PM, matt welland wrote:
So now I'm going to have to stare at a ballot with 20 items and 20!
possible arrangements (is it really that many? its been a long time
since stats class). All I can say is that it sucks and I'd prefer to
stick with broken plurality rather than
On Aug 29, 2011, at 6:25 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
Dave Ketchum wrote:
NOT true, for the vote, without the voter's vote, could be a tie - and
the voter's vote mattering.
That notion of effect has several drawbacks:
...all of which merely serve to minimize its practical importance, not
On Aug 27, 2011, at 12:25 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 27.8.2011, at 2.13, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Aug 26, 2011, at 1:17 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 24.8.2011, at 2.07, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
But back to a possible generic meaning of a score or cardinal rating: if
you think
On Aug 26, 2011, at 12:07 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Second, I want to get at the heart of the incommensurability complaint: in
most elections some voters
will have a much greater stake in the outcome than others. For some it may
be a life or death issue; if X
is elected your friend's
On Aug 26, 2011, at 1:17 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 24.8.2011, at 2.07, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
But back to a possible generic meaning of a score or cardinal rating: if
you think that candidate X would
vote like you on a random issue with probability p percent, then you could
give
On Aug 24, 2011, at 7:33 AM, Warren Smith wrote:
Lundell:
Arrow would not, I think, quarrel with the claim that a cardinal ballot has
a pragmatic/operational meaning as a function of its use in determining a
winner.
But but it's an unwarranted leap from that claim to use the ballot
On Aug 24, 2011, at 5:42 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/8/24 Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com
On Aug 24, 2011, at 7:33 AM, Warren Smith wrote:
Lundell:
Arrow would not, I think, quarrel with the claim that a cardinal ballot
has a pragmatic/operational meaning as a function of its
On Aug 24, 2011, at 6:16 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/8/24 Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com
On Aug 24, 2011, at 5:42 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/8/24 Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com
On Aug 24, 2011, at 7:33 AM, Warren Smith wrote:
Lundell:
Arrow would not, I think
On Aug 24, 2011, at 8:16 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
:
Lundell:
Arrow would not, I think, quarrel with the claim that a cardinal ballot
has a pragmatic/operational meaning as a function of its use in
determining a winner.
But but it's an unwarranted leap from that claim to use the
On Aug 21, 2011, at 5:06 PM, Warren Smith wrote:
Kenneth Arrow has worried that range-voting-type score votes might have no
or
unclear-to-Arrow meaning. In contrast, he considers rank-ordering-style
votes to have a clear meaning.
Nic Tideman has also expressed similar worries in email, but
On Aug 23, 2011, at 4:07 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
It seems to me that Arrow must want a unique generic meaning that people can
relate to independent of
the voting system. Perhaps he is right that ordinal information fits that
criterion slightly better than
cardinal information, but
On Aug 19, 2011, at 9:22 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
Re: 10 words per signatory.
I don't think I should be the one to judge. What do other people think? If
people like things short, I've suggested an extra 15 or 20 words below.
JQ
2011/8/19 Michael Allan m...@zelea.com
One possible
On Aug 15, 2011, at 7:09 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
So, what do you think? Let the debate begin. I expect the above to be torn to
shreds. But once it's starting to seem stable, I'll make a google doc out of
it, so we can collaboratively polish up the language.
Where you will lose many of
On Aug 15, 2011, at 8:35 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/8/15 Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com
On Aug 15, 2011, at 7:09 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
So, what do you think? Let the debate begin. I expect the above to be torn
to shreds. But once it's starting to seem stable, I'll make a google
On Aug 15, 2011, at 10:31 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/8/15 Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com
On Aug 15, 2011, at 8:35 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/8/15 Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com
On Aug 15, 2011, at 7:09 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
So, what do you think? Let the debate begin
On Aug 15, 2011, at 11:58 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
It's true that I might agree to a statement if all it said were We believe
that approval is marginally superior to plurality (thought to the extent
that I agreed, I don't think it's enough better to merit any energy in
advocating it). But
On Aug 15, 2011, at 6:20 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
Or say clearly that you can't sign the statement in any form, and we'll stop
worrying about you. I want this to get as much support as possible, but I
know that I'll never get everyone.
OK, stop worrying, and I'll watch the progress of the
On Aug 14, 2011, at 1:24 PM, Greg Nisbet wrote:
My method can be modified fairly trivially to allow parties with a maximum
size, e.g. an independent candidate would be a party with a maximum size of
one, and simply allow surpluses to be transferred. Even the relatively naive
Gregory
On Aug 14, 2011, at 6:51 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Why transfers?
At least, when I said do a CW type search for the strongest remaining
candidate, I thought of this as adequate without transfers. I do think of
quitting if the remainder are too weak:
. Anyway, quit after filling the
On Jun 2, 2011, at 12:14 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
In the Asset voting case, consider that when you trust your Favorite
candidate’s ranking of the other
candidates, you can mark you favorite and not worry about Plurality strategy.
It appears that between
eighty and ninety percent of
On Feb 22, 2011, at 5:24 AM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
As Jonathan Lundell noted, burial is a simple, intuitive and
attractive strategy that can be easily employed by relatively naive
voters, and it therefore ought to be allowed so that voters can try
to bury their least favorite mainstream
On Feb 22, 2011, at 8:20 AM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
On Tue, Feb 22, 2011 at 11:06 AM, Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com wrote:
Hmm. I think you missed my next sentence.
Burial works against compromise by encouraging voters to rank the potential
compromise candidate last.
Again, voters
On Feb 22, 2011, at 9:48 AM, James Green-Armytage wrote:
Well, I'm interested in these kinds of ideas, sort of. That is, if there are
methods that give strategic incentives, but these incentives don't have a
tendency to lead to harmful consequences, I'd like to talk about that. My
On Feb 22, 2011, at 5:06 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
(Note: In case it's not clear, you are supposed to give the -1 to your
least favorite candidate.)
In which case it's not burial.
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On Feb 21, 2011, at 2:07 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
HOORAY for thinking! Too rare around here!
Ms Dopp misunderstands burial. Burial is specifically the ability to improve
the outcome for your favorite candidate by insincerely ranking your
second-choice candidate last (actually a more general
On Feb 21, 2011, at 4:06 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
There might also be a trade-off. If you have a certain election where a
candidate wins, that election might be made up of honest ballots (in which
case it's good that the candidate wins), or of strategic ballots (in which a
metod
On Nov 16, 2010, at 5:57 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
I suspect that one can't have both quota proportionality and monotonicity, so
I've been considering divisor-based proportional methods, but it's not clear
how to generalize something like Webster to ranked ballots. I did try (with
On Aug 27, 2010, at 12:48 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
with Score and Approval, it's easy to mark your favorite candidate (Score=99
or Approval=1). and we know that Satan gets Score=0 or Approval=0. then
what do you do with other candidates that you might think are better than
On Aug 27, 2010, at 3:39 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Aug 27, 2010, at 4:15 PM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Aug 27, 2010, at 12:48 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
with Score and Approval, it's easy to mark your favorite candidate
(Score=99 or Approval=1). and we know
On May 19, 2010, at 2:04 PM, Juho wrote:
- Maybe there is no need to defend proportional representation. Proportional
representation should in principle be taken as granted since that is the way
the whole country operates.
It's worth keeping in mind that a majority faction has a built-in
On May 11, 2010, at 9:19 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2010/5/9 Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com
On May 9, 2010, at 8:57 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
how about expanding the definition of Later-No-Harm (can we find a name for
it?) to include later harming one's political interest
On May 9, 2010, at 8:57 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
how about expanding the definition of Later-No-Harm (can we find a name for
it?) to include later harming one's political interest (not *just* their
favorite candidate) by sincerely voting their conscience?
That's called
On May 1, 2010, at 2:15 AM, Markus Schulze wrote:
VoteFair representation ranking is described
in chapter 15 of this book:
http://www.solutionscreative.com/download/EndingHiddenUnfairnessInElections_OntarioVersion.pdf
The book also claims that the underlying single-winner method (based on
On Apr 28, 2010, at 7:34 AM, Raph Frank wrote:
On Wed, Apr 28, 2010 at 4:47 AM, Juho juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
You assume that there is only one VP.
Well, if more than 1 VP is possible, then the election could be
- Elect council with PR-STV
- The condorcet winner (only including the
On Apr 28, 2010, at 8:37 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2010/4/28 Raph Frank raph...@gmail.com
On Wed, Apr 28, 2010 at 4:05 PM, Juho juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
Do you mean that voters would concentrate on the first rankings and
strongest candidates? The used method should be such that this kind
On Apr 28, 2010, at 11:29 AM, Raph Frank wrote:
On Wed, Apr 28, 2010 at 4:52 PM, Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com wrote:
This is, I think, a decent general solution to ordering a set of STV
winners: re-count, with only the current winners eligible, for successively
smaller numbers of seats
On Apr 27, 2010, at 6:09 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2010/4/27 Raph Frank raph...@gmail.com
On Tue, Apr 27, 2010 at 7:19 AM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com
wrote:
Why not:
- ranked votes
- STV for council. Keep track of which members are elected first and second,
one of them will
On Apr 26, 2010, at 4:45 PM, Juho wrote:
Draft of a method:
- collect ranked votes
- use Condorcet to determine P (Condorcet tends to elect a compromise
candidate that all voters find reasonably good)
- use STV (using the same ballots) to elect the group of P and VPs (some
special rules
On Apr 26, 2010, at 5:18 PM, Juho wrote:
On Apr 27, 2010, at 3:01 AM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Apr 26, 2010, at 4:45 PM, Juho wrote:
Draft of a method:
- collect ranked votes
- use Condorcet to determine P (Condorcet tends to elect a compromise
candidate that all voters find
On Apr 26, 2010, at 5:54 PM, Juho wrote:
On Apr 27, 2010, at 3:22 AM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Apr 26, 2010, at 5:18 PM, Juho wrote:
On Apr 27, 2010, at 3:01 AM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Apr 26, 2010, at 4:45 PM, Juho wrote:
Draft of a method:
- collect ranked votes
- use
On Mar 11, 2010, at 4:35 AM, Brian Olson wrote:
There was a question on the list a while ago, and skimming to catch up I
didn't see a resolution, about what the right way to measure multiwinner
result goodness is.
Here's a simple way to do it in simulator:
Each voter has a preference
On Mar 11, 2010, at 8:50 AM, Brian Olson wrote:
On Mar 11, 2010, at 11:29 AM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
As with any choice system based on cardinal utility, there end up being two
problems that are not, I think, amenable to solution. One is the
incomparability of individual utility measures
On Feb 14, 2010, at 4:46 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
We may disagree with the counting method that is applied when
35:A
32:BC
33:C
occurs, but it seems very clear that the Condorcet winner in this case
is C, as you seem to agree with me in this case.
Yes. The A voters express
I feel obliged to pass this excellent paper along to the list. It describes not
only portal, hydraulic and feline voting systems, but points out the definitive
advantage of electronic voting systems.
On Voting Systems
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
On Feb 6, 2010, at 12:27 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
For all practical purposes, except when there are only a few candidates, the
first format (1) would be much more compact than the second - which is the
point you're making. The data is probably quite compressible as well.
Well, yes.
On Jan 26, 2010, at 10:30 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
Two weaknesses, it seems to me, and I'm less sanguine about their fixability.
Depends what you mean, of course. But I stand by my one fixable weakness.
One is, as you suggest, the strategy problem. Range, and it's limit in one
On Jan 25, 2010, at 6:07 AM, Terry Bouricius wrote:
Would we agree that voting methods do best when voters give their sincere
rankings to avoid GIGO distortion? Since all voting methods can be subject to
strategic voting strategies with incomplete, exaggerated or insincere ballot
On Jan 26, 2010, at 8:41 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 02:53 PM 1/26/2010, Jameson Quinn wrote:
... a lot of hot air about strategic voting in Range.
Here's the nightmare scenario:
Thanks for an opportunity to address this, it's a very common misconception
about Range.
True
On Jan 26, 2010, at 9:49 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
I understand the limitations of my example. I still think it is a real
weakness for Range - actually, the only real weakness. Range is still one of
the best systems out there. But this is a reason to explore its weaknesses,
not to ignore
On Jan 22, 2010, at 5:32 AM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
On Fri, Jan 22, 2010 at 12:55 AM, Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com wrote:
Arrow never used, never mind defined, the word spoiler.
That is true. Back in Arrow's day,
Back in Arrow's day? Like, um, today?
the word spoiler was not used
On Jan 22, 2010, at 7:57 AM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
I meant back in the days when Arrow came up with his theorem
concerning rank choice votes failing at least one of his fairness
criteria. (IRV fails more of Arrow's fairness criteria than plurality
and fails more of Arrow's criteria than all other
On Jan 22, 2010, at 7:19 AM, Terry Bouricius wrote:
Arrow never uses the word spoiler in his theorem (original nor revised
version). You may be thinking about his independence of irrelevant
alternatives (IIA) criterion. While this could be expanded to have some
bearing on the concept of
On Jan 22, 2010, at 8:54 AM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
As I said earlier, if paper ballots are required, the length of the
paper ballot must be unlimited if the number of candidates who can run
for office is unlimited and you want voters to be able to fully rank
(not that most voters would want to.)
On Jan 22, 2010, at 5:32 AM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
This reminds me of one of the plethora of other deliberately
misleading claims of Fairytale Vote, they constantly cite Arrow's
theorem as if that is a logical reason to support IRV when IRV fails
more of Arrow's Fairness criteria than even
(that, and that monotonicity itself
needs definition in a particular context).
Terry
- Original Message -
From: Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com
To: kathy.d...@gmail.com
Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Sent: Friday, January 22, 2010 12:47 PM
Subject: Re: [EM] I need an example of Condorcet
On Jan 21, 2010, at 1:03 AM, Juho wrote:
What is good in all the common Condorcet methods is that their
vulnerabilities to strategies (and their differences in general) may very
well be so small in typical real elections (large, public, with independent
voter decision making, with changing
On Jan 21, 2010, at 9:03 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
Start telling the truth about IRV at Fairytale Vote, and then when
people speak the truth about Fairytale Vote, it won't sound like a
smear.
Ha ha! I've been meaning to compliment you, Ms Dopp, on that sidesplitting
line. It was really funny the
On Jan 16, 2010, at 5:17 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
Try to get this through your head too. It is *not* necessary to
belittle others, have a pissing contest with others, or put others
down in a derogatory fashion in order to build yourself up.
Indeed.
Try to get this through your head. I am
On Jan 15, 2010, at 7:51 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
Imagine sending all your ballots nationwide to DC for manual counting
to check the outcome of a Presidential election. We'll simply let the
GW administration, for instance, count the results in his own IRV
election!
That's something of a non
On Jan 14, 2010, at 9:34 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
do you mean their 2nd choice is not counted because their first choice loses
in the final round? that goes without saying, but that's the dumb IRV rules.
that is an *arbitrary* threshold imposed upon IRV, that 1st choices count
On Jan 14, 2010, at 11:00 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
simply, if a Condorcet winner exists, and your election authority elevates to
office someone else, that elected person is rejected by a majority of the
electorate. what other democratic value papers over that flaw? LNH?
On Jan 14, 2010, at 7:17 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Again, as I mentioned, the Condorcet Criterion looks good, it's intuitively
satisfying. Unfortunately, it depends on pure rank order, neglecting
preference strength.
Just for the record: for many of us that's an advantage.
On Jan 13, 2010, at 4:13 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Jan 13, 2010, at 4:49 AM, Juho wrote:
On Jan 13, 2010, at 9:14 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
it still is a curiosity to me how, historically, some leaders and
proponents of election reform thunked up the idea to have a ranked-order
On Jan 13, 2010, at 5:02 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jan 13, 2010, at 7:57 PM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Jan 13, 2010, at 4:13 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Jan 13, 2010, at 4:49 AM, Juho wrote:
On Jan 13, 2010, at 9:14 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
it still is a curiosity
On Jan 10, 2010, at 11:22 AM, Terry Bouricius wrote:
Although Abd often asserts that IRV replicates FPTP results, I don't think
he is claiming that in the last Burlington election. The plurality leader
was the Republican Kurt Wright with 33%. He presumably would have won
under FPTP.
On Jan 10, 2010, at 12:42 PM, Juho wrote:
On Jan 10, 2010, at 10:23 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jan 10, 2010, at 2:40 PM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
This is a point that bears repeating, since it doesn't seem to sink in.
It's much to easy to casually assume that ballots cast
On Jan 10, 2010, at 1:02 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 01:06 AM 1/10/2010, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Jan 9, 2010, at 9:23 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
On the other hand, in one-third of nonpartisan top-two runoff elections,
which IRV supposedly simulates, the runner-up
On Jan 9, 2010, at 9:23 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
On the other hand, in one-third of nonpartisan top-two runoff elections,
which IRV supposedly simulates, the runner-up in the primary goes on to win
the runoff, a comeback election, according to a FairVote study. It simply
does not
On Nov 26, 2009, at 12:52 PM, sepp...@alumni.caltech.edu wrote:
Can it be said that Later No Harm (LNH) is satisfied by the variation of
IRV that allows candidates to withdraw from contention after the votes are
cast?
Assuming that the candidates know what the ballots did, then no, it cannot,
On Nov 25, 2009, at 11:41 AM, Warren Smith wrote:
Are there any other voting methods besides IRV, meeting the
'later no harm' criterion?
Plurality (trivially).
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On Nov 16, 2009, at 10:53 AM, Andrew Myers wrote:
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Notice that the requirement of Arrow that social preferences be insensitive
to variations in the intensity of preferences was preposterous. Arrow
apparently insisted on this because he believed that it was
On Nov 16, 2009, at 11:53 AM, Stéphane Rouillon wrote:
Would this suggest it could be possible to overcome Arrow's theorem using
range ballots?
I do not want to say Arrow's theorem is false. All I ask is:
Are prefential ballots one of the hypothesis used in Arrow's theorem proof?
Because
On Nov 16, 2009, at 2:15 PM, Andrew Myers wrote:
Jonathan Lundell wrote:
This is in part Arrow's justification for dealing only with ordinal (vs
cardinal) preferences in the Possibility Theorem. Add may label it
preposterous, but it's the widely accepted view. Mine as well.
Arrow's Theorem
On Nov 16, 2009, at 4:58 PM, Raph Frank wrote:
The theorem states (from wiki) that there is no method which has the
following properties:
* If every voter prefers X over Y, then the group prefers X over Y.
* If every voter prefers X over Y, then adding Z to the slate
won't change the
On Nov 10, 2009, at 5:07 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Dear Warren,
I don't seem to understand the definition:
A single-winner voting system fails the NESD property if, when every
honest voter
changes their vote to rank A top and B bottom (or B top and A bottom;
On Nov 8, 2009, at 10:00 AM, Warren Smith wrote:
2. Bouricius forgot to mention, same way he usually forgets to
mention, that Tideman also found IRV to be unsupportable.
conditionally supportable, actually.
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On Nov 8, 2009, at 10:40 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Nov 8, 2009, at 7:50 PM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Nov 8, 2009, at 4:35 PM, Warren Smith wrote:
Tideman said IRV was unsupportable if it is feasible to compute
pairwise matrix. That was
because Tideman had other voting methods
you get
on the ladder to the show.
Juho
On Nov 2, 2009, at 4:40 PM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Nov 1, 2009, at 10:49 PM, Juho wrote:
Firstly, STV-PR can be used in all public elections, including
those that are non-partisan.
Yes. Non-partisan multi-winner elections are however rare
On Nov 1, 2009, at 10:49 PM, Juho wrote:
Firstly, STV-PR can be used in all public elections, including
those that are non-partisan.
Yes. Non-partisan multi-winner elections are however rare in
politics. They may be more common e.g. when electing only a small
number of representatives
On Nov 1, 2009, at 10:51 PM, Juho wrote:
I wouldn't be as strict as saying that Droop proportionality is an
absolute requirement. I'd be happy to classify all methods that
approximate the principle of x% of votes means x% of seats as
acceptable PR.
I'd like to see a definition of what
On Nov 2, 2009, at 9:54 AM, James Gilmour wrote:
robert bristow-johnson Sent: Monday, November 02, 2009 5:44 PM
whose *ballot* gets their vote transferred? it shouldn't matter in
which order the counting is. if my ballot is needed to give the
candidate what he needs, and your ballot isn't
On Oct 31, 2009, at 7:29 AM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
3. STV does *not* achieve proportional representation at all unless
there is no vote splitting and just the right number of candidates run
who support each group's interests. I.e. the success of methods like
STV to achieve proportional
On Oct 31, 2009, at 10:25 AM, Juho wrote:
(PR makes sense in general but I wouldn't deny people the right to
achieve the political balance using two-party systems if they so
want.)
How would this decision be made? Majority rule?
Election-Methods mailing list - see
On Oct 31, 2009, at 11:08 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
(PR makes sense in general but I wouldn't deny people
the right to achieve the political balance using two-party
systems if they so want.)
How would this decision be made? Majority rule?
It's not hard to imagine a referendum with that kind
On Oct 19, 2009, at 8:50 AM, Warren Smith wrote:
But this leads to another interesting idea. Consider this naive-
exag
voter strategy: rank the two frontrunners AB (where you prefer AB)
top bottom, then anybody better than A is ranked co-equal top (or if
that forbidden, then just below A)
On Oct 19, 2009, at 4:34 PM, . wrote:
er, not if they are the frontrunners, but if they are PERCEIVED
to be the front-runners, which was the whole point of the
experiment. :)
Right. Strategy must be linked to knowledge (or at least conjecture)
about the behavior of other voters. A voter
On Sep 20, 2009, at 7:49 AM, Brian Olson wrote:
Catching up from a couple weeks ago, I just wanted to add my short-
short version of explaining Proportional Representation that usually
gets a good response from people:
A 20% group should get 20% of the seats.
Kathleen Barber has a nice
On Sep 15, 2009, at 4:01 PM, James Gilmour wrote:
Setting a candidate's keep value to zero should only increase
the vote totals of all the other candidates. Thus, all
elected candidates would stay elected and Meek's method never
changes the keep values to eliminate an elected candidate.
The
On Sep 10, 2009, at 6:14 AM, Raph Frank wrote:
Also, there is a philosophical argument. The effect of the count
back procedure is that people who have died/left the constituency
since the last election get their vote counted, while new adults/
people who have move into the constituency
On Jul 2, 2009, at 2:23 PM, Paul Kislanko wrote:
Without going into detail, if all states do not use the same
collection
method, applying a national counting method that isn't the lowest
common
denominator method, there would be a violation of the equal process
clause of the 14th Amendment.
On Jun 30, 2009, at 10:44 PM, Paul Kislanko wrote:
One can infer a plurality ballot from any kind of ranked ballot, but
not the
other way around.
One can infer an approval ballot from any kind of ranked ballot that
allows
equal ranks, but not the other way around.
Except for strategic
On Jun 9, 2009, at 2:30 PM, Warren Smith wrote:
6. My old (1999-2000) Bayesian Regret simulations, when considering
strategic voters,
made as their first move, the decision to rank the two frontrunners
top and bottom.
It's worth noting that this is a transparently bad strategy for any
On Jun 6, 2009, at 11:10 AM, Paul Kislanko wrote:
The number of possible votes is not the same as the amount of
information in
a single ballot. With 3 candidates, there are indeed 8 possible
ballots, but
any one ballot can be encoded in 3 bits, since any particular choice
requires only that
On Jun 6, 2009, at 11:59 AM, Paul Kislanko wrote:
Besides the obvious problem with the notion of a fraction of a bit,
you're
still confusing the number of possible ballots with the amount of
information conveyed by a single ballot.
There's no problem, really, with fractional bits. It's
On Jun 6, 2009, at 2:23 PM, Paul Kislanko wrote:
If all we need is a lookup table we need to count the number of
bits in
that table as a part of every ballot.
No more than we need extra bits to explain the meaning of your 00 01
10 11 encoding. (And it'd be once per election anyway, not
On Jun 5, 2009, at 1:08 PM, Warren Smith wrote:
In a 3-candidate election, there are 6=3! possible rank-order votes.
Only if truncation is forbidden.
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