After writing the post on improving the Sainte-Laguë index, I started
wondering about what the PR problem would look like, phrased
geometrically. And I think I found one. It's a bit different from what
Warren proposed years ago, but it has the advantage that the problem for
party list PR and
The Sainte-Laguë index is optimized by the Sainte-Laguë method. It is:
SUM over all parties p: (V_p - S_p)^2 / V_p
where V_p is the fraction of votes for a party, and S_p is the fraction
of seats. However, the score can range to infinity, so it's not clear
what it measures. Other indices
On 09/04/2013 04:21 AM, Fred Gohlke wrote:
* It might be well to select a larger number initially and include an
opt-out provision so those with no interest in politics can remove
themselves from the process.
That's a good point. The electoral commission could choose a larger
number than the
I may get back to this in greater detail later, but some notes for now
(yes, I'm writing late again):
On 09/03/2013 11:07 PM, Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
On Mon, Sep 02, 2013 at 10:18:36AM +0200, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Here's a short post (since I don't have as much time as I would
like
On 08/31/2013 02:24 PM, Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
This may be a bit outside what is usually discussed here, but I'll give
it a shot and if someone know of some resources I should check up on
then please let me know.
I've not followed this list for a long time, but my impression is that
the main
On 07/29/2013 07:22 PM, Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
On Mon, Jul 29, 2013 at 01:36:49PM +0200, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 07/28/2013 04:37 PM, Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
Upper apportionment:
- Party seats are apportioned using unmodified Sainte-Laguë based on
national votes. If desirable
Here's a short post (since I don't have as much time as I would like)
with an idea of how to make Sainte-Lague even more like STV. I started
thinking about it as part of my thinking that perhaps pairwise
multiwinner methods will always be too complex; and so I tried to
include some Condorcet
On 09/02/2013 09:23 PM, Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
I once considered a hybrid system that *would* use elections, but in
a quite different way: first you'd select a significant number of
people at random, and then these would elect from among their
number. It does away with continuity both for ill
On 08/28/2013 11:12 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:
The Wikipedia article titled Electoral reform in the United States
contains a heading Electoral Reform Proposals and then under that
heading is a section titled Instant-runoff voting. Obviously this
needs to be broadened to Election-method reform
On 07/24/2013 08:54 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
Certainly you could propose complex systems that could be better than
this proposal in some ways. For instance, you could use a proportional
representation system such as Bucklin Transferrable Voting (BTV) for the
first round. But this proposal is a
On 07/22/2013 07:20 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
An interesting article from DLW on modelling two-party voting as a
battle between two networks. (The comments are depressingly stupid, though.)
Maybe that could be used to argue in favor of Michael Allan's party
that will dissolve itself. The
On 07/22/2013 07:20 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
An interesting article from DLW on modelling two-party voting as a
battle between two networks. (The comments are depressingly stupid, though.)
Maybe that could be used to argue in favor of Michael Allan's party
that will dissolve itself. The
On 07/19/2013 11:50 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 19.7.2013, at 10.18, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
In such cases, I would also suggest a few of the seats of the
parliament be given by a centrist- or minmax-based method (e.g.
Condorcet, CPO-SL with few seats, or possibly even minmax approval
On 07/19/2013 07:45 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 18.7.2013, at 23.36, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
(And now that I think about it: if it's desired, it should be
possible to make n-proportional apportionment methods for n2 --
e.g. a method that tries to balance regional representation,
national
On 07/18/2013 08:13 PM, Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
Thoughts are welcome, and sorry for the amount of mails, I'm having a
lot of spare time at the moment.
Could you try implementing Balinski's primal-dual method? It's somewhat
explained in the Wikipedia article on biproportional apportionment,
On 07/11/2013 10:54 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
This message (that was sent by me) was not properly delivered to me.
Did someone else have similar probelms or was it only me?
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2013-July/032170.html
I got it.
Election-Methods
On 07/07/2013 10:27 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 7.7.2013, at 16.16, Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
Alternatively, instead of running Sainte-Laguë in each county, you
could run SL on the national result (distributing all 169 seats),
something which would produce a representation percentage very
close to
Among other things, in Wahlberg's thread, there was a discussion about
ways of making Sainte-Laguë party list PR accommodate ranked ballots.
The simplest method found was:
1. Allocate seats according to Sainte-Laguë or Webster with respect to
first preference votes.
2. If any party got zero
On 07/06/2013 02:26 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
The method should be weakly summable (i.e. when the number of parties
are kept constant). For each cell in the matrix, do the elimination
first, then store the counts for each party. These counts can be summed
up between districts, so if n
On 07/05/2013 12:29 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Foundation_elections_2013/Post_mortem
I think it would be worthwhile to bring some expertise to the section at
the end. But let's keep it on-topic and try to keep from getting too
deep into the election
On 07/04/2013 08:39 PM, Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
On Thu, Jul 04, 2013 at 07:18:18PM +0300, Juho Laatu wrote:
That doesn't sound so different from leveling seats. In the
Norwegian system, you give each county an extra seat, but this
seat is assigned based on the difference betweeen the seats so
far
On 07/05/2013 02:47 PM, sepp...@alumni.caltech.edu wrote:
Only one voting method satisfies IMC: Maximize Affirmed Majorities (MAM).
Can other methods satisfy IMC too, or does IMC imply MAM?
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On 07/04/2013 08:55 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
In principle ability to vote for persons helps populist candidates.
My best understanding is that in Finland, that uses open lists, well
known candidates (from sports, TV etc.) probably have slightly better
chances to win a seat when compared to
On 07/02/2013 07:09 PM, Chris Benham wrote:
I am sure this meets Droop Proportionality for Solid Coalitions.
Does that mean that the method reduces to largest remainders Droop when
the voters vote for all candidates of a single party each?
That would be interesting because there's no
On 07/01/2013 07:27 PM, Benjamin Grant wrote:
Did my arrival somehow bring less civility and/or tolerance, or was this
always a rough-and-tumble place before I even got here?
I would hate to think that I brought the level of conversation down,
politeness-wise.
If you're counting my recent
On 06/30/2013 03:02 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
**
Kristofer Munsterhjelm**wrote (29 June 2013):
The combined method would go like this:
1. Run the ballots through RP (or Schulze, etc). Reverse the outcome
ordering (or the ballots; these systems are reversal symmetric so it
doesn't matter). Call
On 06/29/2013 09:38 AM, Alexander Kjäll wrote:
Hi
I'm trying to implement the Schulze STV method and are currently working
through the paper schulze2.pdf.
On page 38 there is an example (section 6.3) where this result was
arrived at:
N[{a,b,c},d] = 169;
and Ñ[{a,b,c}, {a,b,d}] = 169;
And i
On 06/29/2013 11:32 AM, Markus Schulze wrote:
Hallo,
N[{a,b,c},d] = 169 or Ñ[{a,b,c}, {a,b,d}] = 169 means
that W=169 is the largest value such that the electorate
can be divided into 4 disjoint parts T1,T2,T3,T4 such that
(1) Every voter in T1 prefers candidate a to candidate d;
and T1
On 06/29/2013 01:27 AM, Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
On Fri, Jun 28, 2013 at 03:04:13PM +0200, Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
This gave me an idea.
We seem to agree that it's notably the exclusion part that may end up
excluding a party that is preferred by many, but just isn't their first
preference.
I'm
On 06/25/2013 07:15 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
KM2:So you're saying that nothing short of actually trying the
experiment in public elections will change your mind?
Then I believe I am done here. I can't change your position, so all I
can do is to argue to others that your position is flawed.
On 06/27/2013 06:58 PM, Benjamin Grant wrote:
Hi, first a quick note: I haven’t been commenting because real life
stuff, work, etc has been keeping me busy, but I fully intend to go back
and answer any posts sent to me via the list(s). If just that my time
and focus comes in bursts and
On 06/16/2013 06:18 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 02:02 AM 6/16/2013, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
It would work, but the rating variant is better. In the context of
ranking, Bucklin fails Condorcet, for instance.
Straight Bucklin does fail Condorcet, of course, as do straight Range
On 06/28/2013 03:30 AM, Benjamin Grant wrote:
Something else came up while I was analyzing some voting methods. If
you have a disproportionate number of political leaning in an election,
some voting systems go awry.
There may be a criterion for this, this is what I mean.
Let’s say that you
On 06/27/2013 03:12 AM, Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
Greetings!
I'm new here, I'm not a mathematician and merely a layman on the subject
of voting methods so please grant me some leeway, but do feel free to
correct any misconceptions I may have.
Briefly about my goals:
I'm trying to find a better
On 06/26/2013 11:24 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 25.6.2013, at 18.07, Benjamin Grant wrote:
Now there are some criteria that aren't important to me at all, that I
do not value what the try to protect - and those I factor out.
I think I don't have any criteria that I'd absolutely require.
On 06/25/2013 12:25 AM, David L Wetzell wrote:
KM:Alright, then tell me what kind of evidence would change your mind as
to whether the scarcity of competitive candidates is an artifact of
Plurality or inherent to single-winner elections. (If no such evidence
can exist, then there's no point in
On 06/25/2013 12:38 AM, David L Wetzell wrote:
It's a good argument.
1. What if candidates/parties are inherently fuzzy and rankings are
tenuous? It can be done, I just don't put a lot of faith in them.
A. If I'm wrong and IRV proves defunct then IRV can be used to upgrade IRV.
B. If I'm
On 06/25/2013 09:00 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 25.6.2013, at 1.06, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Remember that criterion compliances are absolute. So a method may
fail a criterion yet be perfectly acceptable in real elections.
I just want to support this viewpoint. It is not essential how many
On 06/25/2013 09:17 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 25.6.2013, at 1.25, Benjamin Grant wrote:
On Mon, Jun 24, 2013 at 6:19 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_el...@lavabit.com mailto:km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
Scenario 1: Voters don't rank now, but will rank when they see
it's worth it. Here IRV
On 06/25/2013 12:53 AM, Benjamin Grant wrote:
On Mon, Jun 24, 2013 at 6:06 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_el...@lavabit.com mailto:km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
Also, Range could possibly give different results than Approval
voting. Consider an election where 99% of the voters
On 06/25/2013 02:43 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
I've arrived at my destination, so I'll try to process through this
thread. It's substantial, so I'll probably have several comments to
make. I'll start with a quick response to Kristofer.
... So, for rated methods, I suggest Majority Judgement.
On 06/24/2013 05:08 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
To ignore the simple upgrade to IRV that I have proffered
and defended at length on this list-serve,
when you argue against IRV?
Yes, for many reasons. Among them: because other simple upgrades give
way greater bang for the buck.
Consider
On 06/24/2013 09:33 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
There should be a few more fewer ranks in the red in his example.
http://rangevoting.org/IrvIgnoreExample.html
Also, I don't think voters care that much if their deeper preferences
aren't consulted when their top prefs get elected or come in 2nd
On 06/24/2013 04:10 PM, Benjamin Grant wrote:
As I have had it explained to me, the Plurality Criterion is: If there
are two candidates X and Y so that X has more first place votes than Y
has any place votes, then Y shouldn't win.
Which I think means that if X has, for example, 100 votes, then
On 06/24/2013 03:06 PM, Benjamin Grant wrote:
Hi guys, I’m still here, still pondering, but now I have another
question. I’ve been thinking about score voting, approval voting, and
plurality (FPTP) voting, and I have a concern.
Say we have a situation where we have three candidates, say Gore,
On 06/24/2013 11:22 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
Another might add, This is why the number of competitive candidates and
the extent of low-info voters matters in the comparison.
Alright, then tell me what kind of evidence would change your mind as to
whether the scarcity of competitive
On 06/24/2013 11:28 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
The short-cut in my hybrid has been used in some elections and it had
potential to coopt the momentum of IRV, but I think that FairVote's
upgrade to top-two might take its place...
Now, The same might be true of BTR-IRV, the main draw-back is that
On 06/17/2013 03:10 AM, Warren D Smith wrote:
is my name for an idea advanced in atrocious work by several
economists (2012-2013) and improved/corrected/examined by me. The idea
is by paying to cast your score voting ballot according to certain
carefully designed price formulas, you will become
On 06/16/2013 06:55 PM, Benjamin Grant wrote:
With your kind indulgence, I would like some assistance in understanding
and hopefully mastering the various voting criteria, so that I can more
intelligently and accurately understanding the strengths and weaknesses
of different voting systems.
So,
On 06/16/2013 05:26 AM, Benjamin Grant wrote:
I just started trying to wrap my brain around all the ins and outs about
voting methods, and I wanted to check two things with my elders (on this
subject):
1)As far as I can see, the reason IRV has some strange/unusual results
is because it is
On 06/14/2013 09:06 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 12:44 AM 6/14/2013, Chris Benham wrote:
My suggested 2-round method using Approval ballots is to elect the
most approved first-round candidate A if A is approved on more than
half the ballots, otherwise elect the winner of a runoff between
On 06/08/2013 10:16 PM, Chris Benham wrote:
Yes.
Say there are three candidates: Right, Centre-Right and Left, and the
approval votes cast are
49: Right
21: Centre-Right (all prefer Right to Left)
23: Left
07: Left, Centre-Right (sincere favourite is Left)
Approval votes: Right 49, Left
Say we have an organization or government that wants to use a better
type of two-round runoff than top-two Plurality. What kind of
distribution should the candidates for the second round have?
To be a little more specific, and to make the concept a bit easier to
think about, consider a top-n
On 06/12/2013 07:04 AM, Rob Lanphier wrote:
Responding to Abd's points: We're operating under very different
parameters than, say, a Wikimedia-operated wiki like Wikiversity. In
particular, we don't have the infrastructure to deal with user creation
spam. There are big advantages to sharing
On 05/29/2013 08:06 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
My apologies. I'm not always good w. names.
I had a really long reply queued up here, but now that I've got a few
days to think since RL business has not been quite as hectic, I think
there's one thing we need to establish before we continue
On 05/29/2013 12:15 AM, David L Wetzell wrote:
On Tue, May 28, 2013 at 4:36 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_el...@lavabit.com mailto:km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
On 05/27/2013 09:19 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
Smith's http://rangevoting.org/__PuzzIgnoredInfo.html
http
On 05/27/2013 09:19 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
Smith's http://rangevoting.org/PuzzIgnoredInfo.html
needs to be taken w. a grain of salt.
The short-comings of IRV depend on the likely number of serious
candidates whose a priori odds of winning, before one assigns
voter-utilities, are strong.
On 05/28/2013 01:54 AM, Richard Fobes wrote:
On 5/27/2013 12:19 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
...
The short-comings of IRV depend on the likely number of serious
candidates whose a priori odds of winning, before one assigns
voter-utilities, are strong. If real life important single-winner
On 05/06/2013 11:21 PM, Jonathan Denn wrote:
In these likely scenarios, and assuming there is no electoral
college, doesn't a runoff of the top two seem the best method until
someone gets a majority?
It would solve that problem, but the problem can be reintroduced if each
party gets greedy.
On 04/20/2013 10:32 PM, r...@audioimagination.com wrote:
From: Kevin Venzke step...@yahoo.fr
It's true that *with the ballots as cast* any Condorcet-compliant
method would have
worked identically.
including no specific Condorcet method, since there was a CW.
What you don't know until
On 04/20/2013 12:09 AM, Forest Simmons wrote:
Suppose the two methods were IRV and Approval, and that each voter could
choose which of the two methods to vote on their strategic ballots, and
then rank the candidates non-strategically as well for the choice
between the two method winners.
We
On 04/09/2013 04:01 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
You can make up complicated scenarios that bear no resemblance to what
would actually happen, and scare yourself with them.
The Mafia is just another interest group. Attempting to apply
large-scale coercion tends to piss people off. They don't
On 04/07/2013 03:59 AM, Ross Hyman wrote:
More general variant: Candidate sets of N candidates are notated by
Greek letters.
[snip]
You said that this method was based on a cloneproof single-winner method.
Woodall generalized the clone criteria in
On 04/07/2013 03:59 AM, Ross Hyman wrote:
More general variant: Candidate sets of N candidates are notated by
Greek letters.
[snip]
You said that this method was based on a cloneproof single-winner method.
Woodall generalized the clone criteria in
On 04/07/2013 10:19 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 04/07/2013 03:59 AM, Ross Hyman wrote:
More general variant: Candidate sets of N candidates are notated by
Greek letters.
[snip]
You said that this method was based on a cloneproof single-winner method.
Sorry about the 3x duplication
On 04/04/2013 09:31 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 12:12 PM 4/4/2013, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 04/04/2013 08:02 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 02:24 AM 4/3/2013, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
However, there is a rated method that is also strategy-proof. It is
called Hay voting
On 04/05/2013 01:50 AM, Forest Simmons wrote:
Kris,
Optimal MJ strategy is still approval strategy. You can instruct the
voters to make absolute choices, but you cannot enforce it. Their
willingness to abide by the instructions is purely psychological. The
same psychology will work, only
On 04/05/2013 09:37 PM, Forest Simmons wrote:
The following observation about Condorcet IRV Hybrids has probably
already been made (but I have been gone for a while):
These hybrids have no good defense against burying. For example
Sincere ballots:
40 AC
35 BC
25 CA
If the A faction
On 04/04/2013 02:40 AM, Forest Simmons wrote:
On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 12:07 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_el...@lavabit.com mailto:km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
Perhaps there's some value in making methods that appeal to the
right sentiment, even if one has to trade off objective
On 04/03/2013 12:01 AM, Forest Simmons wrote:
Jobst has suggested that ballots be used to elicit voter's consensus
thresholds for the various candidates.
If your consensus threshold for candidate X is 80 percent, that means
that you would be willing to support candidate X if more than 80
Unless I'm mistaken, the method called Random Favorite is cloneproof,
for an extended variant of independence from clones that says that the
probability of a clone set member being chosen can not depend on the
size of the clone set.
Say the first ballot is chosen. Then before cloning, the
On 03/19/2013 03:08 AM, Richard Fobes wrote:
I continue to fail to understand why citizens think of politics as a
left-versus-right tug-of-war. That's what it used to be before special
interests hired election experts to advise them on how to take advantage
of vote splitting.
Now, the much
On 03/15/2013 06:55 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:
On 3/15/2013 2:22 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 03/14/2013 11:26 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:
...
One way is to eliminate the need for coalitions. This is the purpose of
VoteFair negotiation ranking, which allows the elected representatives
On 03/17/2013 06:32 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:
On 3/15/2013 2:12 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 03/14/2013 06:45 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
IRV will prevent a true spoiler (that is a candidate
with no viable chance of winning, but whose presence in the race changes
who the winner
On 03/15/2013 09:27 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 04:16 AM 3/14/2013, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 03/13/2013 05:09 AM, Michael Allan wrote:
If the experts in the Election Methods list can't find a serious fault
with this method, then it might be possible to bring down the party
On 03/14/2013 06:45 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
IRV will prevent a true spoiler (that is a candidate
with no viable chance of winning, but whose presence in the race changes
who the winner is) from spoiling the election, but if the spoiler and
the two leaders are all roughly equal going
On 03/14/2013 11:40 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:
Does anyone know of any other political party that uses the
election-method reform that they promote?
The Pirate Party of Sweden uses Schulze for their primaries. They don't
promote Schulze, though. Since Sweden is parliamentary, there are no
On 03/14/2013 11:26 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:
On 3/11/2013 1:33 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Here's a scenario I've been thinking about lately.
Say that you have a parliament using proportional representation, and
the voting method is party list. Then say that the situation is
so
On 03/13/2013 10:48 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 03:16 PM 3/13/2013, Richard Fobes wrote:
For the benefit of those who don't understand why FairVote promotes
IRV (instant-runoff voting) in opposition to many forum participants
here, I'm posting this extract from an excellent, well-written,
On 03/12/2013 06:27 PM, Michael Allan wrote:
Hi Kristofer,
I think the liquid democracy solution can be salvaged by moving it
into an open primary.
I suppose the problem is that the coalition makeup is set up after
the election rather than during it. So the voting method has no idea
about how
On 03/13/2013 05:09 AM, Michael Allan wrote:
If the experts in the Election Methods list can't find a serious fault
with this method, then it might be possible to bring down the party
system in as little as a few years. Mind you, it would be no bad
thing if it took a while longer, given the
On 02/14/2013 07:07 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:
... as in
the top-down method of Otten?
I did not find any information about the top-down method of Otten. If
you send me a link to a place that describes it, then I can answer this
part of your question.
I've been really busy lately, so I
On 02/12/2013 12:24 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
What does monotone even mean for PR? You can make something that's
sequentially monotone, but it's (I think) impossible to avoid situations
where AB were winning but changing CAB to ABC causes B to lose (or
variants of this kind of problem). That's
On 02/12/2013 01:42 AM, Richard Fobes wrote:
On 2/11/2013 2:33 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Although what I'm going to say may be a bit offtopic, I think I should
say it. I think it could be useful to quantify exactly what is meant by
quoted-in proportionality in the sense that the Czech
On 02/12/2013 04:59 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 02/12/2013 12:24 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
What does monotone even mean for PR? You can make something that's
sequentially monotone, but it's (I think) impossible to avoid situations
where AB were winning but changing CAB to ABC causes B
On 02/09/2013 09:41 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:
2013/2/6 Richard Fobeselectionmeth...@votefair.org:
How many candidates would/could compete for the five (open)
party-list positions?
On 2/6/2013 3:12 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Say twenty, for instance.
To: Peter Zbornik
After considerable
On 02/06/2013 08:56 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2013/2/6 Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com mailto:pzbor...@gmail.com
Jameson,
I am not sure if we understand each other here.
I am looking for an election system, where the quoted-in seat gives
(or moves toward) a proportional
On 02/05/2013 12:52 AM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Kristoffer,
no the example below applies for my two-round proposal as well, thus
rapidly sinking what I previously proposed :o)
Nice to having had done away with the two-round variant of IRV.
Now I don't have to bother about it any more.
For
On 02/05/2013 06:50 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Dear all,
We recently managed, after some effort to elect some people in our
party using STV (five of seven board members of the Czech Green Party
and more recently some people to lead the Prague organisation etc.).
We used standard fractional STV,
On 02/05/2013 06:50 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
The problem (after a slight simplification) is as follows:
We want to elect five seats with any proportional ranking method (like
Schulze proportional ranking, or Otten's top-down or similar), using
the Hagenbach-Bischoff quota
On 02/05/2013 09:37 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Hi Kristofer,
I am afraid your approach might in some cases not lead to
proportionally distributed quoted-in candidates.
For instance, say we have three coalitions: A, B, C.
Coalition A and B get their first place candidate
Coalition C get their
On 02/04/2013 02:40 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Being a green party member (although a Czech one and not US), I would
advocate only the top-two-run-off
variant of IRV, i.e. elimination of the candidates and transfer of
votes until two remain, no quota for election (or quota=100%) except
for the
On 02/04/2013 09:31 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Hi I am afraid a proportional approach in the first round wouldnt
work, it opens up for strategic voting.
Say we have an election with A, B, C.
45 A
30 B A
25 C B A
The first round in a 2-seat election the quota is 34 votes
If we would have a
On 01/30/2013 05:30 PM, Peter Gustafsson wrote:
Kristoffer:
Thanks for pointing out those possibilities for how a big party can
instruct its voters on how to thwart the intent of this proposed
criterion. Obviously, BVP is not sufficient to ensure the transition
from a two-party environment to
On 01/21/2013 03:31 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
I do not spend enough time following this subject to memorize all the acronyms.
Could posters to this list please make your emails comprehensible to
someone like myself by spelling out the words comprising the acronym
when it is first used in each and
On 01/31/2013 08:31 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On 1/31/13 1:05 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:
On 1/30/2013 2:21 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
...
For instance, the LNHe failure of such traditional unimproved
Condorcet (TUC) methods, such as Beatpath, Ranked-Pairs, etc. is
admitted by most to be
On 01/27/2013 03:45 PM, Peter Gustafsson wrote:
There are lots of voting system criteria that have been described,
but I have not seen this one - or any one like it - described
before.
Bullet-voting prohibition Criterion: A voting system should not be
constructed in such a way so that it is
On 01/24/2013 01:08 PM, Ross Hyman wrote:
http://www.knesset.gov.il/elections19/eng/list/results_eng.aspx
The official Israeli election results show that of the parties
receiving more than the 2% threshold needed to get into the
Knesset, the center-left
On 01/18/2013 06:46 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:
On 1/17/2013 10:49 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
The general pattern I was trying to think of, in any case, was this: the
society is too far in one direction (according to the people). Candidate
X has a position solidly on the other side
On 01/18/2013 05:18 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2013/1/18 Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com
mailto:km_el...@lavabit.com
On 01/17/2013 06:07 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:
Soon enough, just as has happened in Aspen (CO) and Burlington
(VT), the
weaknesses of IRV
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