Mike,
Here's why I think that the CLD part is not necessary when we limit MMPO to
three slots:
The most likely situation where the CL wins is the case in which there is a
clone cycle of three
candidates that generate a lot of opposition among themselves, more opposition
than any of them
Mike,
I wonder if it is possible for a CL to win three slot MMPO when the number of
ballots on which X appears
in the bottom slot is counted as an oppsitions to X.
In other words, I wonder if the CL disqualification is redudant in that context.
Also, how does the CLD rule affect the FBC in
Kristopher,
I agree that Plurality failure is bad in a public proposal and hard to defend
in any case.
In the case of MMPO the question is moot because Plurality failure is so easily
fixed by either of the
following natural tweaks:
1. Put 50 percent in each of the diagonal positions. (A
That's very interesting, Mike. I didn't know that three slot voting equipment
was already in place; I never
knew how exactly they handled ballot iniatives. All the more reason to narrow
down to the best three
slot methods!
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for
Date: Mon, 2 Jan 2012 19:44:48 +
From: MIKE OSSIPOFF
To:
Subject: [EM] Forest: MAMD
Forest--
MMPO has several big advantages:
1. The unmatched brevity of its definition
2. Its full-rankings flexibility, which allows the full sincere-
expressivity benefit of AERLO
3. Its ability
Mike wrote ..
MMPO with symmetric completion at bottom, while avoiding Kevin's
bad-example, also sometimes loses
MMPO's ABE-success:
60: AB
55: B
100: C
Forest replied
Here is the pairwise opposition matrix for MAMD:
[[155, 110, 87.5],
[105, 100, 115],
[127.5, 100, 115]] .
The ordinary MMPO pairwise opposition matrix has blanks down the main diagonal.
If you put the
respective disapprovals in those positions, then the Plurality problem goes
away.
Filling in the diagonal elements with disapprovals is tantamount to
incorporating a virtual Minimum
Acceptable
Suppose the ballot limits grade options to A, C, and F, but a sizeable faction
would like to award a
grade of B to a particular candidate. If half of them voted a grade of A and
the other half a grde of C, the
resulting grade points would be the same.
So in elections with large electorates
Now that we have a good definition of honest approval strategy, we can
automatically adapt methods
(like PAV) that are based on approval style ballots to cardinal ratings style
ballots.
Definition: Honest Approval Strategy: Approve your k top ranked candidates,
where k is the sum of
your
Jameson,
could you please submit this again in a plain text format that doesn't put in
extra form feeds?
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Mike wrote
As for myself, in Score-Voting, I'd probably use non-extreme
points assignments only in two instances:
1. The excellent diplomatic ABE solution that you suggested
for
Score-Voting
Forest replied
Excellent except that satisfaction of the FBC is in doubt.
I assumed
Jameson asked for thoughts.
My first thought is that this kind of analysis is exactly what we need.
My second thought is that so far SODA has held up well under all the probes for
weakness that anybody has
come up with. SODA seems to be a very robust method.
My third thought is that I have
While writing the below it occurred to me that we could construct another
Proportional Representation
method based on ordinal ballots (ranked preferences) by the following technique:
(1) Convert the ordinal rankings into cardinal ratings via the monotonic,
clone free techinque that I outlined
From: MIKE OSSIPOFF
To:
Subject: [EM] Approval strategy
Message-ID:
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Forest--
You wrote:
Also, going back to what you metioned before about the value of
showing support for losers that you like
better than the winner (given they
Mike's exposition of basic Approval and Range strategy as variations on the
theme of Better Than Expectation strategy was very interesting and valuable,
including the recommendation of introducintg Approval after score or grade
voting, which are much more familiar to most people.
That was
Mike's exposition of basic Approval and Range strategy as variations on the
theme of Better Than
Expectation strategy was very interesting and valuable, including the
recommendation of introducintg
Approval after score or grade voting, which are much more familiar to most
people.
That was
Mike,
Right ON!
But I tripped up for a second on an unintentional typo concerning Richie's
second claim...
2. The article said that the best strategy in Approval is to
rank the candidates sincerely.
Replace Approval with IRV in the above statement:
Forest
From: MIKE OSSIPOFF
To:
Jobst,
Yes, your Condorcet Lottery was the first of this kind, as I pointed out on the
EM list when the Rivest
paper first came to our attention.
Suppose that we replace each entry in the margins matrix with its sign (-1, 0,
or 1 depending on whether
it is negative zero or positive). we
So basically Richie was stubbornly repeating his lies, but we cannot fault
Science for propagating them.
- Original Message -
From: Jameson Quinn
I believe the only time FairVote has been published in Science
was as a
response to an editorial by Steven Brams. Brams also got a
Let M be the matrix whose row i column j element M(i,j) is the number of
ballots on which i is ranked
strictly above j plus half the number of ballots on which neither i nor j is
ranked.
In particular, for each k the diagonal element M(k , k) is half the number of
ballots on which candidate k
If voters think that SODA is complex, then it's because they have been exposed
unnecessarily or
prematurely to the niceties of strategy considerations.
Let's take a lesson from IRV supporters. They don't get anybody worried about
IRV's monotonicity
failure or FBC failure by bringing them up
Mike,
I think your example applies to all acquiescing coalition methods that we have
considered. The failure is
caused by someone leap frogging over others to get to the top position.
But I think that most of these methods satisfy this FBC like property:
If the winner changes when (on some
Like Andy I prefer SODA as well, especially for a deterministic method. In
some settings I prefer certain
stochastic methods to deterministic methods. But my curiosity impels me to see
what can be done
while ignoring or putting aside the advantages of both chance and delegation.
Chris and Mike,
I think I finally have the right version which I will call MSAC for Majority
Support Acquiescing Coalitions:
Definitions:
A coalition is a subset of the candidates.
A ballot acquiesces to a coalition of candidates iff it rates no candidate
outside the coalition higher than
Thanks for checking the details.
In traditional game theory the rational stratetgies are based on the assumption
of perfect knowledge, so
the A faction would know if the B faction was lying about its real preferences.
Even knowing that the
other faction knew that they were lying they could
Mike asked ...
You can reach the person managing the list at
Forest?
Could LRV, due to the bottom symmetrical completion,
sometimes have an ABE-like problem, if the numbers were somewhat
differentfrom those of the usual ABE? Could it have a co-
operation/defection problem for
Mike,
LRV is just another equivalent way of describing MMMPO. The are just MMPO with
symmetric
completion at the bottom level but not at the top.
In addition to FBC it satisfies MAP, KMBE, and U, but not LNHe.
MAP means Mono-Add-Plump
KMBE means Kevin's MMPO bad-example
LNHe means
Date: Sat, 10 Dec 2011 18:44:15 +
From: MIKE OSSIPOFF
To:
Subject: [EM] MAM evaluation. Summary of FBC/ABE methods.
Message-ID:
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Evaluation of MAM:
Forest--
I've been looking at various ways of doing Mutual Acquiescing
Jameson,
good idea and valuable comments.
However, I'm not sure that regret is the right word. I regret something after
I make a bad choice. I resent
something when I make a good choice that is over-ridden by somebody with the
power to do so.
I suggest Least Resentment Voting, LRV.
Forest
Mike,
yes it is the same as the one you repeated at the end of your reply below.
But notice that in the ballot set
49 C
27 AB
24 B
there are two Acquiescing Majorities, namely both {A, B} and {B, C}, and that C
has more top votes than B.
Forest
From: MIKE OSSIPOFF
To:
Subject: [EM]
If I remember correctly Kevin Venzke's first post to this list was a geometric
argument that
the MMPO winner was apt to be closer to the voter median position in Approval
than the
Approval winner. The scenario he had in mind was something like this
Scenario One:
26 A
24 A=C
24 B=C
26 B
The
Mike,
what about a version of MMT that we could call MAMT:
Define a Mutual Acquiescing Majority set S as a set of candidates that are
acquiesced to on a majority of ballots, i.e. for each ballot of the given
majority set of ballots, no candidate outside the set S is ranked or rated
above any
MinMax Pairwise Opposition satisfies the FBC but not the Condorcet Criterion.
MinMax(margins) satisfies the Condorcet Criterion, but not the FBC.
MMPO combined with symmetric completion of all equal rankings and truncations
is exactly equivalent
to MinMax(margins), so symmetric completion of
Here's an equivalent but simpler description of the FBC/ABE compliant method
that I have been calling
(since Mike's pointer about MaxMin vs. MinMax) MaxMin(EqualRankPairwiseRule):
Let M be a matrix whose entry in row i and column j is the number of ballots on
which candidate i is
rated or
Mike is right; it should be called MaxMin instead of MinMax.
From: MIKE OSSIPOFF
To:
Subject: [EM] Chris: Forest's FBC/ABC method
Message-ID:
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Chris--
I'll describe Forest's proposal briefly:
It's minmax margins (but it's defined as
Chris,
you're right that it is very close to MinMax(margins). Let's compare and
contrast:
In both MinMax versions a matrix M is used to determine the winner in the same
way: if the least
number in row i is greater than the least number in any other row of the matrix
M, then candidate i is
Here’s a method that seems to have the important properties that we have been
worrying about lately:
(1) For each ballot beta, construct two matrices M1 and M2:
In row X and column Y of matrix M1, enter a one if ballot beta rates X above Y
or if beta gives a top
rating to X.
Mike,
I like MMPO2 because (unlike MMPO1) it takes into account opposition from
supporters of eliminated candidates, so is more broad based, and it is easily
seen to satisfy the FBC. Also it allows more brad based support than MMPO3 where
only the support by top raters is considered in the tie
There are several ideas that can be used to make variations on MMPO.
1. One is to use a bottom Tier Pairwise rule that counts bottom level candidates
on a ballot as being opposed by all other bottom level candidates (analogous to
the TTP rule in other methods). Note that this rule doesn't get
While working with MinMaxCardinalRatingsPairwiseOpposition (MMcrwPO) I got an
idea that high resolution Range might have an acceptable solutin to the
defection problem that we have been considering:
Sincere ballots
49 C
x: AB
y: BA
where x appears to be slightly larger than y in the polls.
The
MMCWPO is the method that elects the candidate whose maximal weighted pairwise
opposition is
minimal. It solves the ABE problem as well as the FBC.
I'm being shut down on this computer. More after T day.
Forest
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Chris,
your new method includes the statement ...
If any candidate X TTP beats any candidate Y, is not in turn
TTP beaten
by Y and is
not TTP beaten by any candidate Z that doesn't also TTP beat Y,
then Y
is disqualified.
In other words, there is no short TTP beatpath from Y to X,
Mike, thanks for your comments. I'll respond in line below.
From: MIKE OSSIPOFF
Hi Forest--
Thanks for answering my question about MTA vs MCA. Your argument
on that question is convincing, and
answers my question about the strategy difference between those
two methods.
Certainly,
Here’s my current favorite deterministic proposal: Ballots are Range Style, say
three slot for simplicity.
When the ballots are collected, the pairwise win/loss/tie relations are
determined among the candidates.
The covering relations are also determined. Candidate X covers candidate Y if X
DAC (descending acquiescing coalitions) disappointed Woodall because of the
following example:
03: D
14: A
34: AB
36: CB
13: C
The MDT winner is C, but DAC elects B.
DAC elects B even though the set {B} has a DAC score of zero, because the
descending order of
scores includes both the
Chris,
It could happen that the lowest approval candidate X that covers all higher
approved candidates is covered by an even lower candidate Y that beats all
higher approved candidates but doesn't cover them all.
In that case X, even though X is the Covering DMC winner, some candidate with
less
You're right, I forgot that Kemeny only needed the pairwise matrix. And
according to Warren
Dodgson is summable. I don't see how.
- Original Message -
From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm
Date: Thursday, September 15, 2011 12:14 pm
Subject: Re: [EM] Dodgson and Kemeny done right?
To:
Borda done right is detailed here:
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2011-July/028043.html
Dodgson done right was sketched here:
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2011-July/027888.html
The version of Dodgson I was
The problems with Kemeny are the same as the problems with Dodgson:
(1) computational intractability
(2) clone dependence
(3) they require completely ordered ballots (no truncations or equal ranking),
so they do not readily adapt to Approval ballots, for example.
In my posting several weeks
Very good Chris.
I tried to build a believable profile of ballots that would yield the approval
order and defeats of this
example without success, but I am sure that it is not impossible.
I think in general that if the approval scores are at all valid I would go for
the enhanced DMC winner
One afterthought: Of all the cardinal ratings methods for vvarious values of p,
the only one that satisfies
the Favorite Betrayal Criterion (FBC) is the case of p=infinity, i.e. where the
max absolute rating is
limited, or equivalently, the scores are limited to some finite range, i.e. the
Range voting is cardinal ratings with certain constraints on the possible
ratings, namely that they have to fall within a certain interval or range of
values, and usually limited to whole number values.
Ignoring the whole number requirement, we could specify a constraint for an
equivalent
An example, due to Samuel Merrill (of Brams, Fishburn, and
Merrill fame), simply normalizes the
scores on each range ballot the same way that we convert a
garden variety normal random variable into
a standard one: i.e. on each ballot subtract the mean (of scores
on that ballot) and
After Kevin's and Kristopher's comments, which I agree with, I am hesitant to
beat a dead horse, but I
have two more things for the record that should not be overlooked:
First, just as there are deterministic voting methods that elicit sincere
ordinal ballots under zero
information
Here's a link to Jobst's definitive posting on individual and social utility:
http://lists.electorama.com/htdig.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com/2007-February/019631.html
Also, I would like to make another comment in support of Warren's thesis that
cardinal range scores are
as meaningful or
It seems to me that Arrow must want a unique generic meaning that people can
relate to independent of
the voting system. Perhaps he is right that ordinal information fits that
criterion slightly better than
cardinal information, but as Warren says, what really matters is the
operational
The study of voting systems has made significant progress over
the last
decade, and our understanding is even farther beyond what it was
20 years
ago. One important place where that has happened is on the
election methods
mailing list. This mailing list is likely to include the largest
- Original Message -
From:
Date: Friday, August 12, 2011 3:12 pm
Subject: Enhanced DMC
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com,
From: C.Benham
To: election-methods-electorama@electorama.com
Subject: [EM] Enhanced DMC
Forest,
The D in DMC used to stand for *Definite*.
From: C.Benham
To: election-methods-electorama@electorama.com
Subject: [EM] Enhanced DMC
Forest,
The D in DMC used to stand for *Definite*.
Yeah, that's what we finally settled on.
I like (and I think I'm happy to endorse) this Condorcet method
idea,
and consider it to be
Thanks for the thorough analysis, Chris.
It seems to me that the crux of the matter is the same as the open vs. closed
primaries dilemma.
If you vote sincerely in a closed primary, you may be supporting a candidate
that will not be competitive
in the larger competition. On the other hand an
Last night I realized that my example below shows that my variant of DSC fails
later-no-harm.
Here's an example that illustrates the difference in Woodall's
DSC and my modified version:
25 A1A2
35 A2A1
20 BA1
20 CA1
In my modification of
DSC A1 wins. If the A2 faction truncates A1,
I know that Kevin is using four levels (zero through three) to test various
methods, so here's an idea:
1. Find the number of votes at each level for each candidate.
2. If any candidates have scores of one on more than fifty percent of the
ballots, convert the surplus ones to twos.
3 If the
It seems that if a PR method chose slate {X, Y} for a two winner election, and
only X or Y received
increased support in the rankings or ratings, then {X, Y} should still be
chosen by the method.
But consider the following approval profile (for a two winner election):
3 X
1 XY
2 Y
2 Z
It
To sum up my point of view suppose that the candidates publicly announce the
respective preferences
(with levels of support shown):
48 A
27 CB
25 B
We cannot tell from these ballots alone if B is bluffing or if B really
despises A and C equally.
If the decision is made only on the basis of
That Q in the previous subject heading was a typo.
Here's an example that illustrates the difference in Woodall's DSC and my
modified version:
25 A1A2
35 A2A1
20 BA1
20 CA1
Woodall's DSC assigns 60 points to {A1, A2} and then the only other positive
point coalitions that have
non-empty
Jan,
IRV elects C like all of the other methods if the B faction doesn't truncate.
But IRV elects A when the B
faction truncates. Of course, with this knowledge, the B faction isn't likely
to truncate, and as you say C
will be elected.
The trouble with IRV is that in the other scenario
One way of looking at Woodall's DSC method is that it is designed to elect from
the clone set that
extends up to the top rank on the greatest number of ballots, i.e. kind of the
plurality winner among
clone sets.
There are two ways in which this description is not precise, but maybe we would
Jameson,
as you say, it seems that SODA will always elect a candidate that beats every
other candidate majority
pairwise. If rankings are complete, then all pairwise wins will be by
majority. So at least to the degree
that rankings are complete, SODA satisfies the Condorcet Criterion.
Of course DSC and DAC are the same when rankings are complete. I was only
going to use it to determine the first player, and with amalgamated factions
(almost surely) the rankings would be complete.
Of course there are many variations of this DSV idea [e.g. we could use
chiastic approval to
- Original Message -
From: Jameson Quinn
Date: Wednesday, August 3, 2011 4:10 pm
Subject: Re: Amalgamation details, hijacking, and free-riding
To: fsimm...@pcc.edu
Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
2011/8/3
So if the true preferences are
20 AB
45 C?
35 (something
I want to thank Jameson for taking the ball and running with it on SODA. I
really appreciate his talented
and energetic work on elaborating, explaining, and selling the method.
It's exciting to me to see the possibilities.
Here's more evidence of monotonicity:
With a three candidate cycle
x
So if the true preferences are
20 AB
45 C?
35 (something else),
the C supporters could spare 21 voters to vote AC so that the amalgamated
factions would become
41 AC
24 C?
35 (something else) .
I can see where it is possible for such a move to payoff, but it seems fairly
innocuos compared
Towards the end of July, I noticed that I had to scroll down a long ways in the
archive to get to the most
recent messages.
I wonder if we set some kind of record.
If we were approaching or receding from a major election, it would be more
understandable.
Maybe all of the feisty guys are
To amalgamate factions so that there is at most one faction per candidate X (in
the context of range
style ballots) take a weighted average of all of the ballots that give X top
rating, where each ballot has
weight equal to one over the number of candidates rated equal top on that
ballot.
Jameson,
for my benefit could you elaborate on what you mean by hijacking strategy,
especially in the context of
amalgamation of factions.
Is ordinary Range susceptible to hijacking? If not, then neither is
amalgamation of factions per se, since
Range scores are identical with or without
I think that Andy's question about who the PR winners should be in the three
winner (approval) scenario
20 AC
20 AD
20 AE
20 BC
20 BD
20 BE
needs more consideration.
As was pointed out {C, D. E} seems the best, even though PAV would say the
slates
{A,B,C}, {A,B,D}, and {A,B,E} are tied for
One of the features of SODA is a step where the candidates decide what their
approval cutoffs will be.on
behalf of themselves and the voters for whom they are acting as proxies. One
of the many novel features
is that instead of making these decisions simultaneously, the candidates make
them
In HBH a pecking order is established on the basis of implicit approval or some
other monotonic, clone
consistent order like chiastic approval that has no incentive for order
reversals and minimal incentive for
collapsing (i.e. merging) of ratings.
A monotone, clone consistent measure of
A modification I am considering:
If all of the candidates are ranked on a ballot, then on that ballot keep the
raw range scores without
normalization, so the lowest ranked candidate Z will be ranked at p(Z) which
may or may not be zero.
But on ballots with one or more truncations do the
Here's a minimal range strategy that anybody with an adding machine could carry
out:
First rate all of the candidates sincerely (whatever that means).
Then add up all of the scores to get the number S.
Divide S by the maxRange value to get a whole number quotient Q and remainder
R.less than
Andy's chiastic method is a way of utilizing range ballots that has a much more
mild incentive than
Range itself to inflate ratings. He locates the method in a class of methods
each of which is based on a
different increasing function f from the interval [0,1 ] into the same interval:
Elect
When someone pointed out to Borda that his method led to strategic order
reversals, he replied that he
only intended it for honest voters. Unfortunately, that's only half the
problem; Borda is highly sensitive to
cloning:
Assume honest votes:
80 AB
20 BA
Candidate A wins by Borda and any
Here's an example of a monotone method for converting ranked ballots into
approval ballots
automatically:
x: ABC
y: BCA
z: CAB
First we convert to range ballots using first place numbers cumulatively:
x: A(x+y+z), B(y+z),C(z)
y: B(x+y+z), C(x+z), A(x)
z: C(x+y+z), A(x+y), B(y)
Now we
This kind of approach has been experimented with for a long time by Rob
LeGrand, and there doesn't
seem to be any good way to make it monotone.
Here's a very conservative and simple approach that may have some value in some
context, if not this
one:
For each rating ballot b approve the top
Kristopfer.
Look at it this way, the process of amalgamating the factions is a low pass
filter that gets rid of some fo
the noise. So why not consider the resulting ballots as the true ballots,
and the associated weights
tell how many of them there are of each kinsd. STV can be done with
If one of the finalists is chosen by a method that satisfies the majority
criterion, then you can skip step
one, and the method becomes smoother.
Here are some possibilities for the method that satisfies the majority
criterion: DSC, Bucklin, and the
following range ballot based method:
From: Jameson Quinn
To be clear: if X and Y are the same, there's no need for a runoff?
That's right. I hope that isn't be too anticlimatic!
2011/7/23
If one of the finalists is chosen by a method that satisfies
the majority
criterion, then you can skip step
one, and the method
Toby,
it is much easier to get a clone independent measure of distance or of
proximity with range style ballots
than with voter rankings, i.e. cardinal ratings are better than ordinal
rankings in this context.
Once you have a way of measuring distance (or alternatively proximity) between
I like it!
- Original Message -
From: Jameson Quinn
Date: Thursday, July 21, 2011 4:11 am
Subject: Re: [EM] SODA
To: fsimm...@pcc.edu
Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
For generic SODA, the current rule is: candidates exercise their
ballots in
descending order of
Kevin,
Thanks for running these! This is valuable information.
From: Kevin Venzke
Hi Forest,
I ran some small batches of simulations under a handful of scenarios
(1D and also aspectral) to try to get a sense of general trends. Then
I averaged the numbers.
Hopefully I didn't
From: Andy Jennings
On Mon, Jul 18, 2011 at 6:00 PM, wrote:
Andy and I were thinking mostly of Party Lists via RRV. His
question was
that if we used RRV, either
sequential or not, would we get the same result as the
Ultimate Lottery
Maximization. I was able to
show to our
In our SODA development we came to something of an impasse for determining the
order of play for
the candidates casting their approval cutoffs.
Here's a suggestion:
Let the DSC winner go first, because the DSC winner is easily calculated,
satisfies Later-No-Harm (so
does not unduly encourage
Sounds good.
- Original Message -
From: Jameson Quinn
I would like to keep generic SODA as simple as possible, to make
it easier
to promote for practical use. However, I am still interested in
figuring out
the best possible SODA+ method, using DSC or whatever.
For generic SODA,
Good idea. Let's play with it.
- Original Message -
From: Toby Pereira
Date: Wednesday, July 20, 2011 4:44 pm
Subject: Re: [EM] HBH
To: fsimm...@pcc.edu
Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
I was thinking - Schulze STV compares every result against every
other result
that
It recently struck me that in range we can strengthen the covering relation if
we include the range levels
as virtual candidates:
An alternative beats level L pairwise iff it is rated above L on more ballots
than it is rated below L.
Then for an alternative to cover Y, it has to beat Y
From: Kevin Venzke
Hi Forest,
--- En date de?: Lun 18.7.11, fsimm...@pcc.edu
a ?crit?:
The pecking order is the Range order. Assume no
ties.
I suppose that you could use the range order for the
pecking order, but as you mention below that could
lead to some strategic
It sounds like you guys are straightening out the confusion, and exploring some
good ideas.
- Original Message -
From: Toby Pereira
Date: Tuesday, July 19, 2011 7:47 am
Subject: Re: [EM] Correspondences between PR and lottery methods (was Centrist
vs. non-Centrists, etc.)
To: Kristofer
HBH stands for Hog Belly Honey, the name of an inerrant nullifier invented by
a couple of R.A. Lafferty
characters. The HBH is the only known nullifier that can posit moral and
ethical judgments, set up and
enforce categories, discern and make full philosophical pronouncements, in
other
-
HBH stands for Hog Belly Honey, the name of an inerrant
nullifier invented by a couple of R.A. Lafferty
characters. The HBH is the only known nullifier that can posit
moral and ethical judgments, set up and
enforce categories, discern and make full philosophical
pronouncements, in other
From: Kevin Venzke
Hi Forest,
So here's my summary using a 4-slot ballot and 3 candidates
let's say.
The pecking order is the Range order. Assume no ties.
I suppose that you could use the range order for the pecking order, but as you
mention below that could
lead to some strategic
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