Juho wrote:
Yes, security might force us to use simpler solutions like ballots to be
similar, votes to be shorter (e.g. only two or three rankings allowed),
and even to reduce the number of candidates. The latter two
simplifications are already vote buying / coercion oriented.
Security might
Juho wrote:
The idea of an appropriate size circle around candidates home (or home
district) sounds like a pretty safe and simple approach. That gives also
the voters a natural explanation to why some of the familiar candidates
are on the list and some not.
Dynamic districts may also be seen
On Aug 28, 2008, at 11:36 , Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
One more approach to semi-computerized voting. A computer displays
the personal alternatives and then prints a ballot. This solution
hides the personalized nature of the ballot and still avoids the
problem of voter voting for
On Aug 28, 2008, at 13:18 , Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
One more approach to this would be to provide perfect continuous
geographical proportionality. One would guarantee political and
geographical proportionality at the same time. One would try to
minimize the distance to the closest
The idea of an appropriate size circle around candidates home (or
home district) sounds like a pretty safe and simple approach. That
gives also the voters a natural explanation to why some of the
familiar candidates are on the list and some not.
Dynamic districts may also be seen to fix
Juho wrote:
On Aug 26, 2008, at 1:20 , Raph Frank wrote:
Each candidate can register in any number of polling stations covering
at most N seat's worth of population. (N=5 might be reasonable).
You might want to keep the sizes of the registered areas of each
candidate about equal (or to
On 8/26/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Well, since we're already talking about logistics-heavy methods
Actually, I don't think your suggestion requires that much additional
logistics. All you would need would be for the candidates to register
their home address with the
Raph Frank wrote:
That's fine. In fact, if you had 50% local and 50% national seats,
then it can be made to work perfectly.
Just say that an independent must get at least 50% of the constituency
to be elected and if he does, each of his voters have their weights
reduced to
(VA-50%)/100% where
On 8/26/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Or one could use STV instead, and have more local seats. If I'm not wrong,
the 50% mark of maximum disenfranchisement would be lowered significantly by
STV, so fewer list seats would be required.
Absolutely. The problem virtually
On Aug 26, 2008, at 12:38 , Raph Frank wrote:
On 8/26/08, Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Aug 26, 2008, at 1:20 , Raph Frank wrote:
Each candidate can register in any number of polling stations
covering
at most N seat's worth of population. (N=5 might be reasonable).
You might want to
On Aug 26, 2008, at 12:53 , Raph Frank wrote:
I don't see why allowing candidates to pick which locations they
appear on the ballot is a bad thing.
There could be some practical problems like all candidates of some
party picking districts where that party has largest support. And if
that
One could use also the coordinates of the homes of the voters and get
rid of some of the polling station location related speculation. (One
would be pretty much forced to use the computerized (personal)
candidate lists that I mentioned in my other mail.)
Juho
On Aug 26, 2008, at 10:22 ,
On Tue, Aug 26, 2008 at 9:40 PM, Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Here we are quite close to confusing the voters. If each small district has
different candidates and each voter can vote at any station, then maybe we
could try the (so much feared) computerized voting, but only so that each
voter
On Tue, Aug 26, 2008 at 9:42 PM, Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Aug 26, 2008, at 12:53 , Raph Frank wrote:
There could be some practical problems like all candidates of some party
picking districts where that party has largest support. And if that would
seem probable they might then try to
Raph Frank wrote:
On 8/22/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
If I understand Schulze's STV method correctly, it calculates vote
management strengths and so does vote management on behalf of the voter and
on all candidates. I may be wrong, though, and Schulze STV uses a very
On 8/25/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
There's a problem with this way of thinking, as can be made general to
explicit voting schemes (such as ones based directly on opinion axes), and
that is that it's impossible to ensure perfect representation on all the
axes, so one
Jonathan Lundell Sent: Monday, August 25, 2008 3:42 PM
On Aug 25, 2008, at 7:28 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Dividing a nation into districts before performing STV elections is
itself a constraint on the geographical distribution of the
candidates. If constraints should be done
Raph Frank wrote:
On Sun, Aug 24, 2008 at 8:03 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
As for fairness, consider the case where more than just enough voters
voted for candidate X. With your you either get full strength or no
strength scheme, some voters are going to look at the
Juho wrote:
On Aug 24, 2008, at 1:34 , James Gilmour wrote:
Juho Sent: Saturday, August 23, 2008 9:56 PM
Trying to guarantee proportionality for women at national level may
be tricky if there is no woman party that the candidates and voters
could name (well, the sex of a candidate is
On Mon, Aug 25, 2008 at 8:10 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
That could work, since additional votes for A increase the weighting,
meaning that a vote for A isn't wasted even if A wins.
Right, you basically lose your share of the votes that went to allow A to win.
Let's
On Aug 25, 2008, at 18:05 , James Gilmour wrote:
I do appreciate that the political culture is very different in
countries that have used party list PR voting systems for many
decades. Their electors seem perfectly happy with the whole
country as one district for PR, but they often have
Juho wrote:
On Aug 22, 2008, at 12:36 , Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Juho wrote:
On Aug 18, 2008, at 12:10 , Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
If we are taking about methods that rank the candidates the idea is to
define a grammar and terminology so that the most common voter opinions
On Aug 26, 2008, at 0:46 , Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
In order to guarantee proportionality (of any imaginable grouping)
at national level we may need to allow the voters to rank all
candidates nation wide (as you noted). The next question then is
if we allow the voters of one district
On Aug 26, 2008, at 1:20 , Raph Frank wrote:
Each candidate can register in any number of polling stations covering
at most N seat's worth of population. (N=5 might be reasonable).
You might want to keep the sizes of the registered areas of each
candidate about equal (or to balance the
Raph Frank wrote:
On 8/22/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
What I had in mind was something like this: Say there's a single-winner
election where the plurality winner has 35% support. Then those voters
effectively got 0.5 (+1) worth of the vote with only 0.35 mass. The total
Juho Sent: Saturday, August 23, 2008 9:56 PM
Trying to guarantee proportionality for women at national level may
be tricky if there is no woman party that the candidates and voters
could name (well, the sex of a candidate is typically known, but that
is a special case).
I think you
On Aug 23, 2008, at 3:34 PM, James Gilmour wrote:
And why should there be guaranteed proportionality for women? The
logical corollary is guaranteed proportionality for men. Just
for the record, I am opposed to both and would be very happy if 60%
or more of the MSPs in the Scottish
On 8/22/08, Jonathan Lundell [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Of course, that's true for any single-seat district, FPTP or not.
Right, I was thinking single-seaters.
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Juho wrote:
On Aug 18, 2008, at 12:10 , Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
The extreme would be a voting system where people just say how much
they agree with an opinion, for all relevant opinions, and then the
system picks the maximally representative assembly. Such a method is
not desirable, I
Raph Frank wrote:
On 8/22/08, Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
In Finland where the number of candidates is relatively high some less
obvious candidates may have some trouble getting in to the lists but on the
other hand some well known figures (that have become popular (and respected)
in other
On 8/22/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
What I had in mind was something like this: Say there's a single-winner
election where the plurality winner has 35% support. Then those voters
effectively got 0.5 (+1) worth of the vote with only 0.35 mass. The total
voting power of
On Thu, Aug 21, 2008 at 7:23 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The decoy list strategy appears because it's possible to vote for a
different national party and regional party (constituency candidate), which
leads to an overhang that can be exploited to turn top-up into
On Thu, Aug 21, 2008 at 10:41 PM, James Gilmour
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Surely, this is not a matter of opinion? Surely, the result obtained was
more representative of the expressed wishes of the voters
than if SF had won more seats than the Greens? Irrespective of the policies
of the
On Aug 21, 2008, at 2:22 PM, Raph Frank wrote:
This isn't possible though. Fundamentally, FPTP
means that a candidate can get 1 full seat while only
being supported by 1/2 a seat's worth of voters (and often
less).
Of course, that's true for any single-seat district, FPTP or not.
Predictions based on that idea would consider the ideal to be direct
democracy. Next to that would be continuous update of representative
power (continuous elections). While both of these might work if we
were machines, the former scales badly and the latter would put an
undue load on the
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