Re: [Election-Methods] D(n)MAC/RB

2008-05-28 Thread Juho
Back to the initial set-up. Who should win in this example? If the A group is going to win in any case then they could agree that A is a good compromise candidate (and make his probabilities high). On the other hand A1 is the Condorcet winner, which would make him a good compromise

Re: [Election-Methods] D(n)MAC/RB

2008-05-27 Thread fsimmons
Jobst,After thinking about your recent example:   33: A1AA2 B  33: A2AA1 B  33: B A1,A2,Aand the 66 A-voters try to cooperate to elect A by unanimously approving of her, then they still get A only with a low probability of 16/81 (approx. 20%) while A1 and A2 keep a probability of 64/243

Re: [Election-Methods] D(n)MAC/RB

2008-05-27 Thread fsimmons
Dear Jobst, I think you are right: Plain random ballot (as fall back) induces full cooperation at lower values of alpha than does a mixture of plain and approval random ballot, since the penalty is greater for failing to cooperate in the former case. However, given a value of alpha for