Dear James Gilmour,
you wrote (10 July 2008):
If you are going to mess about with MMP to the
extent that you suggest in the hope of making
some significant improvements to what is
basically a very poor voting system, why not
just adopt STV-PR and do the job properly?
When you promote pure
Markus Schulze Sent: Thursday, July 10, 2008 8:45 AM
If you are going to mess about with MMP to the
extent that you suggest in the hope of making
some significant improvements to what is
basically a very poor voting system, why not
just adopt STV-PR and do the job properly?
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
You use movie site data for your AAR-DSV examples. Does AAR-DSV
manipulability mean that a movie site that uses it would face
difficulty telling users which movie is the most popular or highest
rated? The manipulability proofs wouldn't harm them as strongly (since
Kristofer Munsterhjelm Sent: Tuesday, July 08, 2008 1:25 PM
I don't doubt that the problem exists. After all, the term decoy list
(lista civetta) comes from the Italian abuse of the system.
Do you know of any countries that do have overhang provisions to
ameliorate the problem?
While I am
James Gilmour wrote:
Kristofer Munsterhjelm Sent: Sunday, July 06, 2008 12:10 AM
Second, I've been reading about the decoy list problem in mixed member
proportionality. The strategy exists because the method can't do
anything when a party doesn't have any list votes to compensate for
Rob LeGrand wrote:
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
(On a related note, has anyone tried to use Range with LeGrand's
Equilibrium Average instead of plain average?)
I don't recommend using Equilibrium Average (which I usually call AAR
DSV, for Average-Approval-Rating DSV) to elect winner(s) from
Kristofer said:
That could be an interesting way to solve the indecisive parliament or
frequent government change problem where these exist. In order to
recall the executive, they have to vote for a new coalition at the same
time.
They have kinda that rule in Germany.? The only
On Jul 8, 2008, at 15:24 , Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Even though I think multiwinner methods should be party-neutral, I
can see the appeal of MMP: parties are guaranteed to get their
share of the vote, even if the constituency vote is disproportional.
use a proportional
Dear Kristofer,
you wrote (6 July 2008):
I've been reading about the decoy list problem in mixed
member proportionality. The strategy exists because
the method can't do anything when a party doesn't
have any list votes to compensate for constituency
disproportionality. Thus, cloning (or
Dear Kristofer,
if your goal to issue a smaller group representing the same opinions
and debates than the larger group
I think maintaining proportortionality is a good characteristic to make
sure most positions of
these debates survive the attrition. The reduction in size should
facilitate
Stéphane Rouillon Sent: Sunday, July 06, 2008 6:02 PM
For your second point, there is one way to enforce coherency (using a
mathematical definition)
within an MMP election. If one uses the same results to elect the individual
representatives
and to determine the corrected proportion
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
(On a related note, has anyone tried to use Range with LeGrand's
Equilibrium Average instead of plain average?)
I don't recommend using Equilibrium Average (which I usually call AAR
DSV, for Average-Approval-Rating DSV) to elect winner(s) from a finite
number of
@lists.electorama.com
Sent: Saturday, July 05, 2008 7:09 PM
Subject: [Election-Methods] Matrix voting and cloneproof MMP questions
I thought I could ask a few questions while otherwise being busy making
my next simulator version :-) So here goes..
First, when a group elects a smaller group
I thought I could ask a few questions while otherwise being busy making
my next simulator version :-) So here goes..
First, when a group elects a smaller group (as a parliament might do
with a government, although real parliaments don't do it this way),
should the method used to elect the
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