Range Voting selects the option with the highest average rating. Jobst has
found a method that selects the option with
the highest average rating by a random subset of the voters, while (totally?)
discouraging the exageration of preferences
that tends to happen in ordinary Range Voting.
It
Dear folks,
this night I had two additional ideas for RRVC, so here's two new
versions of it.
In the first version, the fee F is determined from the benchmark ballots
so that the expected price a deciding voter has to pay from her
voting account is just that voter's rating difference
I performed a quick little simulation for version 2:
With K options and N voters, I drew the all K*N ratings independently
from a standard normal distribution and then applied the method with
D=sqrt(N)/2.
However, instead of using all partitions as suggested, I only used N/2D
partitions.
4. For each option, determine the probability P(Y) of being a
randomly chosen benchmark voter's favourite. These probabilities
build the benchmark lottery.
5. Finally, the voting accounts are adjusted like this:
a) Each deciding voter's account is increased by an amount equal to
the total
Dear Warren,
you wrote:
But I do not fully understand it yet and I think you need to
develop+clarify+optimize it further... plus I'd like you to unconfuse me!
I'll try...
Of course, this is far from being a new idea so far, and it is not yet
the whole idea since it has an obvious problem:
Another small remark:
With N voters total and B benchmark voters, the size D of the deciding
group should probably be O(sqrt(N-B)).
This is because the amount transferred to an individual deciding voter's
account is roughly proportional to D times a typical individual rating
difference,
i) A benchmark voter's favourite mark does neither
influence the winner nor the voter's own account, so there is no
incentive to misstate the favourite.
--But it influences how much other people get paid or pay.
If I hate Republicans, I might try to influence things to force
Republicans to pay
I haven't completely digested this yet, but it looks great.
Very ingenious!
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Dear folks,
some time ago we discussed shortly whether it was possible to design a
strategy-free ratings-based method, that is, a method where voters give
ratings and never have any incentive to misrepresent their true ratings.
If I remember right, the methods that were discussed then were only
