Re: [Election-Methods] Why extreme ratings are optimal in RV

At 05:13 AM 7/26/2007, Michael Ossipoff wrote: Suppose that the method is 0-10 RV. Suppose that everyone but you has voted, and now you're going to cast the final ballot. As in actual elections, you don't know how others have voted, though you have some sort of probability estimates, such as

Re: [Election-Methods] Smith--When is extreme rating suboptimal?

At 06:11 AM 7/26/2007, Michael Ossipoff wrote: I forgot to include this in Smith exposes our false statements: Smith said that sometimes extreme rating is suboptimal in RV. So, Smith, when is that so? First of all, the original statement was general, and so Smith simply gave a simple

Re: [Election-Methods] Article about voting methods in Pasadena Weekly

Steve, I am very strongly of the view that the results of elections should as far as possible be determined purely by voters voting. I hate schemes that encourage (or much worse, force) voters to pick some predetermined ranking and/or have (after the votes have been cast) the machinations of

Re: [Election-Methods] Article about voting methods in Pasadena Weekly

At 09:08 AM 7/26/2007, Steve Eppley wrote: It proposes several better methods, including a simple but probably very effective patch for IRV: letting candidates withdraw after the votes are cast. Nice. This could eliminate the center squeeze effect, making IRV much better. Of course, this is kind

[Election-Methods] What's in a name? (was Re: Steve--Accepting or rejecting in Approval)

Hi, Markus Schulze wrote: Hallo, Mike Ossipoff wrote (26 July 2007): By the way, SSD was devised by Steve Eppley and me. Markus Schulze had previously posted about CSSD, and its equivalence with BeatpathWinner, but Steve and I were unaware of that. The term Schwartz Sequential

[Election-Methods] Article about voting methods in Pasadena Weekly

Hi, The current issue of the Pasadena Weekly, also available at www.pasadenaweekly.com, includes an article I wrote. It shows how spoiling can occur given Instant Runoff (IRV), contrary to the beliefs of most IRV proponents. It proposes several better methods, including a simple but

[Election-Methods] Final reply round completed. Really quitting now.

Now I've answered everything, except for a heap of postings by Lomax, which, as I said, though I haven't read them, are surely all answered in my previous postings. So this time, having completed the final round of replies in my phased withdrawal, I'm finally quitting voting systems. Mike

Re: [Election-Methods] Smith exposes our false statements

At 06:01 AM 7/26/2007, Michael Ossipoff wrote: I'd said that the SU claim depends on sincere voting. Smith wants to believe that I was saying that, in general, one can't say anything about SU unless voting is sincere. But I didn't say that. Does Smith know what the means? The definite article

Re: [Election-Methods] Juho--WV vs Margins

On Jul 26, 2007, at 12:33 , Michael Ossipoff wrote: I pointed out on EM that, with Margins, sometimes the only outcomes in which a CW is elected at Nash equilibrium are ones in which defensive order-reversal is used. In other words, in some situations, the election of a CW without

Re: [Election-Methods] DYN is probably better, but less proposable

Regarding: It is simply not traditional in politics. It is ubiquitous in business referring to proxy voting. I don't think you want to go there. The way proxy voting works in business is you give the board your proxy or don't get a vote at all. And if you give your vote to the board, they don't