In ranking systems we think of the voter assigning a numeric rank to each
candidate such as, for A,B, 4,5 or 4,4 or 5,4.
What are you proposing?
Remember also that in a race for governor the voting information must go
to a central counting site. In Condorcet, without your proposal, the
On Mar 5, 2008, at 14:54 , Andrew Myers wrote:
Suppose that in a Condorcet system, we allow people to submit a
ballot that has an arbitrary preference relation, so any two
alternative A and B can have either AB, A=B, or AB. There can
therefore be cycles in the graph of preferences, like ABCA.
Juho wrote:
Use of arbitrary preferences is interesting but rather theoretical,
and the changes in the outcome might be marginal (at least in typical
public elections). Any more reasons why it should be allowed?
(In regular public elections also the complexity of the ballots might
be a
At 03:20 PM 3/2/2008, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I'm curious about voting methods that take ranked ballot methods and
adapt them to range ballots. For example, with Baldwin's method, you
take drop the candidate with the lowest Borda score, recalculate,
and so on. A range variant might drop the
Thanks. I missed the part of breaking the ballot into pieces already
before counting it.
I know one example where at least people claimed that one person
monitoring the elections in a small village, after watching all the
voters vote, after the day had almost accurate results on how many
I missed one case. The votes can be made more anonymous by allowing
only a limited number of candidates, or using ballots that contain
complete rankings only if the number of candidates happens to be
small enough. Typical presidential elections might e.g. have only say
five candidates and
