Dear Juho,
this sounds nice -- the crucial point is that we'll have to analyse what
strategic voters will vote under that method! Obviously, it makes no
sense to the A voters to reverse their CB preference since that would
eliminate C instead of B and will result in B winning instead of C...
Juho wrote:
Here's an example on how the proposed method might work.
I'll use your set of votes but only the rankings.
51: ACB
49: BCA
Let's then reverse the votes to see who the voters don't like.
51: BCA
49: ACB
Then we'll use STV (or some other proportional method) to
Hi bunch,
this mail oriented me toward a nother subject I like:
Measuring satisfaction among voters.
When comparing the result to the possible candidates, one
can determine its level of satisfaction by the proportion of
candidates elected compared to the number that received
support form the
Satisfaction analysis should help answer your question
Diego Santos a écrit :
I was not enough clear when i wrote my previous email. The '' is not
a real approval mark on the ballot, it was only a satisfaction limit
from each voter. I am arguing that not always the Condorcet winner is
the
Again satisfaction analysis can be used to objectively determine which
of IRV and FTP
produces the best outcome. Using enough election data, one could even
measure how often IRV may
elect the candidate not favored by most voters. My humble estimation is
rarely (1/50 times).
In comparison I
Yes those flaws exist.
But their FPTP equivalent (vote-splitting) happens very more often than
the sum of occurence of
the previously cited.
Warren Smith a écrit :
St.Rouillon:
IRV defendors should aim at showing that IRV flaws are smaller
than FPTP flaws, thus FPTP should be declared
On Sat, May 3, 2008 at 10:26 AM, Stéphane Rouillon
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Again satisfaction analysis can be used to objectively determine which of
IRV and FTP
This statement does not make logical sense because measuring
feelings like satisfaction is not an objective measure.
For example
Of course,
I supposed that the information provided from ballots was sincere
And I supposed that the outcome that would have been obtained
if all voters had voted like a particular voter would give 100%
satisfaction to this particular voter.
Stéphane
Kathy Dopp a écrit :
On Sat, May 3,
Hello Kevin,
these ratios are guesses I have for real elections.
But I am fed up with guesses so the goal is to build an objective method
able to
determine for a perticular set (method, ballots expressing sincere
preferences, outcome)
of one electoral data, the most satisfying method in the
On Sat, May 3, 2008 at 5:51 PM, Stéphane Rouillon
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Of course,
I supposed that the information provided from ballots was sincere
And just what State do you live in where you will have opportunity to
review the ballots that have been secured and reconciled to prevent
At 12:29 AM 5/4/2008, Kathy Dopp wrote:
However, even despite some voters using strategy because they realize
that IRV fundamentally does not work the way it is intended to, you
will undoubtedly find ample number of cases of candidates winning
elections who were not preferred by most voters.
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