At 10:52 PM 5/7/2008, Fred Gohlke wrote:
Good Evening, Juho
re: I already commented earlier that the groups of three based
method that you have studied does not implement proportionality in
the traditional way.
You're right. It's not traditional, but it sure is
proportional. One of the
One observation on clone independence and electing a centrist
candidate using rankings only and when one of the extremists has
majority.
Votes:
51: ACB
49: BCA
C is the winner.
A will be cloned. The votes could be:
51: A1A2CB
49: BCA2A1
C should still be the winner.
B will be cloned. The
Dear Juho,
you wrote:
One observation on clone independence and electing a centrist
candidate using rankings only and when one of the extremists has
majority.
...
It is thus impossible for the algorithm in this case and
with this information (rankings only) to satisfy both requirements
and
Dear Raphfrk,
you wrote
There needs to be some system for providing an incentive for people
to give their honest ratings.? A random system with trading seems
like a reasonable solution.
I am glad that I am no longer alone with this opinion...
If a majority has a 100% chance of getting their
On May 8, 2008, at 5:52 , Fred Gohlke wrote:
re: I already commented earlier that the groups of three based
method that you have studied does not implement proportionality in
the traditional way.
You're right. It's not traditional, but it sure is proportional.
One of the unspecified
On May 9, 2008, at 0:56 , Jobst Heitzig wrote:
For A1,A2 to be considered clones, the ratings would have to be
something like
51: A1 100 A2 99 C 55 B 0
49: B 100 C 55 A1 1 A2 0
Could be also e.g.
A C 99 B 0
and after inserting the clones
A1 100 A2 99 C 98 B 0
There are thus many
On May 9, 2008, at 1:09 , Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Usually I consider Random Ballot a benchmark method for
this very reason: the default winning probability of a candidate
should equal the proportion of the voter who favour her. Any deviances
from this default distribution should be justified
At 05:33 PM 5/8/2008, Juho wrote:
(If there are e.g. two parties, one small and one large, the
probability of getting two small party supporters (that would elect
one of them to the next higher level) in a group of three is so small
that in the next higher level the number of small party
