Dear folks,
this night I had two additional ideas for RRVC, so here's two new
versions of it.
In the first version, the fee F is determined from the benchmark ballots
so that the expected price a deciding voter has to pay from her
voting account is just that voter's rating difference
I performed a quick little simulation for version 2:
With K options and N voters, I drew the all K*N ratings independently
from a standard normal distribution and then applied the method with
D=sqrt(N)/2.
However, instead of using all partitions as suggested, I only used N/2D
partitions.
At 07:36 AM 7/21/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
That sounds very much like Delegable Proxy, which Abd says was first
thought of by Dodgson (Lewis Carroll). In DP, as far as I understand
it, voters associate with proxies (delegates in your terminology)
and the proxies accumulate votes
Dear Warren and list members,
you wrote:
The main differences, however, are these:
- Voting money is transferred on a regular basis, not only in the very rare
case of swing voters, thus making the strategic incentive much stronger.
--this is good. However, in one of your revised schemes you
Hi,
Some more comments and questions on the properties of the proposed
method.
1) All voters are candidates and it is possible that all voters
consider themselves to be the best candidate. Therefore the method
may start from all candidates having one vote each (their own vote).
Maybe
