Juho wrote:
Many of the criteria would be nice to have. One must however remember
that often they have two sides. Winning something in some area may mean
losing something in another area (e.g. the LNH property of IRV has been
discussed widely on this list recently) especially when trying to
Kathy Dopp wrote:
Thanks Kristofer for the explanations. Do you know a good place that
discusses the Ranked Pairs method of resolving cycles, or all the
methods of resolving cycles? I would still like an example of a
spoiler in Condorcet no matter how unlikely if possible. Thank you.
Juho wrote:
On Jan 22, 2010, at 12:05 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Jonathan Lundell wrote:
In that case it might be a good starting point to define spoiler,
so we know what we've found when we find it.
What's an example of an IRV spoiler who's not a pretty strong
candidate?
A very
Kathy Dopp wrote:
James,
Your formulas below are only correct in the case that voters are
allowed to rank all the candidates who run for an election contest.
That may be true in Australia, but is not true in the US where
typically voters are allowed to rank up to only three candidates.
As a
Kathy Dopp wrote:
Jonathan,
Monotonicity is a mathematical concept that is fairly simple to
describe. There is non-decreasing monotonicity, strictly increasing
monotonicity, non-increasing monotonicity, etc. Arrow describes the
concept re. elections fairly well in one of his fairness
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Feb 2, 2010, at 2:28 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
Warren tells me that
C-1
SUM{ C!/n! }
n=1
has a closed form, but didn't tell me what it is. does someone have
the closed form for it? i fiddled with it a little, and i can
certainly see
Kathy Dopp wrote:
People on this list seem to still be sending around their incorrect or
incomplete formulas for the number of possible rank orders for rank
order ballots. This number BTW does *not* correspond to the number of
piles needed to count IRV which is a lesser number but does
One problem of SNTV (which is monotone), even the cumulative
redistributing version I showed earlier, is that voters can spread their
support too thin. This corresponds Plurality's infamous vote-splitting
feature, and shouldn't be very surprising, given that SNTV is
basically multiwinner
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Various factors that affect real elections have been neglected in the
simulations which have been done to compare performance of various
voting systems. The analysis which has been done, so far, is quite
valuable and represents the best data we have on voting system
Raph Frank wrote:
On Mon, Feb 8, 2010 at 3:23 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
So why not have the method devise its own strategy?
This is what PR-STV was designed to do.
The trick, of course, is to have the strategy transformation preserve
monotonicity.
Well
I have found a monotonicity problem in my Cumulative SNTV-DSV idea,
albeit the one without reweighting.
Consider this simple example:
A1 A2 A3 B1 B2 B3
(a-voters) 67: 10 8 8 1 1 0power: 28
(b-voters) 33: 1 1 0 10 8 8power: 28
Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Feb 14, 2010, at 4:46 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
We may disagree with the counting method that is applied when
35:A 32:BC 33:C
occurs, but it seems very clear that the Condorcet winner in this
case is C, as you seem to agree with me in this case.
Yes. The A
In a previous post, I showed how my DSV version of SNTV, based on
cumulative votes, could paint itself into a nonmonotonic corner. I said
that this happened because there was no diminuation, so selecting better
candidates led to one of them having an excess, and therefore, a
candidate that was
Warren Smith wrote:
Here's a different rule set which might be better for the internet
age. It pretty much depends on modern technology (fortunately, or
not).
W-winner election with C candidates, 0WC. We assume there is a
public bulletin board on which the total for each candidate is
Warren Smith wrote:
A preliminary page on this now at
http://rangevoting.org/MarketBasedVoting.html
Insights please...
One possible problem of the market paradigm is this: in a market, there
are buyers and sellers. The market finds a clearing price so that supply
balances demand. While the
Does nonmonotonicity in three-candidate IRV only happen when the
Condorcet winner is eliminated?
More generally, does a candidate-elimination method have to be able to
eliminate the Condorcet winner in a three-candidate scenario in order to
be nonmonotonic with only three candidates?
Juho wrote:
does a candidate-elimination method have to be able to eliminate the
Condorcet winner in a three-candidate scenario in order to be
nonmonotonic with only three candidates?
I'm not quite sure what the intended question is but isn't it enough to
eliminate the candidate with most
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
Well, that's sad. Even with a sorta narrow victory the anti-IRVers will
swagger down Church Street like they own the place. We will now all
accept that God instituted the traditional ballot for use forever and
that a 40% Plurality is a winner.
It would have
Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Mar 5, 2010, at 8:34 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Mar 5, 2010, at 8:17 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Mar 4, 2010, at 1:04 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
...
so, i'm for Condorcet too. i am sorta agnostic about what to do
about a cycle (because i really doubt
Chris Benham wrote:
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote (6 March 2010):
Another benefit to Ranked Pairs is that you don't have to confuse
matters with WV versus Margins.
snip
Kristofer,
Why is that?! That certainly is a benefit of Smith//Approval.
It's not the only method where you don't
Juho wrote:
On Mar 10, 2010, at 7:08 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
so, keeping RP, Schulze in mind for later, what would be a good
scheme for resolving cycles by use of elimination of candidates? what
would be a good (that is resistant to more anomalies) and simple
method to identify
I think I have found a multiwinner method that is both monotonic and
proportional. I have, at least, found no counterexample.
The method achieves monotonicity by cheating about proportionality:
instead of strictly adhering to the quota, it determines a divisor and
sets up a number of constraints
Brian Olson wrote:
There was a question on the list a while ago, and skimming to catch
up I didn't see a resolution, about what the right way to measure
multiwinner result goodness is.
[snip]
This is sounding a bit like an election method definition, and I
expect that this definition of
Juho wrote:
On Mar 10, 2010, at 7:26 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Juho wrote:
I'm not aware of any sequential candidate elimination based method
that I'd be happy to recommend. One can however describe e.g.
minmax(margins) in that way. Eliminate the candidate that is worst
Raph Frank wrote:
On Thu, Mar 11, 2010 at 9:41 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
Having just a single from each state may be /too/ centrist, but to pick two
senators from each using a proportional ordering might work - as long as it
doesn't introduce partisan division
Warren Smith wrote:
Kristofer Munsterhjelm's monotonic proportional multiwinner method
-- a few comments
(1) wow, very complicated. Interesting, but I certainly do not feel
at present that I fully understand it.
Alright. If you have any questions, feel free to ask.
(2) RRV obeys a
Raph Frank wrote:
On Thu, Mar 11, 2010 at 8:38 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
In other words, determine the value of q so that at least one set can
pass the combined set of constraints (at least round(V_i / q) of the
candidates from coalition i must be in the outcome
Raph Frank wrote:
I wonder if this is equivalent to your method;
assign seats to each coalition one at a time, using Sainte-lague,
until there is only 1 coalition possible.
Let's see if I got this right. Form a sorted list by number of voters,
adjusted according to Sainte-Lague. Then go down
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Mar 20, 2010, at 12:08 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Counting: Besides the N*N matrix,
i dunno why the common layout of the NxN matrix is popularly used. it
should be like a triangle, e.g. for the 2009 Burlington election:
[snip]
It's used to handle equal
Markus Schulze wrote:
Hallo,
of course, I am leaning towards the Schulze method.
This method is by far the most wide-spread Condorcet
method. It is used by about 50 organizations with
about 100,000 eligible members in total. It has also
become very popular among scientists:
Stephen Turner wrote:
Hello. It's been quite a while since
I posted here. I have a question: does
anyone have any good pointers
to material on metrics on elections?
A metric is as usual, and an
election would be simply an
election profile, that is you have
some set S of permitted ballot
Kathy Dopp wrote:
Upon cursory reflection and in response to my strong opposition to any
nonmonotonic method and to any method that fail to treat all voters'
votes equally, the only proportional method I know I would support for
legislative representation would be the party list system where
After reading the post on measuring multiwinner goodness (and writing a
reply to it), I started to think of how to determine how good the
different multiwinner methods actually are.
One way to do that is by criterion compliance. But there is another:
while proportionality can't be expressed
Brian Olson wrote:
Someone needs to tell Thomas Friedman that Alternative Voting (IRV)
isn't all it's claimed to be.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/opinion/24friedman.html
It appears that FairVote's strategy is working, for some value of
working at least. In so insistently giving the
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Mar 23, 2010, at 9:01 AM, Terry Bouricius wrote:
[...]
Since the bill, as passed, actually
used a top-two contingent system (only the top two initial candidates
would advance), the tally would be relatively easy.
so the regional venues would report
Raph Frank wrote:
On Wed, Mar 24, 2010 at 4:01 PM, James Gilmour
jgilm...@globalnet.co.uk wrote:
No, it's not at all like MMP. In MMP half or more of the members
are elected from single-member electoral districts (usually by
FPTP). The additional members in MMP are elected by party-list
Kathy Dopp wrote:
On Thu, Mar 25, 2010 at 3:01 PM,
election-methods-requ...@lists.electorama.com wrote:
Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to
election-methods@lists.electorama.com
From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no
The general scheme would then be: party
Raph Frank wrote:
This is less complex, but not as fair as transferring the surpluses.
Your first method is more proportional than your second. If what you
want is a majoritarian/centrist outcome, use the second.
In any case, I think it can be generalized if you have a house-monotone
method
How's this for an Approval version of the DPC?
If for a given subset S of the candidates, at least p Droop quotas
approve of S and there is no greater set that contains S that also is
approved by at least p Droop quotas, then if this subset has cardinality
f, at least min(p, f) of these
Hello,
Is it possible to make Median Ratings summable? Median Ratings works
like this: gather rated ballots, then the winner is the candidate with
the greatest median score.
Even if it's not a very good method, a way to make it summable would be
of interest to me because it would let me
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 05:57 AM 4/8/2010, Raph Frank wrote:
On Wed, Apr 7, 2010 at 11:25 PM, Dave Ketchum
da...@clarityconnect.com wrote:
Write-ins permitted (if few write-ins expected,
counters may lump all such as if a single candidate - if assumption
correct
the count verifies
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
MMPO minimizes the maximum pairwise opposition, so in some sense tries to minimize the total
disappointment that results from the MMPO winner being elected instead of some other candidate.
(...)
In general no matter who wins, there will be disappointed voters. Why not
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
i haven't been following closely this example scenario (for some reason
they don't seem compelling to me), but i did see WV referred to
several times and missed the definition. i can imagine it might stand
for West Virginia or Working Voter or Winning Votes or
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Schulze's CSSD (Beatpath) method does not satisfy the IIAC, but it does satisfy
all of Arrow's other criteria, that is to say all of the reasonable ones plus
some others like Clone Independence, Independence from Pareto Dominated
Alternatives, etc. We cannot hold the
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
If we had a method that chose the winner on the basis of all possible
candidates, rather than just the actual candidates, then the method would
satisfy the IIAC, because any loser that was removed would automatically be
replaced with a virtual candidate at the same
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Kristopher,
Thanks for your interest. Yes, MMTD also elects C in your scenario. But that is no problem in the
context that I have in mind for MMTD, namely allowing all nominated lotteries into the competition. In
this case an obvious lottery to include is (A+B)/2 .
Markus Schulze wrote:
Hallo,
here is an interesting paper by Ron Rivest:
http://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/RivestShen-AnOptimalSingleWinnerPreferentialVotingSystemBasedOnGameTheory.pdf
He gets to the conclusion that the Schulze
method is nearly perfect (page 12).
I'm curious now as to how
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Here's a method I proposed a while back that is monotone, clone free,
always elects a candidate from the uncovered set, and is independent
from candidates that beat the winner, i.e. if a candidate that
pairwise beats the winner is removed, the winner still wins:
1.
Juho wrote:
On Apr 16, 2010, at 1:23 AM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Since the IIAC is out of the question, how close can we get to the IIAC?
Independence from Pareto Dominated Alternatives (IPDA) is one tiny
step in that
direction. Another step might be independence from alternatives that
are
Juho wrote:
On Apr 19, 2010, at 10:46 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
The same is true of, for instance, LNHarm. If X is the CW, then if a
subset of the voters add Y to the end of their ballots, that won't
make X a non-CW. However, it's also possible to show that no matter
how
Kevin Venzke wrote:
The Burlington votes are inspiring. I'm amazed at how close the
first preference counts were, and that a fourth candidate even got
15%. Unfortunately the resolution is so stereotypical you could
think it was contrived to make a point.
What worries me is the possibility
James Gilmour wrote:
robert bristow-johnson Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 4:03 AM
I dunno about France, but is that the case in Italy? or Israel? I
thought there were a bunch of countries with a half dozen
contending parties or more. it looks to me that even the UK has
three significant
Michael Allan wrote:
I think it misses the main point. For your part, you and Raph hope to
apply Nash's model within the context of voting. You therefore tweak
that context in vitro by adding a little indeterminacy, such that Nash
can grapple with it for analytical purposes. Alternatively,
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
The Rivest lottery is non-monotone, but here is a monotone, clone
independent lottery that always selects from the uncovered set:
1. Let C1 be a candidate chosen by random ballot. If C1 is uncovered,
then C1 wins.
2. Else use random ballot to find a candidte C2
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
By the way, (contrary to Marcus' confusion) UncAAO does satisfy Monotonicity,
Clone Independence, IDPA, and Independence from Non-Smith Alternatives, as well
as the following:
1. It elects the same member of a clone set as the method would when restricted
to the clone
Andrew Myers wrote:
On 7/22/64 2:59 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
However, I strongly urge people who attempt to analyze the situation
and to propose reforms to:
1. Keep it simple. An extraordinarily powerful system for fully
proportional representation consisting of a seemingly-simple
Peter Zbornik wrote:
Hi,
I am a member of the Czech Green party, and we are giving our statutes
an overhaul.
We are a small parliamentary party with only some 2000 members.
Lately we have had quite some problems infighting due to the
winner-takes-it-all election methods used within the party.
I
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 11:57 PM 4/24/2010, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Abd,
--- En date de : Sam 24.4.10, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
a...@lomaxdesign.com a écrit :
This is what is common with the
use of voting systems criteria to study methods. Scenarios
are created, sometimes cleverly, to
Peter Zbornik wrote:
Hi Kristoffer,
The election methods you proposed are a great help.
Just one clarification in order to avoid misunderstandings: The
president and the vice presidents are all members of the board, i.e. you
have X board members out of which one is the president, vice
Consider an elimination method based on a weighted positional system.
WLOG, when dealing with three candidates, the weighted positional system
can be defined so that the candidate ranked first on a ballot gets one
point, the candidate ranked second gets w points, and the candidate
ranked last
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Apr 29, 2010, at 10:25 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
STV uses IRV.
i thought it was the other way around. no? really, isn't STV the
more technical term (that is descriptive of what is happening in those
rounds) and IRV or RCV or PV or whatever are the terms
Peter Zbornik wrote:
Dear all,
I am sending a post scriptum to the email below.
1. The conservative method is only interesting if, the unambiguously
pre-elected president and vice president(s) are not in the set of
proportionally (for instance STV) elected council members.
2. If the
Raph Frank wrote:
On Wed, May 5, 2010 at 12:08 AM, Juho juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
(I note that Raph Frank proposed also an approach where the election of the
last representative would be free of these sex related requirements. That is
one way of relieving the proportionality related problems
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On May 6, 2010, at 12:01 AM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
What could and should be done now is an interesting topic.
i found this to be a fascinating solution:
http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/ . it doesn't need to amend the U.S.
Constitution to abolish electing
Juho wrote:
One could discuss which rule should apply in those special cases when
both criteria can not be met. In order to determine exactly when we have
true clones in our hands we would need to have the original votes, and
also the preference strengths to know if the candidates are closely
Juho wrote:
On May 7, 2010, at 7:11 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Schulze's primary argument is that the use of paths let one make a
method that is very close to Minmax, yet is cloneproof and elects from
Smith. Thus, if one thinks the Minmax yardstick is a good one, yet
that Minmax's
I just thought of a possible Approval variant of M-Set Webster (my
nameless monotone multiwinner method). The only change that is
required is the construction of the sets that are used as a basis for
the constraints. This change is as follows:
Each voter gives one point to every subset of the
Peter Zbornik wrote:
Article in New Scientist:
http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20627581.400-electoral-dysfunction-why-democracy-is-always-unfair.htm
(link from http://www.openstv.org/).
I suppose it's good enough for an introductory article, but some of the
emphasis seems odd.
For
Jameson Quinn wrote:
Condorcet winner is M. But if all the RCM voters truncate before M,
then M does not beat R and L, so there's two cycles MRCR,LM. Most
Condorcet tiebreakers, including Schulze and Minimax, would name RC as
the winner. (Of course, if the M voters retaliate in kind, then R
Jameson Quinn wrote:
Would DH3-resistant Condorcet methods like Smith,IRV or BTR-IRV also
resist the truncation strategy?
Smith-IRV would resist the radical center strategy. I'm not familiar
with BTR-IRV but it very well may do so too.
BTR-IRV is like IRV, but when deciding which
Chris Benham wrote:
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote (12 May 2010):
One idea of mine, although extremely complex, would be to select the two
candidates for a runoff by two Condorcet methods - one that's resistant
to strategy (like Smith,IRV), and one that's not but provides better
results
Peter Zbornik wrote:
Dear all,
thank you for your help with the election system for the council
elections of the green party.
I will try to move on with technical testing of Schulze's methods and
the specification of the elections to the party lists as soon as time
allows.
Thanks all for
Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hello,
I've been working on a new method generator/tester/fixer. I did this once
before, and my approach is still the same, but now truncation is allowed
(instead of strict ranking). The old simulation only defined methods on
8 scenarios, allowing 6561 possible methods. The
Peter Zbornik wrote:
Dear Kristoffer, dear readers,
Kristofer, you wrote below: A minor opinion within the party might need
time to grow, and might in the end turn out to be significant, but using
a winner-takes-it-all method quashes such minority opinions before they
get the chance.
Kathy Dopp wrote:
I believe that may be the case, because a sentence in the paper says:
For example, if a
candidate receives 3 votes from bullet voters, 2 votes from voters who
approve of two
candidates, and 5 votes from voters who approve of three candidates, his or her
satisfaction score is
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Now, you may say that the second problem is analogous to STV's Woodall
vote management (don't vote for a candidate that would otherwise win),
I meant, of course, Hylland vote management. Woodall vote management
involves prefixing the vote with preferences
Raph Frank wrote:
Proportional Approval voting uses a different satisfaction metric.
Each voter is consider to have satisfaction of
1 + 1/2 + 1/3 + + 1/N
where N is the number of approved candidates who are elected.
Proportional approval voting also uses raw Approval scores instead of
Jameson Quinn wrote:
If you're looking for simple proportional systems, you could look at
total representation, where district-based representatives win with a
majority, but some extra seats are assigned to the highest-vote-getting
losers of underrepresented parties to help balance.
I
Kathy Dopp wrote:
Would that system still be additive like SAV is? Not sure how you
obtain the satisfaction scores for each possible group of winning
candidates or candidate satisfaction scores from voters' satisfaction
scores.
No, it wouldn't be.
As for how the satisfaction scores are
Peter Zbornik wrote:
On Wed, May 19, 2010 at 9:43 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km-el...@broadpark.no mailto:km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
I may have given the link before, but I think it's a good graph
showing this tradeoff for a council of two candidates:
http://munsterhjelm.no
Raph Frank wrote:
On Sat, May 22, 2010 at 11:39 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral
Method
One way to generalize Proportional Approval voting to range ballots is by
finding the most natural smooth extension of the function
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral
Method
One way to generalize Proportional Approval voting to range ballots is by
finding the most natural smooth extension of the function f that takes each
natural number n to the sum
f(n) =
Aaron Armitage wrote:
I've considered the question myself, although I've never described my
ideas publicly. Now's as good an opportunity as any.
[snip]
The first way of adding lists to STV is simple: you list your candidates,
and last you put a list, which fills out the rest of your
Peter Zbornik wrote:
Dear Kristofer,
would the constant relative risk function be of any help for Approval
voting?
F=( s(1)^(r-1)+...+s(n)^(r-1) ) / (r-1).
s(i) is the number of approved council members that are elected, where
1=i=n, n is the number of voters
r is a coefficient of risk
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Note that the sum
1+1/3+…+1/(2n+1)
is the integral (with respect to t) from zero to one of the sum
1+t^2+…+t^(2n),
and that this integrand is a finite geometric sum with closed form
(1-t^(2n+1))/(1-t^2) .
So this is the appropriate integrand for a Sainte-Lague
Here are the results for Range PAV from my simulator so far. The first
number is proportionality (normalized SLI), and the second number is
normalized Bayesian regret. Except for the Cardinal-* methods, the
scores being used are raw, i.e. not quantized in any way, but since the
number of
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
How to make summable any method based on range ballots.
If no range ballot rates more than one alternative at the top range
value, then replace each ballot with the average of all of the
ballots that have the same favorite.
Otherwise, first split each ballot into n
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Here are the results for Range PAV from my simulator so far.
(...)
It turned out I had been a bit quick at writing that code, and a bug had
slipped in. Instead of calculating a voter's satisfaction of having two
candidates at rating x and y in the council as f
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Also of note is that even though STV only has access to ordinal
information, none of the cardinal methods manage to dominate it.
In STV the candidates represent particular voters, and get no additional credit
for pleasing some of the other voters. In PAV the voters
Jameson Quinn wrote:
Can you add a range-STV method? This would reweight ballots for elected
candidate X by:
max(0,(N-D(rN/R))/N)
where N is num voters, D is droop quota, r is ballot's range score for
X, and R is electorate's range total for X. This should be simple to
code, a small variant
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Kristofer,
How about including Range SAV ?
Assume that the range ballots are functions from the set of candidates into the
set [0, M], where M is the max possible rating. Then ballot r contributes the
following quotient to the total score for subset S of the set of
Warren Smith wrote:
You have to be clearer. E.g.
QUOTE
If N = total number of voters, then (unless there's a bug somewhere) we get:
PA_Linear_Range_STV 0.29813 0.00031
If N = the number of voters voting according to the ballot being
reweighted, then the result
Jameson Quinn wrote:
I haven't seen anyone else argue this, but I've always found taxicab
distance more reasonable. Separate issue dimensions add linearly. If
somebody's going to put/take $3 in/from my left pocket and $4 in/from my
right pocket, that's a total of $7, not $5.
One could
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jun 9, 2010, at 12:42 AM, Warren Smith wrote:
1. I think using utility=-distance
is not as realistic as something like
utility=1/sqrt(1+distance^2)
I claim the latter is more realistic both near 0 distance
and near
infinite distance.
Why would that be? Do
Just a quick reply:
Jameson Quinn wrote:
Kristofer - have you been able to get results for this formula?
I *think* this is the same as my Quadratic Range STV method, but I'm
not sure. I have been busy with work and so haven't been able to check
if it is indeed the same.
The quadratic
Jameson Quinn wrote:
I'm resending the message I sent to Kristofer because I think it's
generally interesting. I redid the formula for an STV-like Range-based
proportional system, and it's actually simpler than my previous (totally
broken) formula. When electing candidate A, just multiply all
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 11:53 AM 6/11/2010, Kevin Venzke wrote:
But you say this and then quote Woodall's Majority criterion, which
Plurality fails?
Plurality allows voters to place a candidate at the top of their
preference listings. Does Plurality fail Woodall's Majority Criterion?
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
If you still think this is just ordinary majority, check
http://www.mcdougall.org.uk/VM/ISSUE3/P5.HTM , where Woodall explicitly
says that Majority is the two-seat version of the Droop proportionality
criterion, which involves sets. Quoting Woodall:
As Benham
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 10:09 AM 6/13/2010, Kevin Venzke wrote:
--- En date de : Sam 12.6.10, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
a...@lomaxdesign.com a écrit :
Plurality allows voters to place a candidate at the top of
their preference listings.
That is inadequate to satisfy the criterion, which
Kevin Venzke wrote:
Another thing it occurs to me to note:
--- En date de : Lun 14.6.10, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
Approval passes ordinary Majority. If a certain
candidate
(or set) is approved by a majority of the voters, any
candidate that has a hope of beating it must also be
approved
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