Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hello,
The last thing I did with my simulation is check whether on average a
candidate would prefer to have withdrawn (considering the results of
thousands of trials of one position) than stand, with the assumption that
they care what happens when they lose. (I'm not sure
Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Kristofer,
--- En date de : Mer 16.6.10, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no a
écrit :
I think that a nomination simulation would have to be more
complex, to take feedback into account. Candidates would
position themselves somewhere in opinion space, then move
Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Jun 16, 2010, at 9:57 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Kristofer,
--- En date de : Mer 16.6.10, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km-el...@broadpark.no a écrit :
That is possible. Would primaries encourage that effect? If
so, would we expect parties in two-party states without
voter
Peter Zbornik wrote:
Hi, just a quickie.
I wonder if you have discussed Condorcet tie-breaking using sport
scoring, like in football (soccer)?
In the Premier League, the scoring is essentially done by a modified
version of Copeland's method. Instead of Copeland's method which either
scores
Peter Zbornik wrote:
Hello,
an other question I wonder if you could help me with:
For single winner elections we currently use the two round system, which
is equivalent to the Contingent vote providing that the voter does not
change preferences
see
Peter Zbornik wrote:
Hi Kristofer,
thanks,
so is it right to state, that:
The only advantage of Contingent vote before Schulze in terms of
satisfied criteria is in the case of three candidates, where the
Contingent vote satisfies Later-No-Harm?
It's not exhaustive; my point is that
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
but if cycles are *not* involved (at all, going into a cycle from a
sincere CW or coming out of one), i would be interested in you showing
us how a strategy, such as Bullet Voting, can change the CW from someone
you didn't support to someone you do support.
To
Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Kristofer,
--- En date de : Mar 22.6.10, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no a
écrit :
Here are two questions regarding
criterion compliance:
First, does ordinary Copeland (one point for a win, nothing
for a tie or loss) pass Smith?
I believe so. Suppose
Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Kristofer,
--- En date de : Jeu 24.6.10, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no a
écrit :
Hi Kristofer,
--- En date de : Mar 22.6.10, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km-el...@broadpark.no
a écrit :
Here are two questions regarding
criterion compliance:
First, does
I have implemented an extended Minmax method, which I'll call
Ext-Minmax, and let my criterion compliance program test a version
ensured to be Smith (Smith,Ext-Minmax(margins)). It has thus far not
found a single mono-add-top failure, although it has done so for certain
other methods I've
Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Kristofer,
Here's an attempt at a more concrete example:
A 3
ABCD 13
ACBD 1
ACDB 5
ADBC 5
BACD 16
B 3
BCDA 5
CDAB 20
DBCA 24
total 95
(...)
A does have two tied margins; I'm unsure if they make a difference, or
if it can be easily fixed if they do.
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
i still think that rectangular N*N matrix is sorta useless. it's hard
to read. each pair should be grouped together for visual inspection.
How do you handle the case where some voters have no preference between
certain candidates? In that case -- say someone
As part of tinkering with my simulator, I have found that for certain
methods, it's having problems finding disproofs of criterion compliance.
As I think the reason may at least in part be with my ballot generator
(which uses impartial culture plus a hack for truncation and
equal-rank), I've
Kathy Dopp wrote:
Kristofer,
If you are trying to generate disproofs of criterion compliance then
using equal probability of selecting each ballot type for each voter
may be preventing you from generating selections that disprove certain
criterion, even if the method does not meet the criterion
Kathy Dopp wrote:
On Fri, Jul 16, 2010 at 7:39 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
Therefore, my program needs some form of sampling. As impartial culture
seems to do reasonably well in the full-rank case, yet I cannot test
criteria that may need truncated ballots for a disproof, I was wondering how
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Suppose that we have a method that satisfies independence form covered alternatives, and that gives
greater winning probability to alternative B in this scenario
40 BCA
30 CAB
30 ABC
than in this scenario
40 DBC
30 BCD
30 CDB
as any decent method would.
Could one
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
River, Schulze, and Ranked Pairs all give the win to D in the scenario
40 DBCA
30 ABCD
30 CADB
because in the pairwise beatpath D beats B beats C beats A, all of the defeats are 70 to 30, and all
other defeats are weaker.
But alternative D is covered by A.
Even
Jameson Quinn wrote:
I've been thinking recently about systems which enforce chiral symmetry,
making condorcet ties impossible. While it is possible to solve the
truncation/burial problem (eg, between two near-clones who split a weak
majority) in this way, I have not been able to come up with
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
... my goodness! it's been at least 2 weeks with no activity.
Yes. Other things have occupied my time, and that seems to have been the
case for the other ones around here, too...
just a little story: we are about to have our primary elections (August
24) here
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Aug 14, 2010, at 5:37 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Since FV thinks IRV is so nice, it's to their benefit to link
preferential voting, the concept, to IRV, the method, so that others
thing oh, either IRV or Plurality. Since IRV appears better than
After talking about that Approval should be DSV, I thought of this
method. It is:
- Voters submit ranked ballots.
- First count as in Plurality. Candidates that are tied at top rank may
either get one point each, or 1/k if there are k tied candidates - I
don't know which would be better.
-
Dave Ketchum wrote:
I see below that leeswalker is doing his best for IRV.
Would be useful if some of us could do better for Condorcet - which I
see as a competitor that should win.
TRC - True Ranked Choice - my thought for a possible label for
Condorcet, based on:
Like IRV, let's
mrou...@mrouse.com wrote:
I was wondering if someone on the Election Methods list could give me the
name (or better yet, a link to more information) on a particular variation
of the Bucklin method.
In Bucklin, you check first place votes to see if a candidate has a
majority. If not, you add
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
we have a legitimate cliff-hanger here in Vermont with the Democrat
gubernatorial primary.
5 candidates, 4 that were all viable, 3 that are within 1% and the top 2
that are within 0.1%.
i wonder how close this would have been if there was something better
Raph Frank wrote:
On Wed, Aug 25, 2010 at 9:41 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
Third, the primary is not open and so
even if a good ranked method were used, it would elect the candidate closest
to the party's median, not that of the electorate in general
and i don't quite get whether a bunch of people bullet voted in the
Burlington IRV elections has much to do with the Approval or Score.
some people chose to bullet vote on the ranked-order ballot in the two
IRV elections we had in Burlington VT. that bullet voting was not
necessary (or
Warren Smith wrote:
http://rangevoting.org/IrvParadoxProbabilities.html
computes the probabilities of a lot of pathologies in IRV3.
It is, I believe, the best available such computation.
The total paradox probability in such elections, i.e. the
probability that at least one among the 8
Jameson Quinn wrote:
This thread has touched several points.
*Branding*
I'm not particularly fond of TRC as a name for Condorcet. Ideally, a
name should give some idea of how the system actually works. That was
where my VOTE branding idea came from (Virtual One-on-one Tournament
Election).
Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Aug 27, 2010, at 12:48 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
with Score and Approval, it's easy to mark your favorite candidate
(Score=99 or Approval=1). and we know that Satan gets Score=0 or
Approval=0. then what do you do with other candidates that you
might think
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
i just think that the strategy of swinging an election from the
Condorcet winner into a cycle is just a risky strategy. you never know
who will come out on top; your worst enemy might just as well as the
centrist may or as well as your candidate. with something
Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Aug 29, 2010, at 1:29 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Aug 27, 2010, at 12:48 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
with Score and Approval, it's easy to mark your favorite
candidate (Score=99 or Approval=1). and we know that Satan
gets
Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Aug 30, 2010, at 4:56 AM, Raph Frank wrote:
One of the things that the Burr dilemma assumes is that the voters are
split into 2 groups and each group rates their candidates as vastly
superior to any candidate from the other side.
When I see clones I think of them as
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Aug 31, 2010, at 4:03 PM, Raph Frank wrote:
On Tue, Aug 31, 2010 at 11:08 AM, Juho juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
The serious problems of Approval come into play only when there are more
than two potential winners. As long as T1 and T2 are called T (i.e.
minor)
C.Benham wrote:
Kristofer M. wrote:
I don't think so. For the first two ballot groups, you have X = 9, Y =
1, Z = 0, but then you change them to X = 9, Y = 8, Z = 0 for the last.
So what does the phrase not all equal refer to then?
It means that you can't assign the same value to all
Kathy Dopp wrote:
Markus,
Unfortunately I don't have time to study it now, but a quick perusal
makes it seem written in a clear, easily-understood style of writing.
Am I to assume that this method solves the problem of irrelevant
alternatives (the spoiler problem) in all cases unlike both
Kathy Dopp wrote:
The mathematical definition of increasing monotonicity says when I
increase the independent variable, the dependent variable likewise
increases (for voting, when I increase votes for a candidate, that
candidate's chance of winning increases.) Or the mathematical
definition of
Michael Rouse wrote:
It's probably already been discussed before (most likely with a more
descriptive name), but the election methods list has been quiet, so...
Has anyone looked at making a ranked list of candidates -- either by
number of first place votes, as in IRV, or Borda order, as in
Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Chris,
--- En date de : Mer 3.11.10, C.Benham cbenha...@yahoo.com.au a écrit :
The guaranteed majority criterion requires that the winning candidate
always get an absolute majority of valid votes in the last round of
voting or counting. It is satisfied by runoff voting,
Jameson Quinn wrote:
2010/11/8 fsimm...@pcc.edu mailto:fsimm...@pcc.edu
A few years ago Jobst invented Total Approval Chain Climbing or TACC
for short.
At the time I was too young (not yet sixty) to really appreciate how
good it was. It is a monotonic. clone
free,
Kathy Dopp wrote:
What does clone free mean again please?
It means that if people always vote a certain set of candidates next to
each other, but not necessarily in the same order, the probability that
the win comes from that set is independent of how many are in that set.
It's intended to
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Nov 12, 2010, at 3:57 PM, Juho wrote:
Sincere cycles are probably not very common in real elections. There
have already been many ranked ballot based elections with reasonably
sincere ballots, but at least I'm not aware of any top level cycles in
them.
i
Bob Richard wrote:
On 11/13/2010 8:09 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Sand W wrote:
Here are the results on an actual election:
http://www.demochoice.org/dcresults.php?poll=OakMayortype=table
http://www.demochoice.org/dcresults.php?poll=OakMayortype=table
Perata (or maybe someone in his
Bob Richard wrote:
On 11/15/2010 4:58 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
When majority rules, a 51 percent majority can have their way in
election after election. But what other
possible standard is there for democracy and fairness besides
majority rule?
For seats in legislative bodies,
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Nov 16, 2010, at 8:57 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Nov 15, 2010, at 8:40 PM, Bob Richard wrote:
On 11/15/2010 4:58 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
When majority rules, a 51 percent majority can have their way in
election
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 08:57 AM 11/16/2010, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Condorcet doesn't give proportional representation. If you have an
example like:
51: D1 D2 D3 D4
49: R1 R2 R3 R4
and pick the first four, all the Ds will win.
Just for fun, suppose this is STV, to elect
Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Nov 16, 2010, at 5:57 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
I suspect that one can't have both quota proportionality and
monotonicity, so I've been considering divisor-based proportional
methods, but it's not clear how to generalize something like
Webster to ranked
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
How did this thread get side tracked to Proportional Representation?
Proportional Representation only works for multi-winner elections.
Of course, everybody knows that PR is the way to go in multi-winner elections.
And why is that? Because it solves the tyranny of the
majority rule?
For seats in legislative bodies, proportional representation.
for which STV or a more Condorcet-like ordering (what would the name of
that be? Kristofer Munsterhjelm had a Schulze ordering for Oakland) does
well. here in Vermont we just had an election where for my state senate
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
James Green-Armytage wrote:
So, the nomination results are a little less robust, but many of them
seem pretty intuitive. For example, it makes perfect sense to me that
plurality would be most vulnerable to strategic exit, and that minimax
would be minimally
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
As I mentioned in my last message, Designated Strategy Voting (DSV)
methods almost always fail monotonicity, even when the base method is
monotone. I promised that I would give a general technique for
resolving this technique.
Before I try to keep that promise, let’s
I'm currently refactoring my voting simulator, and was considering
including some of the NP-hard single-winner methods: Kemeny, Dodgson,
and Young (which seems to eb different from Kemeny).
Thus, I wonder if anybody knows reasonable integer programs that give
candidate scores (or the winner)
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
To my knowledge, so far only two monotone, clone free, uncovered methods have
been discovered. Both of them are ways of processing given monotone, clone free
lists, such as a complete ordinal ballot or a list of alternatives in order of
approval.
I think Short Ranked
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Where's a good place to find out more about the Landau set? Is
it really
possible to have a monotone, clone free method that is
independent of non-Landau
alternatives?
It turns out that there are several versions of covering, depending on how ties
are treated. All of
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Kristofer,
Jobst has also pointed out that, like Copeland, the Condorcet
Lottery is not touched by my example, since it gives equal
probability to all three candidates in the top cycle.
What is the Condorcet Lottery method? Is it Random Pair, where the
pairwise winner
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
So far we have established a formal analogy between lotteries (i.e. allocations
of probability among the alternatives) in stochastic single winner methods and
allocations of seats to parties in deterministic list PR methods.
In the single-winner case, holding lotteries
Stephen Turner wrote:
Dear EM fans!
I was wondering if anyone can think of a source
for the following simple observation, as it might make
a nice little paper. It amounts to seeing how the Borda
count can be made Condorcet-compliant by
replacing the mean by the median as detailed below.
Stephen Turner wrote:
Kathy, yes the Borda winner assigns r points to the (n-r)th
ranked candidate. It's a method with important problems.
Robert: yes, that was the point, a sort of
Condorcet:Borda::median:mean, if you like. There is no
new method or algorithm here.
Kristofer: yes, it is a
Stephen Turner wrote:
So to go from median to mean you just keep adding one datum above
and one below. Thanks for that.
Your idea about a gradual Black's method is interesting
for a different reason. Black's method actually has some
mometum behind it at the moment, as it is advocated by
Ordinary Yee diagrams are constructed by, for each point, producing a
Gaussian distribution centered on that point, and have each sample of
the Gaussian vote on candidates in order of preferences. This approach
will always contain some noise, since the sample size is finite.
Some times,
Raph Frank wrote:
I implemented one that can handle PR methods, but that didn't use randomness.
It also uses java to let the user move the voter centre around. Two
circles are use. The inner one contains 50% of the voters (if I
remember correctly).
http://raphfrk.com/ping_yee/results.html
Leon Smith wrote:
Ka-Ping Yee's code has weaknesses, but it is straightforward.
Sadly, it only supports 4 candidates. I implemented 4-candidate
Bucklin ranked 1 through 4.Honestly I'd rewrite the whole thing,
but this was a quick and easy way to see how Bucklin behaves. I
included the
Raph Frank wrote:
Warren has a way of calculating the score for each candidate using the
fast fourier transform.
And what is that way? It would be interesting to know.
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Leon Smith wrote:
There are a couple different (honest) voter models that have commonly
been used. The two used in Warren's Bayesian Regret simulations and
ranked Yee diagrams come to mind, of course.
I think Warren's Bayesian Regret simulations use a number of models,
averaging together
Leon Smith wrote:
On Fri, Jan 28, 2011 at 3:08 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
One could generalize Yee diagrams to other distances than Euclidean, but
AFAIK, there's a theorem that says that with any centrosymmetric
distribution, the Yee diagram for a Condorcet method
Hello,
does anybody know of a summable way of determining the entire mutual
majority set? The mutual majority set is the set of candidates that are
ranked above those not in the set by a majority (but not necessarily in
the same order).
The summable set method would take data with space
Leon Smith wrote:
How does the mutual majority set differ from either the Smith Set or
the Schwartz Set? Can't you just sum the a beats b half-matrices
and then run a strongly connected component algorithm on the result?
Kosaraju's algorithm produces the SCCs in a topological order, so
you
Warren Smith wrote:
COROLLARY:
There are at most C-1 different non-boring
MM-sets if C candidates (boring=empty or full), and it is possible
in linear(C)
space to write them all down (in a suitable notation). So it is kind
of silly for
JGA's program only to output the smallest, you might as
Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Kristofer,
--- En date de : Lun 7.2.11, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no a
écrit :
Is that the same as the CDTT set? The CDTT set is like the
Schwartz set, but the relation is beats by a majority
rather than just beats. You could make a ranking of sets
If there is a polyspace summable method to determine the mutual majority
set, that method can't be using the pairwise matrix alone. After
tinkering a bit, I found an example where two different sets of ballots
give the same pairwise matrix, yet have different mutual majority sets;
since a
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
If there is a polyspace summable method to determine the mutual majority
set, that method can't be using the pairwise matrix alone. After
tinkering a bit, I found an example where two different sets of ballots
give the same pairwise matrix, yet have different
Charlie DeTar wrote:
Howdy,
I'm on the board of a small non-profit, and have been tasked with
revising the portion of the bylaws that defines how to elect the board
of directors. Having had some exposure to better election methods
through a colleague, I'm interested in exploring how we might
Brandon Wiley wrote:
While I think Range Voting would work great here, if for some reason it
doesn't go over (sometimes people think it seems complicated) then
Approval Voting would also be very easy to use. Again just rank
candidates by number of approvals and take the top X.
Both bloc
James Green-Armytage wrote:
Dear Election Methods Fans,
I've been working on a paper entitled Four Condorcet-Hare hybrid
methods for single-winner elections, which I'd like to submit to Voting
Matters sometime in the near future, and I'd really appreciate your
comments and feedback.
Here
Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Kristofer,
--- En date de : Sam 19.2.11, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no a
écrit :
Some other observations: it seems that adding a Smith
constraint (Smith, or Smith//) limits the vulnerability to
compromising, and that having the base method satisfy LNHarm
James Green-Armytage wrote:
Dear election methods fans,
After reading the last few messages on this topic, my feeling is that
immunity to burying should be its own criterion. I?m not quite sure what
the relationship is to later-no-help and later-no-harm, but it doesn?t
seem like it?s
Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Kristofer,
--- En date de : Sam 19.2.11, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no a
écrit :
However, if the method passes
LNHarm, then, to quote Woodall's definition, adding a later
preference should not harm any candidate already listed. In
other words, because
Kevin Venzke wrote:
Now, if only we could use something more clone-friendly than first
preferences... The tricky thing is that most other metrics (such as
worst pairwise loss) are already vulnerable to burial.
It would be a very strange system, but perhaps IRV. Define the ordering
so that if
Since mentioning CFC-Kemeny, I've been thinking about whether it's
possible to make a CFC-method with a more viable runtime. I think I have
found one, but let's define my terminology first.
CFC means continuous forced clustering. The idea of these methods is
like Monroe's method, in that each
Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Kristofer,
--- En date de : Lun 21.2.11, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no a
écrit :
Now, if only we could use something more
clone-friendly than first
preferences... The tricky thing is that most other
metrics (such as
worst pairwise loss) are already
Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi,
I threw together a program that takes the DNA used by the method generator,
and computes distances between methods based on the number of scenarios in
which they give the same outcome. Then it tries to come up with a nice map
that minimizes inaccuracy.
You could try
Kathy Dopp wrote:
I can't help wondering why anyone would think it beneficial to have
either later-no-harm or burial prevention in a voting method. Here is
why:
1. later-no-harm prevents finding compromise candidates, and thus is
not a desirable feature of a voting method, and
2. if a voter
Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Feb 21, 2011, at 4:06 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
There might also be a trade-off. If you have a certain election
where a candidate wins, that election might be made up of honest
ballots (in which case it's good that the candidate wins), or of
strategic ballots
Bob Crossley wrote:
I defer to Walabio's point about Fair Votes as I know nothing about US
politics but I strongly suspect that they are currently getting a lot of
support from across the Atlantic.
You may have heard that in May the UK will have a referendum on
introducing IRV (we call it
Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Kristofer,
--- En date de : Lun 21.2.11, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no a
écrit :
Then it tries to
come up with a nice map
that minimizes inaccuracy.
You could try using synthetic coordinate algorithms for
mapping the distances to 2D. I did
James Gilmour wrote:
Kristofer Munsterhjelm Sent: Friday, February 25, 2011 2:29 PM
I'm not a UK politics expert, but it seems this is a minimal concession,
of the sort one would see in negotiation. AV/IRV doesn't really lead to
multiparty systems, if Australia is to be any judge. Instead
Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi all,
I'm working on another simulation. It is for 3-candidate elections and
allows these ballot types (if the method also allows them):
A (bullet vote)
ABC (strict)
A=BC (tied at the top)
A|BC (middle candidate ranked but disapproved)
This should be enough to handle most
Andy Jennings wrote:
Balinski and Laraki call it the linear median in their book. Is that
good enough?
I think linear median is good enough. Perhaps you'd want to clarify it
by calling it the linear median method or linear median ratings.
Election-Methods mailing list - see
Jeffrey O'Neill wrote:
Hello,
I just noticed that we have a new issue of voting matters and a new
editor (Prof. Tideman), and I haven't seen a post on this on this list.
Here is my blog post on the new issue: http://www.openstv.org/node/130
And the issue itself:
Owen Dalby wrote:
Set a threshold for election on this scale
(say, 3.5 on a 5-point scale), and the candidates whose average
scores fall above that threshold are given a seat. In this case the
candidates with lesser name recognition, and therefore probably fewer
votes, would have an average
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Apr 15, 2011, at 8:59 PM, ⸘Ŭalabio‽ wrote:
“Owen Dalby” owen.da...@gmail.com:
I apologize if I am asking a dumb question, but would appreciate
any honest and practical advice from this list. I am conducting an
election among a group of colleagues
⸘Ŭalabio‽ wrote:
The total number of elected officials in the USA is about half a
million elected seats which is greater than the squareroot of 300
million.
The cuberoot of 300 million is:
669
The United States House Of Representatives should have about 700
Representatives. It is too bad
⸘Ŭalabio‽ wrote:
2011-04-17T07:47:56Z, “Kristofer Munsterhjelm”
km_el...@lavabit.com:
⸘Ŭalabio‽ wrote:
The cuberoot of 300 million is:
669
I could reform the United States Of America, this is what I would
do:
Expand the House Of Representatives to 1024.
Why? 1024 is much greater
Alex Small wrote:
I've been following some of the apportionment threads, and wanted to
pose a related question: Is there an optimal legislature size from the
standpoint of apportionment?
If you look at this from an optimization perspective, you have one
objective that pulls in the direction
Quite some time ago, I rewrote and expanded the singlewinner part of my
election method analysis program, mainly to add a cache to make X,,Y and
X//Y methods very fast if results for base methods and sets X and Y had
been calculated earlier -- and to only calculate the pairwise matrix one
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
likewise, when the IRV method chooses the same candidate as Condorcet
would (which is what would happen if the Condorcet winner makes it into
the IRV final round), we can say Hey, IRV did pretty good! but if IRV
fails to elect the Condorcet winner, it doesn't
Dave Ketchum wrote:
Well, Fairvote would like to make us believe that some cases, if the
Condorcet winner had won, we'd all be saying but wait! He didn't have
enough core support! Boo!.
But, we chose ranking rather than Approval to let voters approve, but
with unequal liking. Bush haters
⸘Ŭalabio‽ wrote:
Note: I got swamp with work a few weeks ago, but since Kristofer
Munsterhjelm went through the trouble of writing me, I should
respond.
2011-04-18T18:46:16Z, “Kristofer Munsterhjelm”
km_el...@lavabit.com:
The ideas of districts is that the politicians are accountable
Michael Allan wrote:
I don't know if it's helpful information, but Mercurial and Git are
functionally very similar. There isn't much to choose between them.
I never understood why Torvalds and crew bothered coding Git in the
first place. I use Mercurial.
There's a bunch of hosting sites for
Jameson Quinn wrote:
How hard it is to vote in each system is an empirical, not a theoretical
system. The evidence is pretty clear that it is easier for most people
to rate candidates on an absolute scale - whether numeric or verbal -
rather than ranking them relative to each other. That is
⸘Ŭalabio‽ wrote:
¡Hello!
¿How fare you?
In list Election-Methods run out of Electorama.Com, I hit upon why
rating is easier and faster than ranking:
With rating, one determines the best candidate and gives that
candidate the rating +99. One determines the worst candidate and
gives that
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