Richard Fobes wrote:
To: Kristofer Munsterhjelm
I believe that you imply, in your message copied below, that you like
the following words in the older version of the recently edited
paragraph (of the Declaration of Election-Method Reform Advocates):
... we would not hesitate to support any
matt welland wrote:
Assuming that a) decent information about the candidates has been
available via news, web and debates and b) reasonable quality approval
polls have been conducted prior to the election then:
In the case where there are too few good options then clearly the
candidates do not
matt welland wrote:
On Mon, 2011-10-17 at 20:42 +0200, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
matt welland wrote:
Again, I think it is very, very important to note that the ranked
systems actually lose or hide information relative to approval in both
these cases.
In what manner does a ranked method
Andy Jennings wrote:
Hi Kristen,
I'm having trouble understanding what your goal is in re-posting the
first four paragraphs from this April post of mine.
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2011-April/027194.html
Is this some new kind of mailing list spam?
capologist wrote:
See section 5 of my paper:
Not quite what I'm looking for. That section describes a
non-deterministic method for generating a complete linear order.
I don't require a linear order. I'm OK with a partial ordering.
I'm looking for a deterministic method for generating a
Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/10/25 Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com
mailto:km_el...@lavabit.com
Jameson Quinn wrote:
* A multimember-district system helps with the above
problems, but
doesn't actually solve them. Who wants a system where
capologist wrote:
I'm no expert in this field, but it is one I find interesting and
visit from time to time. My first encounter with it was when I
stumbled on a website advocating what was then called the Tideman
method, before it was called Ranked Pairs and before the Schulze
method was
David L Wetzell wrote:
Hello Walabio, et al.
On Mon, Oct 31, 2011 at 4:41 AM, ⸘Ŭalabio‽ wala...@macosx.com
mailto:wala...@macosx.com wrote:
6. I advocate for FairVote's IRV3.
I hate to break this to you, But FairVote.Org is Astroturf.
The Republicrats and
David L Wetzell wrote:
And I don't think the Condorcet criterion is /that important/, as I
think in political elections, our options are inherently fuzzy options
and so all of our rankings are prone to be ad hoc.
If opinions are fuzzy, that means that the voters' true distribution
within
I'll reply to your other post, but I think this one is the easiest to
reply to, so I'll do so first.
David L Wetzell wrote:
On Thu, Nov 3, 2011 at 9:14 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_el...@lavabit.com mailto:km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
David L Wetzell wrote:
And I don't think
Jameson Quinn wrote:
Condorcet*: Elects center with honesty? Yes; 10/10
Doesn't elect Condorcet loser, even with strategy? Usually not, though
it is in theory possible for the L voters to shoot themselves in the
foot by strategically provoking a LRCL cycle but end up electing R
thereby.
Since many of your replies follow the same pattern, I'm going to address
them where I first see each. Thus I may veer a bit from replying only to
the issue quoted.
I've also been a bit slow in writing this. I'll blame work and play :-)
-
David L Wetzell wrote:
KM:Your first points seem
Ted Stern wrote:
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/science/voters-experience-stress-on-election-day-study-finds.html
I remember hearing about other studies showing that making difficult
decisions uses up the energy and neurotransmitters required for will
power.
So to bring this back on topic,
Dave Ketchum wrote:
Really a trivial question, and brings us back to looking closer at
Condorcet.
IRV also does ranking, but has a different order of looking at ballots:
Vote for minor candidate? Likely discarded when seen, thus of
little effect.
Vote for third party before
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
Who is wronged in Kevin's MMPO bad-example?
---
Yesterday I asked how bad C can be, in that example, if nearly all
the A voters are indifferent between B and C, and the only one not
indifferent prefers C to B.
I'd like to
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
Kristofer:
I'd said:
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
Who is wronged in Kevin's MMPO bad-example?
---
Yesterday I asked how bad C can be, in that example, if nearly all
the A voters are indifferent between B and C, and the only one not
David L Wetzell wrote:
I blogged about this at my blog a while back in response to the args
given by the Electoral Reform Society of the UK against ordered party
list forms of PR.
http://anewkindofparty.blogspot.com/2011/05/electoral-reform-society-united-kingdom.html
I think a better way
this state was Illinois, but apparently not, as my
mail search function can't find any messages of yours mentioning it.)
Second, I'll reply to some of your replies below, but I think we're
converging on what the disagreement is.
David L Wetzell wrote:
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Either the major
David L Wetzell wrote:
On Fri, Nov 18, 2011 at 7:14 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_el...@lavabit.com mailto:km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
Loring argues that Plurality councils can swing wildly and deny
representation to people who should be represented, while PR
councils can still
David L Wetzell wrote:
This is based on what I've culled from empirical findings reported in
Choosing an Electoral System.
http://anewkindofparty.blogspot.com/2011/04/choosing-electoral-system-part-i.html
1. While all forms of PR fall short of proportionality in
representation, the best
David L Wetzell wrote:
On Tue, Nov 22, 2011 at 5:34 PM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com
mailto:jameson.qu...@gmail.com wrote:
What kind of evidence would convince you to change your mind about
IRV? How about on IRV3/AV3 resolving most of IRV's problems? (I
believe that
David L Wetzell wrote:
-- Forwarded message --
From: robert bristow-johnson r...@audioimagination.com
mailto:r...@audioimagination.com
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Date: Thu, 24 Nov 2011 15:50:02
Jameson Quinn wrote:
Mostly I agree with what Kristofer says. Where I don't agree, I still
think that Kristofer is a living example of why there are both
principled and pragmatic reasons why everyone shut up and support my
method won't work; or at least won't work today, not until we start out
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
what do you mean: weight? rankings are just rankings. if a voter
ranks Candidate A above Candidate B (independent of what the absolute
rank values are), all that means is that this voter would vote for A if
it were a simple two-candidate race with B. and all
matt welland wrote:
On Sat, 2011-11-26 at 22:31 -0500, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On 11/26/11 6:58 PM, matt welland wrote:
Also, do folks generally see approval as better than or worse than IRV?
they don't know anything about Approval (or Score or Borda or Bucklin or
Condorcet) despite
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
If one is going to propose a method involving proxies, then Proxy DD is the
biggest and most
ambitious improvment. I described it in a posting when you asked about it.
Though it's a much more ambitious thing to ask for, maybe people _would_ want a
good proxy system such
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Mike,
I like MMPO2 because (unlike MMPO1) it takes into account opposition from
supporters of eliminated candidates, so is more broad based, and it is easily
seen to satisfy the FBC. Also it allows more brad based support than MMPO3 where
only the support by top raters
Peter Zbornik wrote:
Dear all,
do anyone of you know the best way to incorporate single constraints
into STV and proportional rankings from STV (see for instance:
http://www.votingmatters.org.uk/issue9/p5.htm)?
For instance, the constraint can be that at least 1/3 of the elected
seats go to
Peter Zbornik wrote:
Hi Kristofer,
I don't consider Schulze STV, only standard STV (IRV-based, fractional
static Droop quotas, not meek),
since it is the only method, which is simple to explain to
non-enthusiasts and widely used and have tested and widely used
software support for vote
David L Wetzell wrote:
The two major-party equilibrium would be centered around the de
facto center.
But positioning yourself around the de facto center is dangerous in
IRV. You might get center-squeezed unless either you or your voters
start using strategic
David L Wetzell wrote:
KM:I think this is where we differ, really. On a scale from 0 to 1,
you think their relative merit is something like:
0: Plurality
0.7: IRV3/AV3
0.72: Condorcet, MJ, etc
while I think it's something like:
0: Plurality
0.25: IRV
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
because *both* the winning votes is tied and the margins is tied. what
else is there?
i wonder if it would be better to first rank each pair according to
Margins and then, in the case of tie of Margins, Winning Votes are used
to break the tie to determine
Clinton Mead wrote:
What would be the simplest paper count that will produce a winner in the
smith set?
I'm not completely sure how your method works, but how about this?
Count the number of ballots on which each candidate is ranked (in any
position). Call each candidate's count his approval
Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/11/29 robert bristow-johnson r...@audioimagination.com
mailto:r...@audioimagination.com
IRV, with its kabuki dance of transferred votes, is more complicated
than Condorcet. when i was asked by one of the leaders in this town
of the anti-IRV movement
David L Wetzell wrote:
On Sat, Nov 26, 2011 at 3:20 PM, David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com
mailto:wetze...@gmail.com wrote:
Here's a bunch of responses
dlw: SL may be more proportional than LR Hare, but since I'm advocating
for the use of a mix of single-winner and multi-winner
We're still hitting the same disagreements. I say look at the others,
you say this time it'll be different, I say Condorcet IRV, you
say marketing differences are great while in practice, there's no
difference between Condorcet and IRV large enough to make a difference.
Thus, let me do some
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
Kristofer:
I'd said:
The solution: Choose someone honest, as your proxy. That's a big difference from
ordinary representation. You, and you only, choose your proxy.
If you don't think anyone is honest, then don't use a proxy.
I should add: If proxy-honesty is a
On 12/14/2011 09:59 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
if we push hard for the use of American Proportional Representation
it'll give third parties a better chance to win seats and they will
prove great labs for experimentation with electoral reform.
You keep on saying that. We can keep stating our
On 12/21/2011 05:10 AM, David L Wetzell wrote:
Happy Holidays, I reply to RBJ, Ted Stern, Dave Ketchum and Kristofer M
below.
(...)
DK:But when marketers lie and get caught, potential customers get
suspicious as to future marketing.
dlw: To simplify is not to lie.
IRV finds the majority
And an addendum I forgot first time around. I hope this won't distract
you from the other post.
On 12/21/2011 05:10 AM, David L Wetzell wrote:
Let me add RBJ that I really do appreciate your comments in response to
Kathy Dodd. I would add that if the GOP/Prog Haters cd go back in time
to the
On 12/22/2011 12:49 AM, David L Wetzell wrote:
More later...
Alright. I'll reply to all of it when you've finished your reply, time
permitting.
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On 12/22/2011 08:27 AM, Richard Fobes wrote:
NP-hard problems require that every possibility be tested in order to
know the characteristics of each -- and every -- possibility.
Just as a nitpick: that's not entirely true. Consider integer
programming. Integer programming is NP-hard, but in
As I wrote in a post I think I sent to this list, no method that uses a
positional matrix can pass the Droop proportionality criterion when
there are more than three candidates. I showed this by giving two ballot
sets, each of which had the DPC mandate a different subset of the
candidates
to Kevin's example, I don't think you can call the
MMPO criticism inherently non-valid. To quote yourself, in an earlier
post:
You (Kristofer Munsterhjelm -ed) wrote:
You could of course argue that if I gave it to B, A would have been
just as unhappy, and if I gave it to A, B would have been
On 12/29/2011 10:49 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
Kristofer continues:
You say
that it is non-valid from your own point ofview
http://www.textsrv.com/click?v=VVM6MTQwMTY6MTIxOnZpZXc6ZmIzNmIxM2E4NTZhY2M2YjczNGZjZWNhZjA1NDJjNGU6ei0xMDMyLTEwMzY4Omxpc3RzLmVsZWN0b3JhbWEuY29t,
where you think the
On 12/30/2011 05:51 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Suppose the ballot limits grade options to A, C, and F, but a sizeable faction
would like to award a
grade of B to a particular candidate. If half of them voted a grade of A and
the other half a grde of C, the
resulting grade points would be the
On 01/03/2012 10:44 PM, Ted Stern wrote:
I've seen examples in which Bucklin (with equal ratings) fails the
Participation criterion, AKA Woodall's mono-add-top criterion for
deterministic methods:
the participation criterion says that the addition of a ballot,
where candidate A is
On 12/30/2011 10:59 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
Kristofer:
First, let me agree that not-valid is only a subjective opinion. I was using
it as shorthand to mean
that I don't consider the objection to be important.
So I don't deny the subjective-only value of not-valid when I said it.
Thank
On 01/04/2012 04:56 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
The Plurality criterion isn't just failed by methods that return an
un-Plurality-method-like result. It is also failed by methods that
return an un-Approval-like result. Recall that the Plurality method says
if A is ranked first on more
In trying to generalize my 2-of-3 Bucklin method, I think I have found
one that very seldomly fails monotonicity, if at all. Since I am using
an experimental setup (basically trying what works and checking if the
program can find a monotonicity failure), I can not be certain that the
method is
I think we're reaching the end of this thread, as I'm not all that
interested in continuing further. It's relatively clear that changing
your position will take a lot of work, and to put it simply, I'm not
getting paid enough for this :-) I have recently had other things to
focus on, as you
On 01/24/2012 07:28 AM, Bryan Mills wrote:
I've been looking at a voting system over the past week or so that I
think is really interesting: a combination of the delegable proxy
system with a sortition procedure to elect a standing legislature.
My objective is to find a way to use conventional
On 01/25/2012 01:01 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
Does anyone have any references of academic papers that talk about the
relationship between the honest CW and the honest Range winner? Ie, when
are they necessarily the same or not? For instance, in a spatial model
(voronoi diagram)? I want to mention
On 01/26/2012 06:27 PM, Fred Gohlke wrote:
I, for one, regret that Kristofer Munsterhjelm is yielding to the
futility of posting on the Election Methods site. My main purpose in
scanning the site has been to read his always penetrating insights and
Mike Allan's valuable attempts to generate
On 01/11/2012 08:34 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
Jameson--
Yes, sorry to have again missed SODA in my list of FBC/AOC methods.
Methods involving delegation or proxy can do a good job of avoiding
strategy problems.
I suggest that Proxy Direct Democracy, as I've described it during
the last few
On 01/28/2012 09:13 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
On a related subject: The other thing lacking at EM, in
addition to mock elections, is support for claims that a criterion is
important. We hear, “I consider this criterion to be very important”. But such
assertions need to be supported by
On 01/30/2012 10:09 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
Does anyone here know the strategy of MJ? Does anyone here know what
valid strategic claims can be made for it? How would one maximize one’s
utility in an election with acceptable and completely unacceptable
candidates who could win? How about in an
On 01/31/2012 01:48 AM, Ted Stern wrote:
I've been thinking that one way to spread information about
alternative voting systems might be to gamify one or more systems.
[...]
Has anyone out there in the EM communities thought about this?
I saw someone made a game out of gerrymandering. Did
On 01/31/2012 07:14 AM, Clinton Mead wrote:
Why not simply IRV until 500 candidates are left.
STV would probably be better - or if you want a weighted assembly,
continuous cumulative voting (which is like RV except every ballot's
rating is divided by the sum of the undivided ratings on that
On 01/31/2012 07:05 AM, Bryan Mills wrote:
On Wed, Jan 25, 2012 at 12:52 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
I think it is strategy-proof, but I wonder if people would irrationally
reason something like this:
My chance of winning is very low, so I shouldn't keep my hopes
On 02/01/2012 06:15 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
On 2012 1 31 01:45, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com
mailto:km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
On 01/30/2012 10:09 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
Does anyone here know the strategy of MJ? Does anyone here know what
valid strategic claims
On 02/02/2012 05:28 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
I honestly think that honest rating is easier than honest ranking.
(How's that for honesty per square word?) MJ is the only system which
allows honest rating to be full-strength in practice; and SODA is the
only good system which allows anything
On 02/02/2012 07:24 AM, Bryan Mills wrote:
Single-winner is required by 2 USC Sec. 2c:
[...] there shall be established by law a number of
districts equal to the number of Representatives to which such
State is so entitled, and Representatives shall be elected only
from
On 02/03/2012 02:26 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
Of course, in most real-world elections I've ever heard of, 4 candidates
are plenty. So is there a way to fix SODA to make those pesky
5-candidate scenarios go away? Analogously, Condorcet's paradox arises
for 3 or more candidates, but you can make 3
On 02/02/2012 09:40 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
MJ:
Thanks for all the answers about MJ strategy.
But I'd told how easily a strategic faction can take advantage of and
beat a sincere-voting faction.
And, if the contest is close, then even a small difference in sincerity
could decide which
On 02/03/2012 08:45 PM, Andy Jennings wrote:
- If someone built a computer program that presented me pairs of
candidates at a time as Kristofer suggested, that would make it somewhat
easier. I think I would still prefer to divide them into tiers first,
but if I divided them into tiers first, I
On 02/04/2012 06:47 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On 2/3/12 11:06 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
No, he's saying that when the CW and the true, honest utility winner
differ, the latter is better. I agree, but it's not an argument worth
making, because most people who don't already agree will
On 02/04/2012 01:07 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Personally I don't understand why one would want to spend time on a
method that you have to defend by saying it might work anyway, even
if as built the incentives are wrong.
I don't know if you're replying to me, but it seems to me that any
On 02/07/2012 11:16 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
Kristofer:
You say that MJ and RV are the methods to propose because they're the
ones that meet the two criteria you defined.
Have you demonstrated that they're the only ones?
No, I didn't say that, and no, I haven't demonstrated they're the only
Earlier I mentioned that I had found a way of making my Bucklin
multiwinner method more managable - more sequential. I did not, however,
say exactly how I had done that.
So why not do that here?
Consider my previous version of the Bucklin multiwinner method (for
which I still haven't found a
On 02/10/2012 11:02 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
We can add a candidate C_k to PC if there exists a subset (coalition)
that supports at least k+1 candidates, where k is the cardinality of the
intersection of PC and that coalition, and that coalition also contains
C_k.
Oops, seems I reused
On 02/10/2012 11:18 PM, Ted Stern wrote:
Hi Kristofer,
I am very interested in PR multiwinner methods, especially those that
use ER-Bucklin.
However, I have a hard time following your logic.
Would it be possible to work out a relatively simple example using a 3
winner election, a Droop-like
On 02/19/2012 06:04 AM, Richard Fobes wrote:
David Wetzell, your reply reveals that we view the U.S. political system
very differently.
Here is a link to a map of the U.S. political system as I see it:
http://www.votefair.org/pencil_metaphor.html
If the Republican party and the Democratic
On 02/19/2012 06:18 AM, Richard Fobes wrote:
I have in mind European parliaments where coalitions are typically needed.
In my opinion, coalitions require back-room compromises that most voters
would not like (if they knew what those compromises were).
I have not seen any parliamentary
On 02/15/2012 06:08 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
But conditionality-by-mutuality violates later-no-help, and as such,
raises the spectre of a DH3 http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/DH3-like
scenario.
I think you can have burial in methods that pass LNHelp too, unless the
method also passes LNHarm.
On 02/19/2012 09:37 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Does anyone understand why the DH3 concept exists? Why envision three
major blocs, instead of two major blocs plus the small bloc belonging
to the pawn candidate? That doesn't require four candidates and more
closely resembles how burial problems are
On 02/20/2012 03:13 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On 2/19/12 8:53 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
It seems quite a few election rules get quirky in one way or the other
with a 3-way competitive election.
That might be a point worth considering in the abstract in a paper or
something why are
On 02/20/2012 04:03 AM, Richard Fobes wrote:
On 2/19/2012 1:04 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 02/19/2012 06:04 AM, Richard Fobes wrote:
...
Here is a link to a map of the U.S. political system as I see it:
http://www.votefair.org/pencil_metaphor.html
If the Republican party
On 02/22/2012 11:15 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
I'm working on sketching out data structures so that Helios Voting
https://vote.heliosvoting.org/, an online, open-source,
cryptographically-verifiable voting system, can use advanced voting
procedures such as Range, Majority Judgment, and SODA.
On 02/23/2012 03:35 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
Basically, we agree. I am working on helios not because I think it
should or will be used for public elections, but because I think it can
be useful for private elections, and introduce users to better voting
methods. Also, honestly, the math is fun.
On 02/23/2012 11:24 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:
Kristofer Munsterhjelm asks: ... why do you propose rules that would
make it harder for third parties to grow? ...
What I promote is VoteFair ranking. It includes a PR-related portion --
called VoteFair partial-proportional ranking -- that gives
On 02/24/2012 02:15 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi,
De : Kristofer Munsterhjelmkm_el...@lavabit.com
As a consequence, among ranked methods, some really bad methods (like Plurality)
gets it wrong when there are two candidates plus no-hopes; some slightly better
methods (like IRV, and perhaps I'd
On 02/20/2012 03:34 AM, Richard Fobes wrote:
On 2/19/2012 1:24 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 02/19/2012 06:18 AM, Richard Fobes wrote:
...
More specifically, European politicians seem to be as clueless as U.S.
politicians about what is needed to create jobs and restore
widespread
On 02/26/2012 06:25 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:
On 2/24/2012 1:01 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 02/23/2012 11:24 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:
Kristofer Munsterhjelm asks: ... why do you propose rules that would
make it harder for third parties to grow? ...
What I promote is VoteFair ranking
I think I have found a way to help the design of multiwinner methods.
As you may know, I've been using a proportionality measure to find the
degree to which multiwinner methods give proportional representation,
and along with Bayesian regret, to define the current Pareto front of BR
versus
On 03/09/2012 01:46 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
*De :* Kevin Venzke step...@yahoo.fr
*À :* election-methods election-meth...@electorama.com
*Envoyé le :* Jeudi 8 mars 2012 18h36
*Objet :* Re: [EM] Obvious Approval advantages. SODA. Approval-Runoff.
Hi Mike,
I don't think
On 03/03/2012 07:59 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:
(My comments are interspersed because there are multiple topics here.)
On 2/29/2012 2:02 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
I'm not entirely sure what you're saying. If you're saying that you
can't have more than two seats per district and still
On 03/08/2012 06:27 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
It didn't happen, much to my astonishment:
http://www.burlingtonvt.gov/CT/Elections/Results---DMS-Documents/2012/Annual-City-Election-Results/
So, for the time being, losing the ranked ballot hasn't hurt the cause
of majority rule in
On 03/09/2012 06:53 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
I'm not criticizing all academics. In mathematics, physics and other physical
sciences,
I have no quarrel with the authority of academics.
But a sweeping worship of academic authority in general is unproductive for
progress
of any kind.
There are
On 03/17/2012 07:16 PM, Andy Jennings wrote:
Kristofer, (and others too)
If I recall, you were recently experimenting with how to best determine
a winner (or was it a full ranking) from incomplete pairwise
information.
I don't seem to recall that offhand, but life has been somewhat chaotic
On 03/19/2012 02:39 PM, Peter Gustafsson wrote:
To all readers:
When I have been posting, I see my own posts as one very long line, with
no line breaks despite the fact that I have used them when I composed
the message. If it looks like that to you also, please advise me of that
unfortunate
On 03/20/2012 01:51 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
I know that online polls are silly. But thousands of people see them,
and if they see that the idea actually has support, some of them will be
more open to consider if it has merit.
While the poll has comments of low quality, and the users seem to
On 03/22/2012 07:57 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
There are plenty of voters who report having to hold their nose and
vote only for someone they don't like. They'd all like to be able to
vote for better candidates to, including their favorites. Even if one
only counts the Democrat voters who say that
On 03/23/2012 05:36 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On 3/23/12 12:00 PM, Markus Schulze wrote:
Hallo,
here is an e-petition for the Schulze method:
http://epetitions.direct.gov.uk/petitions/31387
note the .gov.uk . i guess i am not eligible.
You can sign (just choose No to British
On 03/29/2012 09:41 PM, Ted Stern wrote:
It is my impression that the only situations in which IIAC fails is
when there is no majority.
Would it be possible to get around IIAC by adding a two-candidate
runoff?
I don't think so. In a subset of all possible two-round elections, the
voters are
On 03/31/2012 08:24 AM, Richard Fobes wrote:
So, wrapping up this explanation:
If the Condorcet-Kemeny problem were in the field of encryption, then of
course only an exact solution would be relevant.
But the Condorcet-Kemeny problem is an optimization problem -- or it can
be regarded as a
On 04/02/2012 03:49 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 08:57 PM 4/1/2012, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
Approval applies a burden of tactical voting to the voter right from
the start.
In other words, a burden of responsibility for the effect of our actions
on the world. Those who would
On 04/04/2012 08:06 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:
My comments are interspersed as answers to specific questions/statements.
On 4/3/2012 12:53 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
But anyway, I'll try to find an example where:
- VoteFair elects A,
- VoteFair has no ties in its social ordering
On 04/10/2012 03:57 AM, ⸘Ŭalabio‽ wrote:
¡Hello!
¿How fare you?
We require candidates to get the squareroot of the number of voters
to get on the ballot with writeins allowed. Let us look at an
hypothetical single-winner election:
Let us suppose that 420 people make the ballot. ¿How can the
On 04/09/2012 11:31 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
I've said seemingly contradictory things about IRV. It's particularly
flagrant FBC failure makes it entirely inadequate for
public political elections, more so than Condorcet, which, too, is
inadequate due to FBC failure.
You keep saying anything
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