On 04/13/2012 09:11 PM, ⸘Ŭalabio‽ wrote:
¡Hello!
¿How fare you?
I have had interactions with people on this list hating rated
ballots. I have a question for them:
If the ballot would allow both ratings and rankings, ¿would that be
acceptable?
The ballot could allow ranking or ratings with
On 04/10/2012 10:20 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
Kristofer:
You wrote:
On 04/09/2012 11:31 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
I've said seemingly contradictory things about IRV. It's particularly
flagrant FBC failure makes it entirely inadequate for
public political elections, more so than Condorcet,
On 04/14/2012 09:43 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Yet that isn't absolute. Again, consider Burlington. The Burlington
voters, thinking they could now vote as they wished, ranked the
candidates in a manner suggesting a relatively close race between
the three major candidates. They didn't discover
the other
advanced Condorcet methods. If only Kemeny can pass both Condorcet and
reinforcement, then approximations of Kemeny won't. They might fail it
even when N = 6, as reinforcement concerns itself with full social
orders, not just winners.
On 4/7/2012 3:19 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote
On 04/23/2012 04:16 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
The wikipedia table of voting systems
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voting_system#Mathematical_criteria and
criteria continues to evolve productively. One issue which remains is
that it contains no criteria which distinguish between Shulze and Ranked
On 04/18/2012 10:25 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
You see, there are methods for which we can assure people that it's
been proven that no one can benefit from favorite-burial.
Yes, such methods exist, but you have to give up quite a bit to get FBC.
You have to give up Condorcet's Criterion.
On 04/22/2012 05:07 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:
The core of the system is VoteFair popularity ranking, which is
mathematically equivalent to the Condorcet-Kemeny method, which is
one of the methods supported by the Declaration of Election-Method
Reform Advocates.
You said there are ballot sets
On 04/23/2012 10:32 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
ICT:
Kevin Venzke proposed ICA. Improved-Condorcet-Approval.
ICA passes FBC. The part of ICA that ICT uses is the Improved Condorcet
part. But instead of completing IC with
Approval, it completes it by electing the IC winner ranked top on the
On 04/24/2012 08:37 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:
In the non-mathematical world the word equivalent means having
similar or identical effects which allows for not _always_ being
_identical_ in _all_ respects. That is the context for usage in the
Democracy Chronicles article.
A context which is
On 04/27/2012 07:32 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
...but wouldn't it be better not to have the disadvantags?
Sure. It would be better to make Arrow and GS go away, but it's not
going to happen. If you want to have Condorcet, you have to give up some
desiderata. If you want FBC, you have to
On 04/29/2012 04:48 AM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Computers do well at performing the tasks they are properly told to
perform - better than humans given the same directions. Thus it would
make sense to direct the computers and expect them to do what is needed
accurately.
Still, we sometimes wonder
On 04/29/2012 05:43 AM, Paul Kislanko wrote:
Mike, I asked what ballots are you going to hand-count. I vote by
touching a touch-screen, and the machine gives me a receipt. You say I
COULD give you a paper ballot to hand-count, but if I just voted by
pressing a portion of a
On 04/30/2012 11:11 PM, Paul Kislanko wrote:
I always thought the “Condorcet is like a round-robin athletic
tournament” analogy was weak, because individual voters don’t get to go
through the round-robin and make their pairwise preferences explicit.
(As a voter, I’d find a “better/worse”
(Oops - seems that I clicked Reply instead of Reply to All. Let's
try that again.)
---
It appears that your mail program has seriously mangled your reply,
bunching up all the text into a single block. In addition, it seems to
have sent multiple versions of your reply in the same message.
(It did send, now, but it truncated it early. Again! I'm sending this to
Mike too, as the original mail I sent to him might have been truncated
early, too.
If this does work, I've found a bug in Thunderbird.)
--
It appears that your mail program has seriously mangled your reply,
bunching up
On 05/03/2012 09:29 AM, Richard Fobes wrote:
I like this analogy. It does not amplify enough, yet it prompted me to
think of this idea:
We tend to think of politics as a pyramid that has our few-in-number
leaders at the top, and the numerous voters at the bottom who support
the leaders through
On 05/08/2012 08:46 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Since Richard wants to make a which one wins comparison between
FBC and Condorcet's Criterion (CC), then I'll remind him that, when
FBC failure sufficiently makes its problem, CC compiance becomes
quite meaningless and valueless. And there is good
On 05/03/2012 11:19 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Kristofer:
It's necessary to distinguish between _two_ Condorcet disadvantages that
I spoke of:
1. Condorcet's FBC problem, when Condorcet is in use.
2. Condorcet's enactment problem, due to being a complicated
rank-balloting contraption.
You
On 05/11/2012 11:31 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Also, no one has suggested that any method other than Approval can meet
Strong FBC.
Antiplurality meets strong FBC.
Every rated method that:
- gives each candidate a score based on a function f(x) where x is the
aggregation of ratings for that
On 05/10/2012 08:55 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
I emphasize that I don't know if u/a FBC makes a satisfactory guarantee.
I imagine it would be like the independence of clones criterion.
Properly speaking, independence of clones only take into account exact
clone candidates. It would be easy
On 05/13/2012 03:04 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
You're in deinal about Gibbard-Satterthwaite.
You're in denial about Condorcet's blatant and full-magnitude
co-operation/defection problem.
And you're in denial about millions of voters' need to litterally
maximally help the Democrat beat the
Here's a Condorcet method that I think retains CT's defection resistance
while being closer to cloneproof. It is Smith,DSC (but I think DAC would
also work).
Consider Mike's usual C/D example:
Sincere rankings are
33: AB
32: BA
34: C
In DSC, {AB} is affirmed with a strength of 65. Then A
On 05/11/2012 11:31 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Of course the way to define u/a for criteria would be in terms of votes.
A definition of u/a for criteria:
In a critrerion failure-example, an election is u/a for some particular
voter V iff:
The candidates can be divided into two sets, A and
On 05/15/2012 09:10 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
You continued:
Before you talk about a *need* to literally maximally help the Democrat beat
the Republican, consider what you have said yourself, in response to my
posts. You have said that the voters' overcompromise is a result of their
history
On 06/09/2012 12:27 AM, Nicholas Buckner wrote:
Hello,
I am Nicholas Buckner. I developed an alternative method that takes
the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives path over the Condorcet
path. It handles single-winner elections and multiple-winner
elections. I believe it satisfies a great
On 06/11/2012 02:15 PM, Markus Schulze wrote:
Dear Nicholas,
who is elected by your method in these 7 situations?:
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2007-February/019497.html
It appears that his method elects D. Adding 4 DABC voters then makes A win.
I'm
On 06/26/2012 04:34 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Kristofer:
You said:
Similarly, if you pick two states/parties j and k, Webster minimizes the
absolute value of S_j/P_j - S_k/P_k, i.e. the difference between seats
per population (share of influence per person) of state j and k.
[endquote]
Of
On 06/27/2012 07:10 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
I am enjoying this discussion and I thank Fred for starting it. However,
I have only a little to add:
1. Under plurality, parties are a necessary evil; primaries weed the
field and prevent vote-splitting. Of course, plurality itself is an
entirely
On 07/06/2012 02:22 AM, Michael Allan wrote:
Kristofer Munsterhjelm said:
- Thus, it's not too hard for me to think there might be sets of
rules that would make parties minor parts of politics. Those would
not work by simply outlawing parties, totalitarian style. Instead,
the rules would
The Sainte-Laguë index is a measure of disproportionality that is
minimized by Sainte-Laguë / Webster. (Michael Gallagher also recommended
it as the standard measure of disproportionality.)
The Sainte-Laguë index is smiply the sum of, over all parties (or other
distinct groups), (V_p - S_p)^2
On 07/08/2012 12:32 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Kristofer:
When I read about it in the '80s, I, too, noticed the similiarity to
chi-squared.
Since we don't disagree about Sainte-Lague being the best, then the best
I get to do is quibble about _why_ it's the best. :-)
The Sainte-Lague
On 07/09/2012 09:45 AM, ⸘Ŭalabio‽ wrote:
2012-07-08T17:04:50Z, “Fred Gohlke”fredgoh...@verizon.net:
Whether or not 'rule by the best' can work depends in large part on
how well the electoral method integrates the reality that the
common good is dynamic.
All of this time, I thought that you
On 07/08/2012 07:04 PM, Fred Gohlke wrote:
Good Morning, Kristofer
re: Whether this [the assertion that elections impart upon a
system an element of aristocracy] is a good or bad thing
depends upon whether you think aristocracy can work. In
this sense, 'aristocracy' means rule by the best, i.e.
On 07/09/2012 06:33 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
SL/Webster minimizes the SL index, right? It's known that Webster has
_no_ bias if the distribution-condition that I described obtains--the
uniform distribution condition.
I'm not a statistician either, and so this is just a tentative
When runoffs are subjected to criterion analysis, one usually considers
voters to vote in the same order in each round. If they prefer A to B in
the first round, and A and B remain in the second round, they'll vote A
over B in the second round.
This may not necessarily fit reality. Voters may
On 07/10/2012 08:19 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On 7/10/12 6:51 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
When runoffs are subjected to criterion analysis, one usually
considers voters to vote in the same order in each round. If they
prefer A to B in the first round,
now how is this known
On 07/13/2012 05:30 PM, Fred Gohlke wrote:
Good Morning, Dave
re: Clones are a problem for Plurality, and primaries were
invented to dispose of clones within a party
I'm not sure what clones are, but imagine they are multiple candidates
who seek the same office.
Strictly speaking, clones are
On 07/13/2012 10:01 AM, Michael Allan wrote:
To Metagov, (cc Election Methods) [WIK]
This is a proposal to the Metagovernment community to organize, fund
and equip a network of public parties. A public party is a decision
body that issues decisions in the same *form* as a political party,
but
On 07/11/2012 08:16 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
On Tue, Jul 10, 2012 at 6:17 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_el...@lavabit.com mailto:km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
On 07/09/2012 06:33 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
What about finding, by trial and error, the
allocation
On 07/15/2012 11:47 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
If unbias in each allocation is all-important, then can anything else be
as good as trial-and-error minimization of the measured correlation
between q and s/q, for each allocation?
You answered this below. If you know the distribution, then you
On 07/16/2012 12:23 AM, Fred Gohlke wrote:
Good Afternoon, Kristofer
re: Strictly speaking, clones are candidates that are so alike
each other that every voter ranks them next to each other
(but not necessarily in the same order).
and
More generally speaking, a clone could be considered a
On 07/09/2012 03:29 AM, Michael Allan wrote:
Kristofer Munsterhjelm said:
We don't really have primaries here, at least not in the sense of
patches to make Plurality work, because we don't use Plurality but
party list PR. There are still internal elections (or appointments,
depending on party
On 07/21/2012 08:01 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
I spoke of using a polynomial approximation of G(q), the cumulative
state number,and differentiating it to get F(q), the
probability-density.
I'd like to add that a Taylor or McLaurin polynomial approximation of
a complicated function could be
On 08/17/2012 07:30 PM, Clinton Mead wrote:
Is there a proportional representation method such that, given N
candidates, adding N! votes to the set of votes, each one of those N!
votes being one of the possible sequences possible, does not change the
result?
(i.e. adding a whole lot of votes
On 08/24/2012 04:56 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
I've printed the program out, and now I feel that I've probably found
and corrected all of its errors.
Do you have any test vectors? Having tests would make it a lot easier to
see whether you have actually corrected all the errors.
In the case
Here's a system I thought about some days ago. It's a bit interesting on
its own, but I haven't found out if it has any practical uses, or is
good enough to use in the situations that spring most readily to mind.
Say you have a divided society. In this society, disparate groups of
people vote
On 09/05/2012 12:22 PM, Raph Frank wrote:
On Tue, Sep 4, 2012 at 10:15 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
So here's the system. Say you have k different legislative bodies (n doesn't
matter, but should probably be small, and if possible highly composite, so
something like 2
On 09/06/2012 03:43 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Not exactly a winning combination of properties.
Weren't you retiring from voting systems?
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
I've been coding, on and off, a program to determine how often criteria
are failed by voting methods. It uses a GA to devise failure examples
without knowing exactly how to construct those failure examples - for
instance, for monotonicity failure, it just uses the score of the
original winner
On 09/15/2012 09:55 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 15.9.2012, at 6.05, Jeffrey O'Neill wrote:
You can also now save Condorcet results in HTML format but still
working on the best graphics to visualize Condorcet results.
One solution is to support minmax(margins). With that method you can
simply draw
On 09/15/2012 07:33 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
I can't draw any clear conclusions from this on how good Condorcet
methods are in visualizing the results or an ongoing counting
process. The measure of number of voters to change the result seems
to be quite natural measure of distance to victory.
On 09/18/2012 06:18 AM, Andy Jennings wrote:
I have been thinking this for a while, and I would love to see it
implemented for precisely the situation you describe: the legislature,
or even the voters directly, choosing the overall tax rate.
You might want to build in some hysteresis so that
On 09/16/2012 02:35 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 16.9.2012, at 9.57, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
(More precisely, the relative scores (number of plumpers required)
become terms of type score_x - score_(x+1), which, along with SUM
x=1..n score_x (just the number of voters), can be used
On 09/28/2012 10:11 PM, dn...@aol.com wrote:
A B
Choice C comes along.
C may - head to head ---
1. Beat both
C A
C B
2. Lose to both
A C
B C
3. Beat A BUT lose to B
C A B C
Thus, obviously, a tiebreaker is needed in case 3.
Obviously perhaps Approval.
i.e. BOTH number votes and
On 09/29/2012 10:49 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
What is a strong Condorcet method?
Basically, one that gives good results while being resistant to
tinkering by the parties (who have greater capacity to coordinate
strategy than do the voters, and more to lose under the new regime), and
not giving
On 09/30/2012 08:16 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
i dunno exactly how they do their ordering at Wikipedia (to get 2nd, 3rd
place winners using Schulze), but would you say if the Condorcet
criterion was met for each subset, would it be unfair to just identify
the top CW, then kick him/her
On 09/30/2012 12:51 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On 9/29/12 4:49 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
What is a strong Condorcet method?
yeah, and Kristofer, since the word is quoted, who is using the label? i
think it might very well be something to agree with (the use of a really
general adjective
On 09/30/2012 11:47 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 30.9.2012, at 11.56, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
In practice, that means: is cloneproof, passes independence of as
much as possible (independence of Smith-dominated alternatives,
say), and is monotone.
These criteria could be one set
On 10/01/2012 04:05 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On 9/30/12 6:13 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 30.9.2012, at 15.41, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
As far as intrinsically Condorcet methods go, Ranked Pairs feels
simple to me. The only tricky part is the indirect nature of the
unless
On 10/01/2012 12:13 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 30.9.2012, at 15.41, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
As far as intrinsically Condorcet methods go, Ranked Pairs feels
simple to me. The only tricky part is the indirect nature of the
unless it contradicts what you already affirmed step.
To me
On 10/01/2012 08:50 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
the reason i like margins over winning votes is that the margin, in vote
count, is the product of the margin as a percent (that would be a
measure of the decisiveness of the electorate) times the total number of
votes (which is a measure of
On 10/04/2012 07:05 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Dear all,
A simple extention of IRV to two rounds IRV would be the following:
1. In the first round have no quota (i.e. no transfer of surpluses).
2. The two candidates who are eliminated last go to the second round
3. In the second round the two
On 10/02/2012 12:50 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
I just note that there are many approaches to making the pairwise
comparisons.
- One could use proportions instead of margins = A/B isntead of
A-B.
- If one measures the number of poeple who took position, one would
have to know which ones voted for a
On 10/05/2012 12:12 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
And even in the three-categories classification, it's hard to find
any objectively best method.
The third category was quality of the outcome under honesty. For
this category only, finding the best method is straight forward in
the sense that one can
On 10/19/2012 04:35 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
A few methods that pass CD:
ICT
Symmetrical ICT
MMPO
MDDTR
A few methods that fail CD:
Beatpath, RP, Kemeny, VoteFair, MinMax(wv) and apparently all
traditional unimproved Condorcet versions.
Approval and Score don't pass CD either. But, as I
Since it's taking longer than I expected to write a long reply to Mike's
post, I'll give some criterion failures for Condorcet//FPP while I work
on the reply.
Independence from clones (as I understand it) is defined as follows
(Tideman, 1987, Independence of Clones as a Criterion for Voting
On 10/25/2012 10:20 PM, Jonathan Denn wrote:
Hello All,
I'm the editor of aGREATER.US http://aGREATER.US, an internet platform
to find a greater political platform for the US. We are about a year
old. I am also on the board of two different left, right, center reform
groups. One is being formed
On 10/27/2012 07:25 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Kristofer:
You said:
On to some criterion failures:
If there is no truncation or no equal-rank, then (I've been told) ICT
is equal to Condorcet//FPP. Hence, finding an example where
Condorcet//FPP fails independence from clones with no
On 10/27/2012 08:39 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Kristofer:
You complied with two of my requests:
I'd asked for a precise definition of Clone-Independence, and you posted one.,
I'd asked for a failure-example, and you posted one.
But that wasn't all that I'd asked for, was it.
I'd also asked
On 11/16/2012 04:52 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Yes that's an excellent marketing approach. I think advocates of *all*
methods should try to boil down the rationale to a single sentence.
I don't think it is a decisive argument though. Many things in the
world sound good in overview but end up
On 11/15/2012 04:25 AM, Richard Fobes wrote:
On 11/13/2012 3:29 AM, aGREATER.US wrote:
Incumbents have a huge unfair advantage in that corporations
(including unions) pour money into their reelection campaigns.
...
Easily overlooked is the fact that corporations elect their board
members
(I have written some replies to certain of MO's posts, but I haven't
posted them. I'm currently having my share of interesting times and
there's lots of conflict around, so I don't feel the need to add to all
the complexity I have to manage by engaging in likely confrontational
threads.
On 11/27/2012 02:24 AM, Richard Fobes wrote:
I gave 5 stars to the Ban Single Mark Ballots proposal.
FYI, I did not post that proposal. Jon Denn posted the proposal using
the executive summary he copied from the website copy of the Google Docs
original.
(I did work with Jon to post there a
On 11/29/2012 01:51 AM, Raph Frank wrote:
Sorry, hit reply instead of
- reply All, then move EM to to field and delete Kristofer Munsterhjelm
Gmail really hates the system EM uses.
You can use gmail with an ordinary mail client, just like I use lavabit,
which is also a webmail system
On 12/03/2012 02:00 PM, Jonathan Denn wrote:
Fair Redistricting or Ending Gerrymandering is always a great
grievance among electoral reformers. But the solution is much
more elusive. Do you folks ever venture into that area?
I'd prefer dissolving that particular problem to solving it. Use a
On 12/03/2012 05:35 AM, Michael Allan wrote:
Jonathan Denn said:
Someone is editing Kurt Vonnegut letters for publication. This was
online today... I'm struck with editor meaning voter and
stories as candidates
...I invite you to read the fifteen tales ...
I believe whole civilizations have
On 11/29/2012 09:02 PM, Raph Frank wrote:
On Tue, Nov 27, 2012 at 9:16 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
However, if you need supermajority support for decisions, then you have to
have something to put in place when the supermajority support isn't there.
One option is to select 2 PMs. That is what
On 12/03/2012 05:53 AM, ⸘Ŭalabio‽ wrote:
¡Hello!
¿How fare you?
“¡One can introduce advanced voting systems to ponies, but one cannot
make the ponies implement the advanced voting systems!”
That is play off of the saying:
“¡One can take an horse to water, but one cannot make the horse
On 12/04/2012 07:31 AM, Michael Allan wrote:
Kristofer Munsterhjelm said:
One should be careful with election by story, though. The worst kind
of modern-day dictatorial regimes have often been backed by stories
or myths to lend the regime legitimacy. ...
Yes, I agree. The events of the 20th
On 12/08/2012 05:42 AM, Don Hoffard wrote:
*Top 6, Top 2, Head to Head Primary*
*Nominations:*
1. In order for a candidate to get into the primary they must get
registered voters to sign nominating cards for them.
2. Each candidate must get at least one quarter of 1% of the registered
voters
On 12/10/2012 05:12 AM, ⸘Ŭalabio‽ wrote:
¡Hello!
¿How fare you?
While explaining advanced voting systems to Bronies and PegaSisters,
I had an idea about combining the expressiveness of Score-Voting and
he resistance to tactical voting of Majority-Judgement. This is the
line of thought leading
On 12/13/2012 05:28 PM, Chris Benham wrote:
Of the various proposed ways of weighing defeat strengths in
Schulze, Losing Votes is the one that elects most from the tops of
the ballots. Given that we are seeking to convert supporters of FPP
(and to I hope a lesser extent, IRV), I think that is a
On 12/14/2012 08:26 AM, ⸘Ŭalabio‽ wrote:
2012-12-13T06:53:10, Kristofer Munsterhjelm:
- If the voters know that +99 and -99 will be discarded, that
effectively turns +99 and -99 into 0. Thus they'd not use those values,
instead knowing their real maxima to be +98 and -98.
Yes
On 12/14/2012 06:12 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:
On 12/13/2012 11:31 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 12/13/2012 05:28 PM, Chris Benham wrote:
Of the various proposed ways of weighing defeat strengths in
Schulze, Losing Votes is the one that elects most from the tops of
the ballots. Given
On 12/14/2012 05:15 AM, Ross Hyman wrote:
Here is a physics alternative to the effective number of parties
formulas mentioned on the Wikipedia page:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Effective_number_of_parties
Based on the concept of entropy, a sensible formula for the
effective number of parties
On 12/09/2012 07:25 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:
On 12/9/2012 9:12 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
...
2012/12/8 ⸘Ŭalabio‽ wala...@macosx.com mailto:wala...@macosx.com
...
¡That is so last week! I wish to find a way to merge
Score-Voting and Majority-Judgement into something even better.
In
On 12/10/2012 01:25 AM, Michael Allan wrote:
Kristofer Munsterhjelm said:
Could such a cultural election [of a narrative world view]
happen in modern times, do you think? Or what might prevent it?
In the most strict sense, I don't think so. Modernity has too many
aspects to be made
On 01/04/2013 04:14 PM, Fred Gohlke wrote:
Good Morning, Andy
Your response appears to be missing from the list. I'll quote the
paragraph I'm commenting on:
re: The voters' grades do matter. If one voter changed his
grade from D to B, then one more C vote falls down into
the bottom half of the
On 01/06/2013 01:54 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
We live in a technological society. Among some people, there's a
tendency to worship science. Anything that;s more complex is felt to
likely be better. That's MJ's mystique.
It's just complicated enough that it's easy to obfuscate (for oneself)
On 01/08/2013 04:30 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2013/1/7 Greg Nisbet gregory.nis...@gmail.com
mailto:gregory.nis...@gmail.com
Hey, I'd like to get a sense of what sorts of multiwinner methods
are currently known that are reasonably good and don't require
districts, parties, or
On 01/08/2013 09:24 AM, Greg Nisbet wrote:
There's some definite motivation for writing the list of criteria to
exclude parties, districts, and relying on candidates making decisions.
These sorts of mechanisms are not always available (for instance,
picking pizza toppings or locations or
On 01/10/2013 04:38 AM, Richard Fobes wrote:
On 1/5/2013 8:12 AM, Jonathan Denn wrote:
The purpose is to draft a Constitutional Amendment for omnibus
electoral reform. For these people everything is on the table. We had
to pass on another household name because that person wouldn't
On 01/14/2013 03:27 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 01:53 PM 1/13/2013, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
I think term limits, at least for actual political positions (as
opposed to party positions), have a real purpose, and that they would
still have a purpose under a better voting system.
I'm
On 01/16/2013 11:31 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:
On 1/13/2013 10:53 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
...
Consider a country that's leaning too far left for the population's
wishes. A right-wing candidate is elected. This right-wing president (or
PM, through parliament) starts moving to the right
On 01/17/2013 06:07 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:
Soon enough, just as has happened in Aspen (CO) and Burlington (VT), the
weaknesses of IRV counting will get exposed. In the meantime, just
getting people to talk about, and think about, the possibility of better
ballots and better counting methods
On 01/18/2013 06:46 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:
On 1/17/2013 10:49 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
The general pattern I was trying to think of, in any case, was this: the
society is too far in one direction (according to the people). Candidate
X has a position solidly on the other side
On 01/18/2013 05:18 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2013/1/18 Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com
mailto:km_el...@lavabit.com
On 01/17/2013 06:07 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:
Soon enough, just as has happened in Aspen (CO) and Burlington
(VT), the
weaknesses of IRV
On 01/24/2013 01:08 PM, Ross Hyman wrote:
http://www.knesset.gov.il/elections19/eng/list/results_eng.aspx
The official Israeli election results show that of the parties
receiving more than the 2% threshold needed to get into the
Knesset, the center-left
On 01/27/2013 03:45 PM, Peter Gustafsson wrote:
There are lots of voting system criteria that have been described,
but I have not seen this one - or any one like it - described
before.
Bullet-voting prohibition Criterion: A voting system should not be
constructed in such a way so that it is
On 01/30/2013 05:30 PM, Peter Gustafsson wrote:
Kristoffer:
Thanks for pointing out those possibilities for how a big party can
instruct its voters on how to thwart the intent of this proposed
criterion. Obviously, BVP is not sufficient to ensure the transition
from a two-party environment to
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