Re: [Election-Methods] Corrected strategy in Condorcet section

2007-08-02 Thread Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
At 02:04 AM 8/2/2007, Juho wrote: The votres' stated preferences are easy to collect but in a competitive environment voters tend to exaggerate. I guess the basic problem is the feeling you get when Bush wins Gore and you have voter G=100, B=80 and your neighbour has voted B=100, G=0. But your

Re: [Election-Methods] Corrected strategy in Condorcet section

2007-08-01 Thread Juho
On Aug 1, 2007, at 5:37 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: At 04:48 PM 7/31/2007, Juho wrote: The additional (utility/preference strength related) information that range style ballots provide is excellent information. The only problem is that we don't have a voting method that would both take

Re: [Election-Methods] Corrected strategy in Condorcet section

2007-07-27 Thread Kevin Venzke
Juho, --- Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : It's possible that a coordinated strategy may not be feasible, but that is not the heart of the problem in my view. Referring again to this scenario: 49 A 24 B 27 CB Under margins the C voters have great favorite betrayal incentive