From: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax [EMAIL PROTECTED]
As I see it, without doing a rigorous analysis -- far from it! --
the contribution to each fund by each voter would rationally be their
utility for that fund's candidate winning, should they wish to share
the burden of their own caucus. The tragedy of
Dear Forest!
Binding agreements will not solve the problem completely I think. Assume
the situation is this, with 4 candidates A,B,C,D of which 3 (A,B,D) have
each received 1/3 of the vote, and with the following preferences over
lotteries:
A: A 100, C 80, BD 0
B: B 100, C 80, AB 0
D: D 100,
At 10:33 PM 9/5/2007, Forest W Simmons wrote:
As for the prisoner's dilemma problem, I wonder if the possibility of
defection could be eliminated by having trading parties sit down and
sign binding agreements during formal trading.
The concept that I was brought to by this discussion can be
Dear Forest,
Perhaps candidates should be required to publish their range ballots
before the election, and their trading of assets should be required
to be rational relative to these announced ratings?
I had this idea, too. But upon closer inspection, it is not quite easy
to define
There are deterministic method related tracks that have not been
discussed so far. It is possible to use the uncertainty involved in
the polls. The votes need not be exactly 55% and 45% but there can be
some uncertainty on which one of the two groups is bigger.
The A supporters may vote
Dear Abd ul-Rahman,
the ratings that Jobst fed us as a distraction.
You're doing it again -- please stop it.
That was not an insult. It made the challenge more interesting. I'm
sorry that you thought it critical.
I don't think it was insulting. You just repeatedly attribute opinions
or
At 04:23 AM 8/30/2007, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
The only thing I wish is that you try to be post shorter messages,
since I really have trouble to read that much!
Sorry, don't have time!
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Below where I said unlike Borda I should have said unlike D2MAC.
Neither the Borda solution nor the reverse plurality solution requires
anything other than the ordinal preferences.
So the deterministic solutions that do not depend on some form of vote
trading are insensitive to whether or not
At 07:37 PM 8/29/2007, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
the ratings that Jobst fed us as a distraction.
You're doing it again -- please stop it.
That was not an insult. It made the challenge more interesting. I'm
sorry that you thought it critical.
Election-Methods mailing list - see
At 01:07 AM 8/27/2007, rob brown wrote:
On 8/26/07, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED][EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
At 02:59 AM 8/26/2007, rob brown wrote:
Vote trading generally means the ballots can't be secret, so
elections would be inherently corruptible by anyone with money.
This is
On 8/25/07, Jobst Heitzig [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
So there are two main devices for solving the challenge: vote trading
and randomness.
There is a third one! One of the oldest voting methods that have been
studied can also solve it at least in part. I wonder who will first see what
I
At 02:59 AM 8/26/2007, rob brown wrote:
Vote trading generally means the ballots can't be secret, so
elections would be inherently corruptible by anyone with money.
This is commonly assumed. But it probably is not true. First of all,
the ballots don't have to be personally identified, all that
Dear Forest,
The main thing I overlooked was vote trading.
So there are two main devices for solving the challenge: vote trading
and randomness.
There is a third one! One of the oldest voting methods that have been studied
can also solve it at least in part. I wonder who will first see
Dear Kevin,
Hi,
It seems to me there might be a use for something like the method that
was proposed awhile ago that had to do with offering voters incentives
to give sincere ratings. For example, the majority would give the
sincere score to their compromise in exchange for their vote
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