Re: [EM] Winning-votes intuitive?

2002-02-26 Thread Adam Tarr
> Partial rankings are penalized. I don't think it would be a strong exaggeration to characterize this as the crux of your argument. You basically say, "Ranked Pairs ignores partial rankings, while SSD does not. Since partial rankings are penalized, this allows those who are unaware of this

[EM] Margins vs. winning-votes

2002-02-26 Thread Rob LeGrand
First, a quick point: There are (at least) two separate issues discussed on this list. One is methods themselves, like Ranked Pairs vs. SSD vs. IRV vs. Borda; this issue generates most of the interesting posts and debates. The other is the procedures of compiling the pairwise matrix for pairwis

[EM] State Ordered to Replace Old Vote Machines

2002-02-26 Thread DEMOREP1
D- Another *hammer* order from the courts -- like Bush v. Gore, ___ U.S. ___ (2000). - Los Angeles Times State Ordered to Replace Old Vote Machines By Henry Weinstein February 14, 2002 A federal judge in Los Angeles on Wednesday ruled that California has to replace outmoded punch-card vo

Re: To Blake, re: strategy

2002-02-26 Thread Blake Cretney
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote: > Blake said: > > Some countries use plurality with successive elimination for things like > leadership conventions. I think Americans use it for speaker of the > house. Since the strategy is very similar, I think that awareness of > strategy in one would be good eviden

[EM] Cumulative Repeated Approval Balloting for DSV

2002-02-26 Thread Forest Simmons
The goal of maximizing voting power while minimizing manipulability seems to be an elusive will 'O wisp. However, in committees and other small groups one option is repeated balloting. For example, approval ballots can be repeated N times or until the ballots stabilize, whichever comes first. O

Re: [EM] Smith Sets with >3 members

2002-02-26 Thread Forest Simmons
On Tue, 26 Feb 2002, Markus Schulze wrote: > Dear Alex, > > methods that always choose one of the candidates with > the largest number of pairwise victories are called > "Copeland methods". The main problem of Copeland methods > is that they are manipulable by clones in a very > straight forwar

Re: [EM] Smith Sets with >3 members

2002-02-26 Thread Markus Schulze
Dear Alex, methods that always choose one of the candidates with the largest number of pairwise victories are called "Copeland methods". The main problem of Copeland methods is that they are manipulable by clones in a very straight forward manner. Markus Schulze

[EM] Smith Sets with >3 members

2002-02-26 Thread Alex Small
There's been a lot of argument on the list over how to resolve the lack of a Condorcet winner. With >3 members in the Smith set I see some easy resolutions that aren't feasible for 3 members. With 4 members, 2 of them will have 2 victories apiece and 2 of them will have 1 victory apiece (only co