That's about what I'd expect from a Gore supporter. ;-)
Narins, Josh wrote:
Hrm.
I studied this particular issue.
Some people from Harvard applied Bayesian Ecological Inferences to the
absentee ballots.
They report the fact that, according to the Office of the Florida Secretary
Just to further muddy the waters on the definition of majority, note
Duverger's use of the term as apparently synonymous with plurality:
http://www.janda.org/c24/Readings/Duverger/Duverger.htm
(BTW the two-ballot majority system Duverger discusses is NOT the
Runoff method, since there is no
I've seen most of these assertions before, but I would hardly say that
they constitute proof. For one thing all of these sites share a
similar political viewpoint-- for balance you might as well link to some
far right-wing sites to get the other side of the story. For another, I
don't know how
http://approvalvoting.com and http://approvalvoting.org are the sites to
look to for lobbying efforts, at least if you favor approval voting. As
for debating the relative merits of various voting systems or proposing
new ones, this (the EM list) is still the place.
Bart
Douglas Greene wrote:
Alex Small wrote:
Keep this in mind about selling the public on winning votes or margins:
Nobody says Bush won Florida with number of votes, they say Bush won
Florida by 537 votes or whatever the final margin was. (I say Bush won
Florida 5-4 with 50% of the female vote, 100% of the African
Joe Weinstein wrote:
Indeed, it's not totally ridiculous simply to confuse Michigan and
Wisconsin. An early version of 'Wisconsin' was 'Misconsing'.
I always _thought_ they were the same thing. :)
For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc),
please see
Adam Tarr wrote:
So, by my reckoning, every commonly discussed single-winner election method
passes 1p1v, although Borda sort of teeters on the edge, and Condorcet
doesn't really fit rules of 1p1v at all. Well, that's the best I can do,
and I don't think it's particularly meaningful or
Narins, Josh wrote:
Firstly, thanks for the tip on Merrill
Unfortunately, I don't know who Merrill is. Are they on the list?
Samuel Merrill, author of
Making Multicandidate Elections More Democratic
Princeton University Press, 1988
Out of print, but most university libraries should have it.
Alex Small wrote:
I've been thinking about how one would introduce Approval Voting for local
non-partisan races. Many locales use 2-step runoff for some of their
elections. Many of us here believe that 2-step runoff is worse than IRV
or Approval, but a 2 step election fills the void left
Merrill uses a lot of software-modeled comparisons of different systems,
some of which are presented as graphs. To generate useful models, I
think you mainly need knowledge of Statistics (other than basic
algebra). For example, some of Merrill's simulations used normal
distributions of both
James Gilmour wrote:
[...] Publishing results
precinct by precinct is just totally irrelevant when all that matters is the
city-wide totals. It is not a question of keeping them secret. Rather the
question is why on earth would you want to publish such irrelevant information?
Freedom of
James Gilmour wrote:
Bart wrote:
For example, instead of precincts, suppose the division is between
walk-in and absentee votes, or between election-night and recount
results. Imagine candidate A being declared the winner, with a recount
turning up additional votes supporting A,
Actually I have long thought that the situation with boxing in the 70's
was like a Condorcet cycle (or like the rock-paper-scissors game), where
Frazier defeated Ali, who defeated Foreman, who defeated Frazier.
Bart
Alex Small wrote:
My description of boxing probably shows my ignorance:
But that's not a consistency violation. Consistency, as applied to
election methods, means that if ALL districts elect the same candidate
separately, then when combined they should still elect that candidate.
Plurality, Approval, and Borda are all consistent.
Elisabeth Varin/Stephane Rouillon
The issue is that H wins BOTH precincts, but still loses the combined
election. That's the definition of consistency as applied to voting
systems. It seems to me to be related to monotonicity violations.
I think the question is not so much whether the individual precinct
results are relevant,
I'm basically looking at the inputs and outputs, and ignoring what goes
on in between as irrelavent. Adam seems to be taking the opposite
approach, which I suspect is more difficult.
The reason I am comparing only the diagonal (T/T vs. NT/NT) is that the
A and C sides can't know which they
This is in Merrill's book as well:
Making Multicandidate Elections More Democratic
Samuel Merrill, III
Princeton University Press, 1988
It's out of print, but can be tracked down through public or university
libraries via Inter-Library Loan.
The book includes several other election methods,
Adam Tarr wrote:
Bart Ingles wrote:
Adam Tarr wrote:
Specifically, there is the remarkable fact that a voter in a
winning
votes-based Condorcet voting system can NEVER be hurt by fully
expressing
their preferences. There are cases where fully voting your
preferences can
Adam Tarr wrote:
Bart Ingles wrote:
Adam Tarr wrote:
There's no sense in talking about uncertainty and ties; it only
confuses the issue.
Sorry to spoil your clarity. Having never seen an election where the
exact vote count is known in advance (except possibly in a couple
Craig Carey wrote:
http://www.fairvote.org/irv/faq.htm
Who opposes IRV?
Little organized opposition to IRV exists. Election
officials are understandably cautious about a system that
may increase their workload, and some incumbents fear any
Simple letter deserving a simple response:
http://www.bayarea.com/mld/mercurynews/news/opinion/3763071.htm
I'll try to write something if I get time tonight or tomorrow, or can
help edit co-sign someone else's.
Bart
For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ,
James Gilmour wrote:
While I can see merit in an open discussion of voting systems, I have great
difficulty in understanding the attraction of Approval
Voting. If I've got it right, Approval Voting breaks the first and most fundamental
rule of democratic representation: one person,
one
Steve Barney wrote:
[...] The BC is not always proportional, but it is under
certain, arguably the most appropriate, conditions, as when 2 blocs of voters
are completely polarized and vote the reverse of each other. For example, if,
as in some voting rights court cases based on racism,
I mailed my check.
-B
Alex Small wrote:
Thus far $445 is pledged. I think I made a mistake in setting an all-or-
nothing goal. I intend to mail my donation to Hager in the next week,
since I feel it's better to give him all the hope we can, even if it
doesn't reach the initial goal.
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
As an interesting side note, the nation of Sri Lanka (just south of India)
recently switched over to such an instant two stage runoff (we called it ITTR in
a thread a few months ago, for instant top two runoff). Thus far, their ITTR
elections have produced the
.
Bart Ingles
I'll pledge $100.
Alex Small wrote:
Since proposing $2002 in 2002 I've received a pledge from Mike, and thumbs
up responses from Forest, Joe, and Bart. In the absence of any other
nominees, and in the absence of any evidence that potential nominees will
even exist, I call the question.
I don't know if it would get very far, but it would be fun to see how
much press a lawsuit on behalf of a losing Condorcet candidate could
generate, on the grounds that the ballots show him preferred by a
majority to the official winner. Or maybe it should be a class-action
suit involving the
Alex Small wrote:
Bart Ingles wrote:
I don't know how Hager will make out in the LP convention -- apparently
the Indiana LP doesn't participate in that state's primary elections.
Checking out the LP website, Indiana has two candidates for statewide
office -- both running for Sec State
It's almost been sickening to watch from the sidelines, and not have
time to even try to get the word out. But at least I can write a
check.
I don't know how Hager will make out in the LP convention -- apparently
the Indiana LP doesn't participate in that state's primary elections.
Checking
Forest Simmons wrote:
On Mon, 11 Feb 2002, Bart Ingles wrote:
I had the chance to speak to an Australian visitor at a recent local
Libertarian convention. Her stated reason for liking IRV was that she
was able to rank a sure-to-lose fringe candidate above her favorite, in
order
Blake Cretney wrote:
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
I reply:
Well, I've said that one thing that I don't like about IRV is that
its mathematical strategy is exceptionally difficult, requiring
estimate of many probabilities. Difficulty doesn't mean that people
won't try to guess,
We should hold a running contest to see who can identify the most
logical fallacies in one of Donald's posts. I propose 1/2 credit for
straw man, since this seems the most common and easily identifiable.
Here are a few guides to the various fallacies, courtesy of Jeeves:
I would have agreed with you as recently as a year ago, but I now see
Hare (aka IRV) as a sort of dead end in a rat maze. It won't help elect
any third party candidates (look at Australia's lower house). And it
will neutralize any ability of third parties to influence policy
(although 3rd
Richard Moore wrote:
It would be harder to make people see the advantages of a new
method if adopting that method fails to bring those promised
advantages. So abolishing the EC is either a prerequisite or a
corequisite to getting a better method in place.
Only if your focus is the U.S.
more effective than a plain runoff.
Bart Ingles
Steve Barney wrote:
Do we have a consensus that the instant runoff vote (IRV) is MATHEMATICALLY
better than the common two step plurality vote (primary) with a follow-up
runoff between the 2 top plurality vote getters? It seems to me
I would be surprised if they actually allow much of a forum for
dissenting opinion, but I could be wrong. I wonder how many IRV critics
it would take to make a difference there?
Alexander Small wrote:
I've only been interested in alternative election methods for a short time,
but it seems
Forest Simmons wrote:
Another angle just occurred to me: a simulation of the two step runoff
might be preferable to the IRV simulation of the many step runoff.
I believe this is what is known in Britain as the supplemental vote.
The other problem here is that you need to anticipate which
to rank potentially dozens of nominees,
and allows flexibility over how many points to assign to each of the top
11 choices. Pure Borda may not have been practical here.
Bart Ingles
Olli Salmi wrote:
I'm not sure if this is very interesting. This year's Eurovision Song
Contest
No argument from me, my only point was that this particular concern
seemed moot, because almost all methods (except Borda) meet this
first-choice majority criterion when considering actual ballots, and
none meet it when considering sincere preferences.
So yes, I agree the emphasis is misplaced,
Two points to consider:
(1) When examining actual ballots, if only one candidate has a majority,
that candidate will be the Approval winner. In other words, Approval
Voting cannot fail to elect a first choice majority *as expressed in
actual ballots*.
(2) If concerned about sincere
When looking at votes-as-cast, it's easy to show how Borda can elect a
unanimously despised candidate:
Voter rating
---preferred despised---
40 A C D E
60 B
round).
Bart Ingles
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
D- The CVD folks sent the below to Science Magazine which apparently had a
story about voting in May 2001. [...]
I have NOT seen the original Science magazine material.
You also evidently haven't seen Brams and response, appearing on the
next page.
I don't have
are not advocating cumulative voting for single winner
elections, but are saying that Tom's idea might be a good way to get
proportional representation in multi-winner elections.
Forest
On Sat, 5 Jan 2002, Bart Ingles wrote:
Forest Simmons wrote:
Bart,
this discussion reminds
My thoughts as well. This is probably one of the better systems in
current use in single-seat government elections, although I would prefer
to simplify it into plain approval voting rather than combine it with
Condorcet.
Bart
Forest Simmons wrote:
If your interpretation of the Slovenia
. With the
BC you can always tell (correct me if I'm wrong) how many first place votes,
second place votes, etc., a candidate got, if you have the final tally and the
number of ballots (assuming no truncated ballots).
Steve Barney
--- In [EMAIL PROTECTED], Bart Ingles [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote
Forest Simmons wrote:
On Mon, 7 Jan 2002, Steve Barney wrote:
Bart:
What is the definition of a deterministic voting system, as Saari apparently
uses the term?
I think in this context it refers to how well you can predict the ballots
from the utilities. As Bart says, given
I had been meaning to reply to this posting, but never quite got around
to it.
Steve Barney wrote on 11/26/01:
Election Methods list:
Many introductory math textbooks, and the webpage [EMAIL PROTECTED] referred
us to in a recent message, draw too strong a conclusion from Arrow's
Bart Ingles wrote:
If the A and C voters swap just under half of their 2nd and 3rd choice
preferences, the final Borda scores might be something like:
My use of the word swap probably makes it sound as though the A and C
voters are exchanging votes with one another. This wasn't what I
On Fri, 4 Jan 2002, Bart Ingles wrote:
I don't recall using the term average ranking. My focus was on
average (or total) point counts (i.e. Borda scores), as a way of showing
the practical and strategic equivalence among the Borda variations
mentioned.
Steve Barney wrote
-ALTERNATIVE VOTING OUTCOMES, DONALD G. SAARI
http://www.math.nwu.edu/~d_saari/vote/triple.pdf
Steve Barney
Date: Wed, 02 Jan 2002 21:02:21 -0800
From: Bart Ingles [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Interesting use of Borda count
Merrill calls this adjusted
://www.math.nwu.edu/~d_saari/vote/triple.pdf
Date: Tue, 01 Jan 2002 15:17:21 -0800
From: Bart Ingles [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Interesting use of Borda count
I wonder if Bennett's ballot was counted per Borda rules -- i.e.
Bennetts's first choice receiving 10 points
I wonder if Bennett's ballot was counted per Borda rules -- i.e.
Bennetts's first choice receiving 10 points, the remaining nine
receiving 5 points each.
If this were a public election held in Florida, Bennett's candidate
would have contested the election, claiming that either the election
I think I have actually seen definitions of monotonicity which already
take this into account. You only need to specify that the remaining
candidates stay in the same relative order -- no need to mention
avoidable/unavoidable changes since such changes are always avoidable.
So maybe something
Forest Simmons wrote:
Joe Weinstein argues the advantages of unconstrained CR style ballots
below. I would like to add my two bits worth.
Most of the arguments against the use of CR ballots are based on the
misguided assumption that the only way to use CR ballots is to give the
win to
Richard Moore wrote:
Forest Simmons wrote:
Furthermore, the lack of constraint makes it harder for a voter to foul
the ballot. In other words, a voter can hardly violate non-existent
constraints. Which is harder to mess up ... lone mark or Approval? A
lone mark voter who doesn't
Richard Moore wrote:
Forest Simmons wrote:
Here's an example that turns out to be more interesting than it first
appears to be:
(Sincere intensities or utilities are in parentheses.)
45 A(100) B(50) C(0)
30 B(100) C(50) A(0)
25 C(100) A(50) B(0)
...
In this zero
http://www.hager2002.org/
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Bart wrote--
In NYC the top candidate only needs 40% of the vote to avoid a runoff.
Makes sense to me, since 40% is no more arbitrary than 50%. I would
gladly accept a strong plurality over a manufactured majority.
D- Anything less than a majority is
Can this be taken as evidence of an actual business connection between
CVD and a voting equipment manufacturer (note listed contact
information)?
[EMAIL PROTECTED] forwarded:
[press release deleted]
Voting Solutions, LLC is a closely held partnership based in Oakland. For
more information,
Forest Simmons wrote:
Any method that doesn't satisfy the FBC can be manipulated by bogus polls,
so Bart was right (as usual).
Just trying to be vigilant. :)
One way to reduce the likelihood of a runoff election while keeping
conventional elections is to adopt the 40% rule used in New York City's
mayoral primaries:
http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/20011010/pl/politics_newyork_dc_2.html
In NYC the top candidate only needs 40% of the vote to avoid a
Forest Simmons wrote:
If voter X is almost sure that his ballot will make the difference between
a hated (by X) Condorcet Winner and a Condorcet tie (to be settled by
chance), voter X might be tempted to deliver up the election to chance
even if that required him to vote his favorite last
Forest Simmons wrote:
Consider the case of a beats-all check followed by your random ballot
suggestion:
Voters are to submit ranked ballots with truncations allowed internally as
well as at the extremes (i.e. where there is no preference equal ranks are
allowed).
Suppose that the
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Anybody watching on TV about the lifestyle of Taliban folks (with their circa
6,000 B.C. politics) in poor suffering Afghanistan ???
Not too much apparent discussions of election method reforms among them.
If the Taliban is forced out of power, I could see some
Forest Simmons wrote:
However (in defense of Rob's point of view) it seems to me that if a
method yields results that make people regret sincere voting, then voters
can be manipulated by mis-information into an unsatisfactory result.
If voters are satisfied (after the fact) with their
Rob LeGrand wrote:
On the other hand, the best Condorcet methods, while imperfect,
usually make it extremely difficult for a voter to take advantage of
voting insincerely no matter what information he has. I'd rather have
a method that doesn't depend on polls.
Then see my previous post
Alexander Small wrote:
Is there a quantitative measure for how polarizing a candidate is?
If there is, it would probably have to use more than the rankings shown
below. Consider the following two examples, both of which fit the
rankings profile you provide with your question:
9% BCA
51%
Forest Simmons wrote:
Meanwhile, how can we make the best use of our limited equipment?
I don't suppose anyone is turning blue while waiting for my answer. :)
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote in part -
What are the counter-intuitive results of Approval?
D- A *real* first choice can lose (if rankings were being used).
48 A
3 AC
1 BC
48 C
100
Approval
A 51 (all *real* first choice votes)
B 1
C 52
Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Now as for the trivial and important preferences. This is nothing
innate to preference ballots. It will always occur that in an election
some people care more about what they vote and others less, so it will
always be the case that trivial votes cancel out the more
[one of my links was broken]
Apparently the Yahoo group which archives this list's messages is able
to handle approval voting in its online polls feature. I added a poll
for a mock 2000 presidential election (you must be a member of the Yahoo
group to go here):
Apparently the Yahoo group which archives this list's messages is able
to handle approval voting in its online polls feature. I added a poll
for a mock 2000 presidential election (you must be a member of the Yahoo
group to go here):
http://groups.yahoo.comgroup/election-methods-list/polls
that the rule vote for one
is changed to vote for one or more -- no ranking, and none of that
stuff.
Because of the potential for confusion, I actually object to using
approval as part of the name of methods other than approval voting.
On Sat, 22 Sep 2001 23:27:56 -0700 Bart Ingles wrote:
Dave
It appears I misunderstood Mr. Ketchum's earlier post after all:
On Sep. 10, 2001 Dave Ketchum wrote:
Must be able to combine votes from thousands of precincts.
IRV clearly fails, due to easily declaring wrong winners - also has
trouble due to vote patterns being important (Condorcet
in
Gore vs Bush, I must place Gore first; wanting to say that I like Nader
even better than Gore, I cannot place Nader first without weakening my
Gore vote.
Dave Ketchum
On Mon, 10 Sep 2001 22:32:29 -0700 Bart Ingles wrote:
Dave Ketchum wrote:
I wander in looking for something better
Interesting. It certainly calls into question the assumption made by
some, that most people would *want* to be able to express all of their
preference on a ballot. I see no widespread evidence of this. I
suspect that most would be satisfied with merely removing the Hobson's
choice of having
Buddha Buck wrote:
Hmm... I'd love to see an example of this, since I fail to see how it
could happen.
I couldn't find any examples, and wouldn't mind seeing one myself, but
in addition to Nurmi (who cites Young) here are a couple other mentions
of the asserted incompatibility between
often).
Approval voting also has a track record, in private elections (but in
some fairly prominent organizations).
Bart Ingles
IRV clearly fails, due to easily declaring wrong winners - also has
trouble due to vote patterns being important (Condorcet only counts
pairs, with results that can
I pretty much agree with all of this. I have long thought that pairwise
methods made more sense if the number of preference levels were
restricted. Possibly a number of levels as a function of the number of
candidates, with 2 levels (equivalent to approval voting) if there are
few (say three
One of the alleged side-effects of Viagra is hair loss.
But using Rogaine has been known to lead to depression.
A side-effect of Prozac is loss of libido.
With apologies,
-B
[P.S. Think the patient should consider the utilities of the three
pairings?]
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
[EMAIL
I skimmed Warren D. Smith's paper, but didn't have time to go into it
too closely. A couple of initial reactions:
1) I have a problem with referring to strategic or tactical voting as
dishonest voting. It leads to the interesting situation in which the
author pits honest voters against
Anthony Simmons wrote:
From: Bart Ingles [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Responses to some of Forest's ideas
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
See *consent of the governed* in the second paragraph of the U.S.A.
Declaration of Independence.
Democracy means majority rule
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
In a message dated 7/29/01 12:20:39 AM, you wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
See *consent of the governed* in the second paragraph of the U.S.A.
Declaration of Independence.
Democracy means majority rule --- as far as elections are concerned.
Mr.
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
See *consent of the governed* in the second paragraph of the U.S.A.
Declaration of Independence.
Democracy means majority rule --- as far as elections are concerned.
Says who? Maybe as far as two-candidate elections are concerned. The
phrase 'majority rule'
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Consensus (100 percent agreement) is in utopia-land.
As is majority rule when defined as 50 percent, whenever there are
three or more candidates.
Richard Moore wrote:
Forest Simmons wrote:
I vaguely remember that there was a sudden realization that the above mean
criterion was necessary but not sufficient for optimizing expected utility
in a zero-info environment.
I think it's necessary and sufficient for zero-info, large
I basically agree with the following, but question whether there is a
real answer to which candidate (A or B) should be the winner. B is more
of a consensus candidate (depending on the relative strength of ''
versus '').
The general US population may well favor A, after having been taught
Sounds like what we have, at least for federal judges, but a majority
ratifies, not 2/3. Actually it may be more like 60%, if the filibuster
can be used against ratifications.
I think we'd have a hard time ever filing judicial positions with a 2/3
requirement -- a lot of positions are going
Doesn't sound like it's worth $20 -- except maybe to be able to write a
review for the amazon.com site, etc.
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Regarding single winner methods-
The book notes --
Plurality, p. 142
Two-Round Runoff Voting, p. 146
Instant Runoff Voting, p. 151
NO mention of
Article by Steven Brams and Dudley R. Herschbach (Nobel Laureate in
Chemistry).
http://www.sciencemag.org/
Go to archives, then to May 25, then author under B. You'll have to
register to gain access.
The style is different from previous Brams papers, and attempts to take
the readers from
I like it. It looks as though in the non-partisan case (or one where
there is exactly one candidate from each party), the system equates to
cumulative voting. But at the opposite end, where all candidates belong
to a single party, it's equivalent to approval voting.
Or at least a multi-winner
LAYTON Craig wrote:
Interesting. The obsession with having a majority might be resulting in bad
legislation;
(d) If the last remaining candidate did not receive a majority of the votes
cast, excluding blank and spoiled votes, the chief election officer shall
prepare a report of no
Well, that's about my endurance limit...
http://newhawaii.org/irv.htm
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
For folks with some time and endurance ---
http://groups.yahoo.com/
has some 58 email lists that are discussing instant runoff voting.
Most of them, obviously, are NOT discussing its
LAYTON Craig wrote:
Bart wrote:
Are you sure -- I thought I was the only one, and mainly because I
didn't pay enough attention to the numbers. I thought the rest of the
respondents chose the ABC strategy.
No, I'm not really sure. I do recall that some list members (Mike
LAYTON Craig wrote:
Bart wrote (in part):
But as a practical matter, this isn't really necessary in order to know
how to vote. It's clear that approving C provides a several-fold
increase in the likelihood of defeating D, more than making up for the
utility compromise.
It's
I've been meaning to try a mathematical solution to Craig Layton's
approval voting strategy puzzle from a few months back (Feb 11 2001, to
be exact):
This question is open to all the strategically minded posters; Say with the
above utilities (100, 25, 20, 0 - assign A,B,C,D respectively).
Just ran across this link on the Boulder site. It must be fairly new:
http://www.idhop.addr.com/av/index.htm
Anthony Simmons wrote:
From: Bart Ingles [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Yet another IRV problem
Anthony Simmons wrote:
From: Forest Simmons [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Why is IRV considered better than plurality when it fails
this consistency test and also fails
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