Dave wrote (in part)
IRV also has an undefined region, while smaller - what to do when two weak
candidates are equal, and thus neither can be discarded as weakest.
If by this you mean a tie, the standard UK rules (as used in UK public elections)
state that the Returning Officer should first
I wrote (1 March 2003):
I don't think there any necessary connection between promoting
IRV and promoting PR by STV. (...) Most who argue for IRV in
public elections here, do so as a means of preventing any move
towards PR.
Markus asked:
Is this statement only valid for IRV supporters?
Jan wrote
Subject: [EM] Vermont IRV is non-standard
Note that the method described above immediately reduces the field to the
two candidates with the greatest number of first choices. According to the
IRV rules I'm familiar with, candidates should be eliminated one at a time.
Vermont IRV
Kevin wrote (in part)
Is it wise to permit independent candidates to run?
Why would you want to put artificial constraints on democratic representation?
I still don't think STV (etc.) can improve PR. To run
on the party list, candidates will need to conform to
their parties. They will
Donald replied to Olli:
Olli, you wrote: I can see nothing that could be excluded.
Donald here: Then I shall explain for you that which `could be excluded'.
In your example of three seats and three candidates with one-third each,
that which is excluded are the votes between the Droop quota
Donald had written:
District STV has this added problem because there is no linkage between the
party proportionality in the district and the party proportionality in the
entire jurisdiction.
James wrote: This is only a problem if you think it's a problem.
Date: Mon, 23 Dec 2002 19:02:59
Donald
The most important points in your post are at the end, so I am going to start
there. Much of the rest is detail.
You wrote
I am not advocating only one area elections, what I am saying is that there
are methods that will provide near 100% party proportionality for
constituency
Adam had written:
In large district STV
elections in Australia, 95% of the voters vote for pre-determined party
orders, which basically makes STV degenerate into closed party list.
I replied
This is not so much an effect of large districts, but rather an effect
of the
compulsory vote
Markus wrote:
In Australia, the voter has either to cast an X-vote for one and
only one party or to rank all candidates. I suggest that a voter
should be able to rank parties and candidates
I would not make any provision for ranking parties. The voters should rank the
candidates, from 1 to as
Markus wrote
In my opinion, a party should have the possibility to suggest a ranking
of its candidates.
No problem with that.
But the voter should have to agree explicitly to this
ranking.
This should be TOTALLY under the control of the voter.
The vote of a voter, who votes for this party
Markus had written:
in my opinion, the used STV method should be able to interpret
X-vote ballots appropriately. But it should not require X-vote
ballots.
Craig replied:
I agree too. An STV election ought allow voters to use a X instead
of an integer. Not an integer if that paper has HTML
Donald wrote:
District STV has this added problem because there is no linkage between the
party proportionality in the district and the party proportionality in the
entire jurisdiction.
This is only a problem if you think it's a problem. In practice most electors
readily accept a trade-off
Adam wrote
Markus, very good points. You've convinced me that party list in any form
has significant weaknesses.
Amen to that!
What do you think of my last comment, about
the advantages of PAV over STV?
I searched the archive but could not find an explanation of PAV. I found lots of
Donald asked of Markus:
Because you have claimed the Northern Ireland method to be the best, I am
going to assume that you know enough about the method to be able to tell us
some details, like total number of seats and how many districts (if it is a
district method).
If you would be so kind
Rick wrote
I have seen a lot of material written regarding the utility of various
methods for single member districts, but not nearly as much regarding
election methods for multi-member districts.
Specifically I am interested in exploring improved methods for at-large
municipal elections.
Craig Carey said:
Would Rock flinch or pause, if asked to put online an artists depiction
of an Approval ballot paper that shows what the paper looks like when
there are at least 34 (or 25 or more) candidates competing ?.
Alex replied:
It won't look any worse than a ballot for any other
Craig Carey wrote (in part):
It might seem that in a 6 candidate election, the paper (ABC) is more
about A,B,C, than about D,E,F. But it can be expanded out like this:
1(ABC) = ((ABCDEF) + (ABCDFE) + (ABCEDF) + (ABCEFD) + (ABCFDE) + (ABCFED))/6
So every single paper is a paper that
Dave wrote, in part:
Like IRV, separate runoffs have been around a long time. Separate runoffs
almost frustrated French voters into riots this year and, given a similar
set of candidates and voters, IRV could easily have stumbled into the same
result.
I must correct two wrong statements
Dave wrote, in part:
Like IRV, separate runoffs have been around a long time. Separate runoffs
almost frustrated French voters into riots this year and, given a similar
set of candidates and voters, IRV could easily have stumbled into the same
result.
I must correct two wrong
Olli asked:
Do you mean to say that in Approval a vote counts towards the election of
several candidates?
No - one vote can count towards the election only of one candidate. But the voter
may have several votes being counted simultaneously.
Do I have more power if I approve of several
James Gilmour wrote:
[...] Publishing results
precinct by precinct is just totally irrelevant when all that matters is the
city-wide totals. It is not a question of keeping them secret. Rather the
question is why on earth would you want to publish such irrelevant
information
Dave quoted:
Bart had written:
For example, instead of precincts, suppose the division is between
walk-in and absentee votes, or between election-night and recount
results. Imagine candidate A being declared the winner, with a recount
turning up additional votes supporting A, thereby
Bart had been digging the archive and found this exchange:
Bart had written:
For example, instead of precincts, suppose the division is between
walk-in and absentee votes, or between election-night and recount
results. Imagine candidate A being declared the winner, with a recount
Forest wrote:
Rob here's an inconsistency example adapted from message 7642 of the EM
archives:
First Precinct:
190 SHA
140 HAS
120 AHS
Second Precinct:
150 SHA
170 HAS
230 AHS
According
Bart wrote:
The issue is that H wins BOTH precincts, but still loses the combined
election. That's the definition of consistency as applied to voting
systems.
That may be the definition, but it has no relevance in the real world of real
elections.
It seems to me to be related to
elections to councils and boards
that are being elected to represent the
communities they serve.
James Gilmour
FAIRSHARE - Scotland's Campaign for Local Democracy
Visit our website at www.fairsharevoting.org
For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc),
please see http
. This is
not relevant to the election of a committee.
James Gilmour
For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc),
please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em
is highly
centralised, whatever the levels of decision-making you consider.
James Gilmour
For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc),
please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em
While I can see merit in an open discussion of voting systems, I have great difficulty
in understanding the attraction of Approval
Voting. If I've got it right, Approval Voting breaks the first and most fundamental
rule of democratic representation: one person,
one vote.
James Gilmour
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