.
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Rob LeGrand
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http://www.approvalvoting.org/
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selling the public on winning votes or margins:
Nobody says Bush won Florida with number of votes, they say Bush won
Florida by 537 votes or whatever the final margin was.
Excellent point . . . I never thought of it that way.
=
Rob LeGrand
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.approvalvoting.org
convinced of the superiority of Approval back in June; he was previously a
vocal IRV supporter.
Hope to see a few of you there!
--
Rob LeGrand
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.aggies.org/honky98/
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, but it was a pretty good show.
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Rob LeGrand
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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for Texas State Representative, District 50
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:CarterAndersonReagan
20:AndersonCarterReagan
Plurality equilibrium:
49:Reagan
33:Carter
18:Carter --- insincere
IRV equilibrium:
49:AndersonReaganCarter --- insincere
33:CarterAndersonReagan
18:AndersonCarterReagan
=
Rob LeGrand
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for Texas State
above is unique, so all of the
plurality and IRV equilibria for this electorate entail insincerity.
=
Rob LeGrand
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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for Texas State Representative, District 50
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the
above election under plurality; he gives three equilibria.
=
Rob LeGrand
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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for Texas State Representative, District 50
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with a
none-of-the-above concept. Tying it to the turnout would undoubtedly result
in very low Approval percentages for all candidates. With the 50% threshold,
voting a blank ballot and not voting are no longer equivalent.
=
Rob LeGrand
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.aggies.org/robl/
for Texas State
and choosing the best one,
whether that means voting for one, two, four or all but one. A ballot with
votes for 15 candidates is not necessarily more powerful than one with votes
for only two.
Mr Rob LeGrand has a 5 check box example of an Approval ballot
paper
your permission to post my reply to the election-methods list?
I wish you luck in your campaign.
Thank you!
=
Rob LeGrand
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, etc. So you should always vote for your favorite of
the top two and not for the other. Then you should vote for the third-placer
if he's better for you than the first-placer, and so on. That's the way I
think of it, anyway.
--
Rob LeGrand
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.aggies.org/honky98
in the end, even if
it's effective at first. I've tried some tricky strategies in my simulations,
but they never help the voters using them in the long run. If anyone has
specific strategies for me to try, I'm taking suggestions.
--
Rob LeGrand
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.aggies.org/honky98
. Plurality is a great
system for extremists like him, although the Communists fared very poorly.
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, for example:
Anderson 51%
Reagan49%
Carter33%
And of course the focal voter has his own utilities:
Reagan67
Anderson 53
Carter29
Given only this kind of information, how should he proceed?
--
Rob LeGrand
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.onr.com/user/honky98/rbvote/calc.html
off-topic. Thanks.
--
Rob LeGrand
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.onr.com/user/honky98/rbvote/calc.html
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. On the other hand,
deleting Reagan gives:
49:AndersonCarter
33:CarterAnderson
18:AndersonCarter
Which isn't identical to either of the other sets of ballots, so Reagan isn't a
clone of either of them. Can this definition ever fail? Has it been suggested
before?
--
Rob LeGrand
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http
, depending on the
initial votes and the strengths of each victory.
--
Rob LeGrand
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with a real number between 0 and 100 and has a full ranking of the
candidates from the latest poll. How should he determine his Approval vote?
--
Rob LeGrand
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.onr.com/user/honky98/rbvote/calc.html
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candidate you
prefer to the current frontrunner; approve the current frontrunner if you
prefer him to the current second-placer. What are some other good strategies?
How would you decide to vote in Approval given the current projected ranking of
candidates and your own preferences?
=
Rob
remains the winner after the change as
well.
--
Rob LeGrand
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.onr.com/user/honky98/rbvote/calc.html
Fifty-one percent of a nation can establish a totalitarian regime, suppress
minorities and still remain democratic. - Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn
. . . [T]he Bill of Rights does
a nonmonotonic IRV example taken from Philip Straffin's book Topics in
the Theory of Voting:
6:ABC
2:BAC
4:BCA
5:CAB
IRV gives the win to A, but if the BAC voters uprank A and vote ABC, then
IRV gives the win to C. A went from winner to loser when some voters ranked
him higher.
=
Rob LeGrand
[EMAIL
to be the most
manipulable, whereas the Hare and Dodgson systems were found to be the least
manipulable. Has anyone seen this paper? Does anyone have any idea how I
might be able to find it?
=
Rob LeGrand
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.aggies.org/honky98
(and Approval advocates?) someone to vote for.
I'm too poor right now to give anyone money, but I'd support Hager if I could.
We need more like him.
=
Rob LeGrand
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.aggies.org/honky98/
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/rbvote/desc.html you can find my informal
definitions of the methods used. Please let me know if you find any errors on
that page.
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Rob LeGrand
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Forest's cumulative repeated approval idea and keep
a running total, in which case I predict that it will take longer to reach a
stable outcome, but it would jump around less in the absence of a sincere
Condorcet winner.
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Rob LeGrand
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.aggies.org/honky98
of
Approval? It's beautiful in its simplicity.
=
Rob LeGrand
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Condorcet picks Cora as the winner (who is *not* in the Smith set), SSD
picks Abby, and Ranked Pairs picks Brad. Play around with changing the votes
and see how the pairwise matrix and the winners change.
=
Rob LeGrand
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.
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Oops! So sorry. The link to my ranked-ballot voting calculator was incorrect.
It should be http://www.onr.com/user/honky98/rbvote/calc.html . Thanks to
Adam for pointing this out.
=
Rob LeGrand
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.aggies.org/honky98
)
methods I believe that Inverse Nanson (an iterated form of Borda Runoff)
is the best of these four methods based on Borda.
What is Inverse Nanson again? How is it different from regular Nanson (or
Baldwin)? Is it monotonic?
=
Rob LeGrand
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.aggies.org/honky98
. If it doesn't convince you, then
stick with Borda. Believing that Borda is the best method is perfectly logical
if certain criteria are considered more important than others, but aren't
Saari's criteria far removed from real-world concerns?
=
Rob LeGrand
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.aggies.org
sort I've heard called insertion sort. I'd never seen an O(n log n) insertion
sort before, but the scheme you describe certainly makes sense. I'd guess that
the number of actual swaps would still be O(n^2), though.
=
Rob LeGrand
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.aggies.org/honky98
, of
course).
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Rob LeGrand
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:NaderBrowneGoreBushBuchanan
31:NaderGoreBrowneBushBuchanan
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Borda.
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of Dodgson. If the two
BADEC voters uprank A, the votes become
5:ABCDE
2:ABDEC
4:BEDAC
8:DACEB
Now D becomes the winner using this version of Dodgson. D wins both
times using the monotonic version of Dodgson (and every other Condorcet
method I've tried). A wins both times using Borda.
--
Rob
. But note that most Condorcet
methods perform significantly better in my sincere-ballot simulations
than Approval, which should be seen as a *very* rough approximation of
CR. I think we should be very careful drawing conclusions from
individual contrived examples.
--
Rob LeGrand
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http
explanation.
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-winners.htm Craig calls this IFPP
generalization the 'Q' method.
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=33.33 votes)
and elects A. Note that B is the Condorcet winner! I find IFPP to
be well short of ideal, although Craig claims that it's monotonic at
least.
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Thanks to those who participated!
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reason to
be insincere then, and you could see who should have won. :)
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submitted a ballot yet, please read
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/message/7938
and fill out
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/message/7939
I'll wait at least until this Wednesday to do the final count. Thanks.
=
Rob LeGrand
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http
approval votes would be:
9 AB
38 B
40 C
9 DC
4 EFAB
Whichever two candidates emerge to be the frontrunners, B should be one of them
and win. Won't the strategic approval winner always be the sincere Condorcet
winner when one exists?
=
Rob LeGrand
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.aggies.org
Roy wrote:
The pairwise matrix version doesn't use median rank, it uses wins vs.
losses, which may be some kind of median, but it's not an equivalent
method. I recommend calling it Win-Loss bifurcation; it is (as Rob
LeGrand pointed out) very similar to Nanson's. In fact, it's probably
it Baldwin.
See the paper at
http://www.econ.kuleuven.ac.be/ew/admin/Publications/DPS99/DPS9911.pdf
I've only received one ballot for the political party poll. Please participate
when you have a few minutes whether you live in the U.S. or not; I promise
there's a point to it. Thank you!
--
Rob
it allows a sincere
Condorcet candidate to rise to the top when voters are well-informed; other
comparably simple methods such as plurality and bullet often don't allow that.
I think Approval's simplicity makes up for its several disadvantages.
=
Rob LeGrand
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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liking Black because of its high incidence of
agreement with Condorcet and Borda. Example:
http://www.econ.kuleuven.ac.be/ew/admin/publications/DPS99/Dps9911.pdf
Besides meeting the Condorcet criterion, I don't think Black
has any advantage over Borda.
--
Rob LeGrand
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http
) gives the win to B with a score of 249 compared to the CW's
score of 204.
Good example, Forest. Thanks! Black beats it on SU anyway. Borda(wv) does
pick the CW almost all the time, though, just like Minmax (or Condorcet(EM))
almost always picks from the Smith set.
--
Rob LeGrand
[EMAIL PROTECTED
given sincere ballots, for whatever that's
worth.
Thanks for your responses, guys. Tell me what you think.
--
Rob LeGrand
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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Rob LeGrand
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, if a voting system would choose B, the A voters
would be punished by their approval cutoff choice. I think combining Condorcet
and Approval could certainly have merit, but surely it would be best to use
Approval to choose from the voted Smith set. Nice and simple.
=
Rob LeGrand
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http
to figure out a simple general formula, but here are my
results for up to 6 candidates:
candidates: 123456
possible ballots:13 13 75 541 4683
=
Rob LeGrand
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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: A B C
3:AB=C A 3 6
3:A=BC B 2 5
3:CA=B C 5 3
Dodgson(m) and Dodgson(wv) pick A, the Condorcet winner, but Dodgson(av) picks
B, as do beatpath(av) and minmax(av).
=
Rob LeGrand
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http
, and I certainly admire his careful criterion-based approach.
There are a lot of really smart people on this list. It's a shame mutual
respect isn't more apparent. By the way, any women here?!? :)
Keep those ballots rollin' in!
=
Rob LeGrand
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.aggies.org/honky98
good method. But I
don't see any important advantages for it over Path Voting.
=
Rob LeGrand
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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When you vote in the voting systems poll, post your ballot, and
also Cc: it directly to Rob LeGrand.
Yes, please send it to [EMAIL PROTECTED] But don't post it! (See below.)
Now that I'm assured that pairwise count methods will be counted,
the Voting Systems poll will be exactly like
:ID=E=KA=C=H=J=L=MB=F=G
where A through M are the choices in order. Let me know if you find an error
in my analysis.
=
Rob LeGrand
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Barring any more criticism or questions, I'll post the results soon.
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rts how "well"
each method did at giving the public what it wants.
I'd like to have my approach criticized before I post any results. Thanks!
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