On Tue, 19 Feb 2002, Adam Tarr wrote:
The problem with Webster and PAV is not its fairness in allocation, which
is arguably impeccable in the ideal, but rather its manipulability as
compared to d'Hondt. Since d'Hondt has a (very slight) bias toward larger
parties, it eliminates the
Forest wrote:
Suppose that we have a closed list method
and we want to know which order to fill the list's (eventual) quota. The
party could have a sequential PAV primary. Better yet use an open list
instead of a primary, and let sequential PAV decide the order of filling
the quota.
This is an
Using d'Hondt's rule, this sort of offensive strategic manipulation
by clever vote-splitting appears to be impossible... it seems obvious
from playing with examples, although I'm having trouble coming up
with a clean way to explain it. So, it looks like d'Hondt might be
the better choice for
On Tue, 12 Feb 2002, Adam Tarr wrote:
(Side note: I'm almost
sure sequential and non-sequential PAV are equivalent if there is no
overlap in the votes between various voting factions.)
That's right!
As I mentioned, in some cases a pecking order is actually desirable.
Here's another
Adam wrote in part-
In list PR, the candidate lists for parties have to be formed well in
advance of the election. It would be very difficult for a party to foresee
a specific voting breakdown, and split their party into two or more parties
to take advantage of this.
---
D - Any historical
Forest Wrote:
n A and C
n B and C
51-n A only
49-n B only
As long as 2*n is greater than 51, the winning
combination is {A,C} in sequential PAV.
But when 2*n is not too much greater than 51 [up until 65],
the winning combination is still {A,B} in regular PAV.
So I was wrong... good
On Wed, 6 Feb 2002, Adam Tarr wrote:
I _think_ I follow what you are saying. What I am arguing (perhaps
incorrectly!) is that my method of iteratively electing and removing candidates
is exactly equivalent to trying to maximize the PAV score of an entire set of
candidates. That is,
A supplement --
Each political party and independents as a group might be deemed to be
choices in a separate vote.
If any of them get a Droop Quota, then it would get at least 1 seat in the
legislative body.
The math only for the party (independents) involved might be used to
determine
I wrote and Forest responded:
It seems to me that rather than talking about satisfaction points it
makes more sense to decay the value of the ballots that voted for a
winner. The effect is the same, it just makes more sense by my way of
thinking. For example, if we wanted to use
On Mon, 4 Feb 2002, Adam Tarr wrote (among other words):
I think that it is worth comparing methods that do not require ranked
ballots and methods that do require ranked ballots on separate
planes. Since methods that do not require ranked ballots tend to be very
easy to implement,
First, as for the comparison between Plurality Approval,
Plurality has no advantage in that comparison. Approval is Plurality
with an added voter freedom, Plurality done right.
I don't want to say this too often here, but I often compare
Approval to a reliable sound handtool. Rank methods
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